• The Self?
    Wiley. 2009.
    This collection of philosophical papers reflects on the existence and nature of the self. A collection of philosophical papers devoted to the subject of the self. Reflects on key questions about the existence and nature of the self. Comprises contributions from leading authorities in the field: Barry Dainton, Ingmar Persson, Marya Schechtman, Galen Strawson, Bas van Fraassen, and Peter van Inwagen.
  •  14
    The mechanism—the secret—of the given
    Synthese 1-20. forthcoming.
    There is, of course, The Given: what is given in experience. The ‘Myth Of The Given’ is just a wrong answer to the question ‘What is given?’ This paper offers a brief sketch of three possible right answers. It examines an early account by Charles Augustus Strong of why The Myth is a myth. It maintains that a natural and naturalistic version of empiricism is compatible with the fact that the Myth is a myth. It gives proper place to enactivist considerations. It is ) broadly in line with the Sella…Read more
  •  3
    The Impossibility of Moral Responsibility
    In Gary Watson (ed.), Free Will, Oxford University Press. 2003.
  •  158
    Replies to Noam Chomsky, Pierre Jacob, Michael Smith, and Paul Snowdon Mind and World
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (2): 461. 1998.
  •  1
    Selves
    In B. McLaughlin & A. Beckermann (eds.), The Oxford handbook of philosophy of mind, . pp. 541-564. 2009.
  •  1609
    Realistic monism: why physicalism entails panpsychism
    In A. Freeman (ed.), Consciousness and its place in nature: does physicalism entail panpsychism?, . pp. 3-31. 2006.
  •  36
    Realistic monism: why physicalism entails panpsychism, and on the sesmet theory of subjectivity
    In D. Skrbina (ed.), Mind that abides: panpsychism in the new millennium., . pp. 33-65. 2009.
  •  5
    Book review of 'The ethics of memory' by A. Margalit.
  •  307
    This version of this paper has been superseded by a substantially revised version in G. Strawson, Real Materialism and Other Essays (OUP 2008) I take 'content' in a natural internalist way to refer to occurrent mental content. I introduce a 'thin' or ‘live’ notion of the subject according to which a subject of experience cannot exist unless there is an experience for it to be the subject of. I then argue, first, that in the case of a particular experience E, its content C, and its (thin) subje…Read more
  •  33
    Panpsychism? Reply to commentators, with a celebration of Descartes
    In A. Freeman (ed.), Consciousness and its place in nature: does physicalism entail panpsychism?, . 2006.
    Reply to commentators on the paper 'Realistic monism: why physicalism entails panpsychism'
  •  3
    Freedom and Belief
    Philosophical Quarterly 38 (153): 533-535. 1988.
  •  172
    Why I have no future
    The Philosophers' Magazine 38 (38): 21-26. 2007.
  •  45
    Underestimating the Physical
    Journal of Consciousness Studies 26 (9-10): 228-240. 2019.
    Many hold that (1) consciousness poses a uniquely hard problem. Why is this so? Chalmers considers 12 main answers in 'The Meta-Problem of Consciousness'. This paper focuses on number 11, and is principally addressed to those who endorse (1) because they think that (2) consciousness can't possibly be physical. It argues that to hold (2) is to make the mistake of underestimating the physical, and that almost all who make this mistake do so because they think they know more about the physical than…Read more
  •  23
    Conceivability and the Silence of Physics
    Journal of Consciousness Studies 24 (11-12): 167-192. 2017.
    According to the ‘conceivability argument’ [1] it’s conceivable that a conscious human being H may have a perfect physical duplicate H* who isn’t conscious, [2] whatever is conceivable is possible, therefore [3] H* may possibly exist. This paper argues that the conceivability argument can’t help in discussion of the ‘mind–body problem’ even if [2] is allowed to be true. This is not because [1] is false, but because we don’t and can’t know enough about the nature of the physical to know whether o…Read more
  •  4
    Narrative Bypassing
    Journal of Consciousness Studies 23 (1-2): 125-139. 2016.
    In his target paper, John Welwood tells us that we have to beware of 'spiritual bypassing -- using spiritual ideas and practices to sidestep personal, emotional -- unfinished business--, to shore up a shaky sense of self, or to belittle basic needs, feelings, and develop-mental tasks, all in the name of enlightenment'. It's arguable that there is an equal danger of 'narrative bypassing' -- using the idea of one's life as a narrative to 'sidestep personal, emotional --unfinished business--, to sh…Read more
  •  4
    Does space go on for ever?
    Thinking: The Journal of Philosophy for Children 1 (2): 35-36. 1979.
  •  63
    The Self
    Wiley-Blackwell. 2005.
    This collection of philosophical papers reflects on the existence and nature of the self. A collection of philosophical papers devoted to the subject of the self. Reflects on key questions about the existence and nature of the self. Comprises contributions from leading authorities in the field: Barry Dainton, Ingmar Persson, Marya Schechtman, Galen Strawson, Bas van Fraassen, and Peter van Inwagen
  •  9
    In this revised and updated edition of The Secret Connexion, Galen Strawson explores one of the most discussed subjects in all philosophy: David Hume's work on causation. Strawson challenges the standard view of Hume, according to which he thinks that there is no such thing as causal influence, and that there is nothing more to causation than things of one kind regularly following things things of another kind. He argues that Hume does believe in causal influence, but insists that we cannot know…Read more
  •  81
    In metaphysics, the adjective ‘Humean’ is standardly used to describe positions that deny the existence of any necessary connection or causal influence in concrete reality. This usage has been significantly reinforced by David Lewis’s employment of ‘Humean’ in the phrase ‘Humean supervenience’. It is, however, most unclear that this usage is appropriate, and Lewis himself raised a doubt about it
  •  74
    Realistic materialism
    In Louise M. Antony & Norbert Hornstein (eds.), Chomsky and His Critics, Blackwell. 2003.