Garrett Cullity

The circumstances that create the need for humanitarian action are rarely morally neutral. The extremes of deprivation and want that demand a humanitarian response are often themselves directly caused by acts of war, persecution or misgovernment. And even when the direct causes lie elsewhere—when suffering and loss are caused by natural disaster, endemic disease or poverty of natural resources—the explanations of why some people are afflicted, and not others, are not morally neutral. It is those without economic or political power who starve in famines, those who inhabit the most marginal areas who are killed by floods and landslides, those without access to basic education and health care who die from easily preventable diseases. The societies in which these things can happen are unjust, and the injustice of disempowerment is both itself one of the universal afflictions of poverty and a condition of its many other vulnerabilities

What is the relation between moral reasons and reasons of “political necessity”? Does the authority of morality extend across political decision-making; or are there “reasons of state” which somehow either stand outside the reach of morality or override it, justifying actions that are morally wrong? This chapter argues that attempts to claim a contra-moral justification for political action typically suffer from a fundamental confusion – a confusion about the nature and expression of practical justification. The author aims to bring two new things to the debate. A first aim is to show how light can be shed on this issue by examining a question that philosophers have discussed in isolation from it: the question of the relationship between moral reasons and reasons pertaining to personal well-being. This gives us a better appreciation of the range of available views about the relation of the moral to the political; more importantly, it helps to explain the fundamental challenge to the idea that there could be contra-moral justification of political action. However, it also provides us with guidance for thinking about the ways in which that challenge might be answered. There is, after all, a case to be made for thinking that some political actions can be justified even though they remain morally wrong. And those actions are of great importance to national and international politics today.

This chapter examines the distinction that is sometimes drawn between neutral and relative attributions of value. It asks whether a plausible interpretation can be found for claims about relative value; whether an interpretation can be found for claims about neutral value which best captures the thoughts that people express by using this distinction; whether the distinction can be used to produce a satisfactory way of formulating a relative-value consequentialist theory; and whether a theory of that kind is plausible. A positive answer is given to the first three questions, but a negative one to the fourth.

We have an argument for rejecting an iterative but not an aggregative approach to the life-saving analogy. This means that, while Chs 7–9 show that certain forms of personal spending are morally defensible, the life-saving analogy still supplies us with grounds for thinking that other forms of personal spending are not. Some of the main practical implications of the resulting view are spelled out. The resulting view is not puritanical, but is still demanding in the constraints it places on living a morally good life.

The final chapter explains the relationship between the two parts of the book: it explains how Part II has refuted the iterative argument for the Extreme Demand in Part I. It also explains the qualified nature of the conclusion that has been reached: it is a conclusion about the requirements of beneficence, not justice; and it is not the conclusion that morality can never demand extreme personal sacrifices. The implications for direct life-saving action are discussed, and the main strengths of the book’s argument are surveyed.

How far do the demands generated by the life-saving analogy extend? Although the requirement on me to give money to aid agencies is a requirement that I contribute to what we all ought to be doing, that does not mean that, when others are not complying, I am required to do no more than my ‘fair share’. Two further approaches to the life-saving analogy need to be considered: an iterative or an aggregative approach. A case can be given for favouring the iterative approach. But the conclusion to which this leads – the Extreme Demand – allows each of us to spend practically no time or money on sources of personal fulfilment.

How far can the argument against the Extreme Demand be extended? If living one kind of life, or pursuing one kind of good, is better than the alternatives in a significant enough way to ground requirements of beneficence on others to help me, it cannot be wrong for me to refuse to forgo it to help others. Moreover, there are some kinds of lives, and some kinds of goods, that are morally defensible even when there are alternatives that would be no worse for me. This generates neither an ultra-permissive nor an ultra-ascetic view.

Much of the work of aid agencies aims to prevent threats to life, rather than to save lives. And even when an aid agency’s activity does save life, it might be doubted whether my contribution to an agency’s pool of funds will itself benefit anyone significantly. However, whether or not that is true, an argument from the life-saving analogy will still support a collective requirement of beneficence on us as a group; and fairness will require me to contribute to discharging that requirement. The collective activity to which I should contribute includes both preventing threats and saving lives.

This chapter examines the distinction that is sometimes drawn between neutral and relative attributions of value. It asks whether a plausible interpretation can be found for claims about relative value, whether an interpretation can be found for claims about neutral value which best captures the thoughts that people express by using this distinction, whether the distinction can be used to produce a satisfactory way of formulating a relative-value consequentialist theory, and whether a theory of that kind is plausible. A positive answer is given to the first three questions, but a negative one to the fourth.

ABSTRACT Glen Pettigrove’s ‘What Virtue Adds to Value’ maintains that sometimes virtue is fundamental in the order of value, and that we should reject the general thesis that the value of our responses depends on their proportionality to the value of the objects toward which they are directed. He argues that this view is needed to account for the moral phenomena surrounding love, forgiveness and ambition. I object that his view is unable to explain the forms of discrimination that distinguish the good kinds of love, forgiveness and ambition from the bad ones; and that explaining this requires a version of the proportionality thesis he opposes.

There is a difference between acting with a probability of making a difference to who is harmed, and worsening someone’s prospect. This difference is relevant to debates about the ethics of offsetting, since it means that showing that emitting-and-offsetting has the first feature is not a way of showing that it has the second feature. In an earlier paper, we illustrate this difference with an example of a lottery in which you shake the bag from which a ball will be drawn to determine the identity of the person who will suffer a harm. Here, we reply to Stefansson and Willners’ criticism of that example, explaining how their reply makes a mistake about the point of the example.

A familiar part of ordinary moral thought is this idea: when other people are doing something worthwhile together, there is a reason for you to join in on the same terms as them. Morality does not tell you that you must always do this; but it exerts some pressure on you to join in. Suppose we take this idea seriously: just how should it be developed and applied? More particularly, just which groups and which actions are the ones with respect to which you have participatory moral reasons? And just when is it wrong not to join in? I present answers to these questions, and discuss the implications—including for joint action on a very large scale, like global efforts to address climate change or fight a pandemic.

ABSTRACT We have previously argued that there are forms of greenhouse gas offsetting for which, when one emits and offsets, one imposes no risk. Orri Stefansson objects that our argument fails to distinguish properly between the people who stand to be harmed by one’s emissions and the people who stand to be benefited by one’s offsetting. We reply by emphasizing the difference between acting with a probability of making a difference to the distribution of harm and acting in a way that worsen’s someone’s prospect.