•  1
    Australasian Philosophical Review 4 (4): 289-292. 2020.
  •  13
    Moral Disagreement, Self-Trust, and Complacency
    Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 1-15. forthcoming.
    For many of the moral beliefs we hold, we know that other people hold moral beliefs that contradict them. If you think that moral beliefs can be correct or incorrect, what difference should your awareness of others’ disagreement make to your conviction that you, and not those who think otherwise, have the correct belief? Are there circumstances in which an awareness of others’ disagreement should lead you to suspend a moral belief? If so, what are they, and why? This paper argues that three prin…Read more
  •  11
    Liberty, Security, and Fairness
    The Journal of Ethics 25 (2): 141-159. 2021.
    What constraints should be imposed on individual liberty for the sake of protecting our collective security? A helpful approach to answering this question is offered by a theory that grounds political obligation and authority in a moral requirement of fair contribution to mutually beneficial cooperative schemes. This approach encourages us to split the opening question into two—a question of correctness and a question of legitimacy—and generates a detailed set of answers to both subsidiary quest…Read more
  •  5
    Suppose you perform two actions. The first imposes a risk of harm that, on its own, would be excessive; but the second reduces the risk of harm by a corresponding amount. By pairing the two actions together to form a set of actions that is risk-neutral, can you thereby make your overall course of conduct permissible? This question is theoretically interesting, because the answer is apparently: sometimes Yes, sometimes No. It is also practically important, because it bears on the moral status of …Read more
  •  6
    Thinking How to Live
    Philosophical Quarterly 57 (227): 308-311. 2007.
  •  9
    Free riding
    In Hugh LaFollette (ed.), International Encyclopedia of Ethics, Wiley. pp. 2220-227. 2013.
    “Free riding,” used as a descriptive term, refers to taking a jointly produced benefit without contributing towards its production. Used as a term of criticism, it refers to the wrongful failure to contribute towards the joint production of benefits that one receives. On either usage, the central interest of moral philosophy in free riding is the same: to specify the conditions under which not contributing towards the joint production of benefits that one receives is wrong, and to explain why.
  •  6
    Aid, Ethics of
    In Hugh LaFollette (ed.), International Encyclopedia of Ethics, Wiley. pp. 178-184. 2013.
    Aid, in the sense of coordinated, voluntary material assistance provided by well‐off groups to address the needs of the less well off, can be divided into two broad categories.
  •  4
    In Hugh LaFollette (ed.), International Encyclopedia of Ethics, Wiley. pp. 2560-2566. 2013.
    Impartiality is primarily a feature of normative or evaluative deliberation – deliberation about what ought to be done or about something's goodness or badness. An initial description is this: such deliberation is impartial when it is not unduly influenced by the deliberator's own interests, preferences, or loyalties. Derivatively, impartiality can be attributed to actions that are guided by deliberation with this feature, or persons who characteristically deliberate or act in this way.
  •  3
    In Hugh LaFollette (ed.), International Encyclopedia of Ethics, Wiley. pp. 738-744. 2013.
    In the tradition of Western ethical thought, “charity” refers to two ideas. Although now distinguishable, they are historically connected. The first is an attitude: the attitude of selfless love which is treated in the Christian tradition as the most fundamental of the virtues. The second is a kind of action: the action of rendering material assistance to those who need it. Derivative from this second idea is the current use of “a charity” to refer to an organization through which such assistanc…Read more
  •  3
    The Limits of Kindness, by Caspar Hare: Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013, pp. xi + 229, £25.00 (review)
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy 92 (4): 791-794. 2014.
  •  29
    Climate Harms
    The Monist 102 (1): 22-41. 2019.
    How should we think of the relationship between the climate harms that people will suffer in the future and our current emissions activity? Who does the harming, and what are the moral implications? One way to address these questions appeals to facts about the expected harm associated with one’s own individual energy-consuming activity, and argues that it is morally wrong not to offset one’s own personal carbon emissions. The first half of the article questions the strength of this argument. The…Read more
  •  1
    Book ReviewsElijah Millgram
    Ethics 119 (3): 581-585. 2009.
  •  29
    Demandingness, 'ought', and self-shaping
    In Marcel van Ackeren & Michael Kühler (eds.), The Limits of Moral Obligation, Routledge. 2016.
    Garrett Cullity.
  •  58
    Exceptions in Nonderivative Value
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 98 (1): 26-49. 2019.
    According to most substantive axiological theories – theories telling us which things are good and bad – pleasure is nonderivatively good. This seems to imply that it is always good, even when directed towards a bad object, such as another person’s suffering. This implication is accepted by the Mainstream View about misdirected pleasures: it holds that when someone takes pleasure in another person’s suffering, his being pleased is good, although his being pleased by suffering is bad. This view g…Read more
  •  9
    The Moral Demands of Affluence
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (2): 475-483. 2007.
    Garrett Cullity.
  • Ethics and Practical Reason
    with Berys Gaut
    Mind 108 (431): 570-575. 1999.
  •  31
    International Aid and the Scope of Kindness
    Ethics 105 (1): 99-127. 1994.
    Garrett Cullity
  •  181
    Ethics and Practical Reason (edited book)
    with Berys Gaut
    Oxford University Press. 1997.
    These thirteen new, specially written essays by a distinguished international line-up of contributors, including some leading contemporary moral philosophers, give a rich and varied view of current work on ethics and practical reason. The three main perspectives on the topic, Kantian, Humean, and Aristotelian, are all well represented. Issues covered include: the connection between reason and motivation; the source of moral reasons and their relation to reasons of self-interest; the relation of …Read more
  •  32
    Conference on ethics and practical reason
    with Berys Gaut
    Journal of Value Inquiry 30 (4): 573-577. 1996.
  •  23
    Garrett Cullity.
  •  87
    Stupid Goodness
    In Karen Jones & Francois Schroeter (eds.), The Many Moral Rationalisms, Oxford University Press. 2020.
    In Paradise Lost, Satan’s first sight of Eve in Eden renders him “Stupidly good”: his state is one of admirable yet inarticulate responsiveness to reasons. Turning from fiction to real life, I argue that this is an important moral phenomenon, but one that has limits. The essay examines three questions about the relation between having a reason and saying what it is – between normativity and articulacy. Is it possible to have and respond to morally relevant reasons without being able to articulat…Read more
  •  158
    Weighing reasons
    In Daniel Star (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity, Oxford University Press. 2019.
    What is involved in weighing normative reasons against each other? One attractive answer offers us the following Simple Picture: a fact is a reason for action when it bears to an action the normative relation of counting in its favour; this relation comes in different strengths or weights; the weights of the reasons for and against an action can be summed; the reasons for performing the action are sufficient when no other action is more strongly supported, overall; the reasons are decisive when …Read more
  •  204
    Moral Virtues and Responsiveness for Reasons
    In Stewart Braun & Noell Birondo (eds.), Virtue's Reasons: New Essays on Virtue, Character, and Reasons, Routledge. pp. 11-31. 2017.
    Moral discourse contains judgements of two prominent kinds. It contains deontic judgements about rightness and wrongness, obligation and duty, and what a person ought to do. As I understand them, these deontic judgements are normative: they express conclusions about the bearing of normative reasons on the actions and other responses that are available to us. And it contains evaluative judgements about goodness and badness. Prominent among these are the judgements that evaluate the quality of our…Read more
  •  193
    The circumstances that create the need for humanitarian action are rarely morally neutral. The extremes of deprivation and want that demand a humanitarian response are often themselves directly caused by acts of war, persecution or misgovernment. And even when the direct causes lie elsewhere—when suffering and loss are caused by natural disaster, endemic disease or poverty of natural resources—the explanations of why some people are afflicted, and not others, are not morally neutral. It is those…Read more
  •  32
    Concern, Respect, and Cooperation
    Oxford University Press. 2018.
    Three things often recognized as central to morality are concern for others’ welfare, respect for their self-expression, and cooperation in worthwhile collective activity. When philosophers have proposed theories of the substance of morality, they have typically looked to one of these three sources to provide a single, fundamental principle of morality – or they have tried to formulate a master-principle for morality that combines these three ideas in some way. This book views them instead as th…Read more
  •  148
    Public goods and fairness
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (1). 2008.
    To what extent can we as a community legitimately require individuals to contribute to producing public goods? Most of us think that, at least sometimes, refusing to pay for a public good that you have enjoyed can involve a kind of 'free riding' that makes it wrong. But what is less clear is under exactly which circumstances this is wrong. To work out the answer to that, we need to know why it is wrong. I argue that when free riding is wrong, the reason is that it is unfair. That is not itself a…Read more