Gabriela Rossi

Pontificia Universidad Católica de Valparaíso
Universidad Catolica de Valparaiso
  •  2
    Presentación
    with E. Joaquín Suárez-Ruiz and Ana Palazzo
    Cuadernos Filosóficos / Segunda Época 20. 2023.
    Presentación del Dossier 'Perspectivas aristotélicas contemporáneas'.
  •  1
    Presentación
    Síntesis Revista de Filosofía 1 (1): 1. 2018.
  •  3
    El Valor Del Estudio de la Filosofía Antigua (a Modo de Presentación)
    Síntesis Revista de Filosofía 1 (2): 1. 2018.
    En estas páginas ofrezco, en primer lugar, algunas con­sideraciones respecto del valor filo­sófico del estudio de la filosofía antigua, tanto en vista de los aspectos metodológicos y argu­mentati­vos desplegados por los textos de los filósofos antiguos, como en atención al contenido de estos tex­tos. En este último sentido, recojo algunas de las mu­chas instancias de rehabilitación de filósofos y doctri­nas antiguas que han tenido lugar a lo largo de los últimos decenios para poner de relieve có…Read more
  •  2
    Racionalidad en el pensamiento Griego
    Anuario Filosófico 9-19. 2013.
    En esta presentación realizamos un breve balance de la importancia del estudio de la racionalidad en la filosofía antigua, y presentamos un sumario de cada uno de los artículos que integran el volumen, los cuales dan cuenta de un amplio abanico de cuestiones que se abren a partir de su temática central: desde aspectos lógico-semánticos que atañen a las bases de la racionalidad en Aristóteles, hasta aquellas concepciones ontológicas en que la racionalidad tiene un papel preponderante, como la par…Read more
  •  17
    A Method of Resolutions: Rereading NE 7.1, 1145b2–7
    Phronesis 67 (1): 27-61. 2021.
    This article is about the methodological remarks in Nicomachean Ethics 7.1, 1145b2–7, and the way they are carried out in the following chapters. I argue that the procedure therein described does not aim to establish consistency among a subset of endoxa, but to test and refine—by considering and resolving objections against them—endoxa that could enter into a nominal definition of continence and incontinence. The dialectical lineage of this discussion, if there is one, is to be found in the use …Read more
  •  7
    Las bases naturales de la virtud en aristóteles. Una lectura no naturalista
    Kriterion: Journal of Philosophy 61 (147): 723-746. 2020.
    RESUMEN Recientes intentos por conectar la ética y la biología aristotélicas marcan una suerte de continuidad entre el carácter de los animales no racionales y de los seres humanos, de modo tal que en la descripción de los caracteres de los animales no racionales puede identificarse el punto de partida biológico del propio ser humano en el desarrollo de su carácter moral. En este artículo, propongo señalar los límites de este tipo de lectura, ya que, entendida de cierto modo, ella implica una co…Read more
  •  10
    Sobre la función de las emociones en animales no racionales: explicaciones aristotélicas sin Aristóteles
    Anales Del Seminario de Historia de la Filosofía 36 (3): 595-615. 2019.
    El artículo propone poner a prueba la idea comúnmente admitida de que en la concepción aristotélica las emociones tienen una función o fin en el ámbito biológico. Me propongo probar que esta concepción sería más propia de otras posturas, como la tomista y la cartesiana, y especialmente de la darwiniana y neo-darwiniana. Tras presentar en la sección 2 el tipo de explicaciones teleológicas que Aristóteles admite y emplea en biología, analizo en la parte 3 la concepción de las emociones de Descarte…Read more
  •  18
    Este artículo trata el concepto aristotélico de azar, tal como se lo presenta en Física II 4-6. La sección central del artículo se concentra en el análisis de la definición aristotélica de azar y sus peculiaridades esenciales: el hecho de ser una causa accidental y el hecho de existir en el dominio de lo que es en vista de un fin. Según Rossi, ambas características corresponderían a un aspecto causal y a un aspecto no causal del azar. Por último, la autora también trata de mostrar la conexión es…Read more
  •  19
    Lo que es por accidente y sus diversas causas en Metafísica E de Aristóteles
    Eidos: Revista de Filosofía de la Universidad Del Norte 28 190-217. 2018.
    Resumen: En Metafísica E 2 y 3 Aristóteles discute el problema de lo que es por accidente y sus causas, con el fin último de examinar si esto puede ser objeto de la filosofía primera. El resultado de esta discusión es, en este sentido, negativo. Sin embargo, la filosofía primera tiene algo que decir acerca del accidente, aunque solo sea mediante un discurso de segundo orden. La naturaleza de lo accidental es así explorada en estas páginas de la Metafísica para confirmar la imposibilidad de un es…Read more
  •  45
    Aristotle on the Indetermination of Accidental Causes and Chance
    Journal of Philosophical Research 43 223-240. 2018.
    This article offers an interpretation of Aristotle’s tenet that chance and accidental causes are indeterminate. According to one existing reading, the predicate ‘indeterminate’ is said of the effect of chance, meaning ‘causally indeterminate.’ Another reading claims instead that the predicate ‘indeterminate’ is said of the cause of a chance event, meaning something close to ‘potentially infinite in number.’ For my part, I contend that the predicate ‘indeterminate,’ when applied to Aristotle’s co…Read more
  •  16
    Aristotle on the Indetermination of Accidental Causes and Chance
    Journal of Philosophical Research 43 223-240. 2018.
    This article offers an interpretation of Aristotle’s tenet that chance and accidental causes are indeterminate. According to one existing reading, the predicate ‘indeterminate’ is said of the effect of chance (and of accidental causes), meaning ‘causally indeterminate.’ Another reading claims instead that the predicate ‘indeterminate’ is said of the cause of a chance event, meaning something close to ‘potentially infinite in number.’ For my part, I contend that the predicate ‘indeterminate,’ whe…Read more
  •  22
    The papers included in this book explore various aspects of the relation between nature and practical normativity in Antiquity, from the Presocratic period to Neoplatonism. Leaving aside the question how much of contemporary naturalism is present in Ancient Philosophy, and whether that much is sufficient for finding traces of it in ancient naturalism, one may still ask the historical question of whether or not this is a feature that all ancient ethics share. To this effect, the following pages o…Read more
  •  1233
    Recently, a strong hylomorphic reading of Aristotelian emotions has been put forward, one that allegedly eliminates the problem of causal interaction between soul and body. Taking the presentation of emotions in de An. I 1 as a starting point and basic thread, but relying also on the discussion of Rh. II, I will argue that this reading only takes into account two of the four causes of emotions, and that, if all four of them are included into the picture, then a causal interaction of mind and bod…Read more
  • In Physica I,8 Aristotle endeavors to show that a long-term Eleatic puzzle about coming-to-be can be resolved by appealing to his own ontological principles of change (substratum, privation, and form). In this paper, I posit that the key to Aristotle’s resolution lies in the introduction of aspectual distinctions within numerical unities. These distinctions within the terminus a quo and the terminus as quem of coming-to-be made it possible for Aristotle to maintain, while answering the puzzle, t…Read more
  •  25
    The article analyzes the relation between practical normativity and nature focusing on the classical locus NE II 1, 1103a18-26, where Aristotle expressly considers the relation of nature to excellence of character. I argue that in Aristotle neither is practical normativity necessarily grounded on any kind of natural normativity, nor is nature is to be conceived of as being for the sake of human ends. The article deals, to a large extent, precisely with the limits and intersections between these …Read more
  •  29
    Algunas notas sobre la discusión con los eléatas en Física I de Aristóteles
    Tópicos: Revista de Filosofía 20 (1): 137-159. 2001.
    The purpose of this paper is to illustrate the role of some peculiar elements of Aristotle's dialectical development —namely, those emerging in the Sophistical Refutations (SE)— in the analysis and discussion of the Eleatic thesis in Physics I, 2-3. The paper adresses some of Aristotle's preliminary thoughts (Phys. I, 2) (which are read as methodological considerations), and some remarks against Melissus' argument (Phys. I, 3), in order to find connections between such claims and passages of SE,…Read more
  •  477
    This paper deals with Aristotle’s concept of chance, such as it is presented in Physics II 4-6. The central section of the article concentrates on an analysis of Aristotle’s definition of chance and its essential peculiarities: the fact of being an incidental (efficient) cause and the fact of existing in the domain of what is for the sake of an end. According to Rossi, both characteristics would correspond to a causal aspect (in an incidental sense) and to a non causal aspect (or just apparently…Read more
  •  396
    ¿Retórica O Verdad? La “tercera Vía” De Platón
    Revista Latinoamericana de Filosofia 29 (2): 285-316. 2003.
    This paper deals with Plato’s theoretical views on rhetoric, its value, its conditions, and its genuine ethical-political function. My goal is to show that, even from the theoretical and/or metarhetorical point of view (Gorgias and Phaedrus), Plato would admit the practice of arguing from probabilities (eikós) and opinions, and would accept as a legitimate part of rhetoric –in order to persuade the mob– devices such as appeals to emotion. As it is well known, concrete uses of these devices can …Read more
  • Going through aporiai
    Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 52 209-256. 2017.
    This paper challenges a widespread reading of Aristotle’s use of dialectic in the treatment of aporiai. According to this reading, the search for a resolution of an aporia is supposed to proceed by arguing against conflicting theses to refute one of them. I argue that this reading is not satisfactory and propose an alternative, based on an often overlooked distinction between two dialectical procedures, the refutation (elenchos) of a thesis and the resolution (lysis) of an argument. These two te…Read more
  •  34
    The article examines Aristotle’s two attempts to explain the phenomena of voluntary and involuntary actions: Eudemian Ethics (EE) II 6-9 and Nicomachean Ethics (EN) III 1. Though there are notorious coincidences, there are also substantial differences between them in the characterization of involuntary actions, in the general argumentative strategy, and in the definition of voluntary actions. The paper endeavors to account for these material differences on the basis of the general methodological…Read more
  •  47
    En el artículo se examinan los dos intentos de Aristóteles por explicar el fenómeno de las acciones voluntarias e involuntarias: Ética Eudemia (EE) II 6-9 y Ética Nicomaquea (EN) III 1. Entre ambos tratamientos hay muchas coincidencias, pero también diferencias sustantivas, tanto en la caracterización de las acciones involuntarias como en la estrategia argumentativa general y la definición de lo voluntario. El artículo procura dar cuenta de dichas diferencias de contenido en función de la estrat…Read more
  •  481
    In this paper I address some aspects of the discussion of Aristotle against materialism. I take as a starting point the inaugural sentence of Phys. 2.4, where Aristotle refers to the endoxon that there are things which are (einai), and things which become or are generated (gignesthai) by chance. In the first place, I show that Aristotle would have ascribed to the materialists (especially Empedocles) the opinion that things like animals and plants can be (and not only become) by chance. I shall a…Read more
  •  373
    The text of Physics 2.8 has been recently interpreted so as to restore the reading that Aristotle holds an external, and even an anthropocentric, natural teleology. This reading has been defended by D. Furley, and especially by D. Sedley. In this paper I present several arguments against this interpretation of the text. Thus, I will argue that Aristotle does not claim, in this chapter, that it rains for the sake of the growing of the crop, against an opinion which is currently somewhat extended …Read more
  •  80
    This work is the first monograph devoted to the interpretation of Aristotle’s theory of chance in Physics II 4-6 and its implications and projections in other treatises, including an original and comprehensive account of the Aristotelian conception of chance, of accidental causality in the realm of nature, and of accidental causality in the realm of human action. One of the main interpretative issues around Aristotle’s discussion of chance is its relation to the four causes and to teleology. In…Read more