•  7
    Token reflexivity and logic
    Semiotica 2021 (240): 241-259. 2021.
    Token-reflexive theories of indexicals – words like ‘I,’ ‘here,’ and ‘today’ – are widely thought to face a problem in account for intuitively valid arguments involving indexicals. Yet all discussions of the problem with which I am familiar focus on particular examples or on particular rules of inference. In this paper, I first state the problem in its full generality, and then argue that two recent attempts to reject the problem fail. Finally, I consider the proposal by García-Carpintero that d…Read more
  •  17
    Demonstratives in First-Order Logic
    In Tadeusz Ciecierski & Pawel Grabarczyk (eds.), The Architecture of Context and Context-Sensitivity, Springer. pp. 125-148. 2020.
    In an earlier defense of the view that the fundamental logical properties of logical truth and logical consequence obtain or fail to obtain only relative to contexts, I focused on a variation of Kaplan’s own modal logic of indexicals. In this paper, I state a semantics and sketch a system of proof for a first-order logic of demonstratives, and sketch proofs of soundness and completeness. (I omit details for readability.) That these results obtain for the first-order logic of demonstratives shows…Read more
  •  27
    Contexts and Constraints on Use
    Wiley: Theoria 87 (1): 136-151. 2021.
    Theoria, Volume 87, Issue 1, Page 136-151, February 2021.
  •  74
    Propositions, representation, and truth
    Synthese 196 (3): 1019-1043. 2019.
    Theories of propositions as sets of truth-supporting circumstances are committed to the thesis that sentences or other representations true in all and only the same circumstances express the same proposition. Theories of propositions as complex, structured entities are not committed to this thesis. As a result, structured propositions can play a role in our theories of language and thought that sets of truth-supporting circumstances cannot play. To illustrate this difference, I sketch a theory o…Read more
  •  53
    On being called something
    Linguistics and Philosophy 40 (6): 595-619. 2017.
    Building on recent work by Delia Graff Fara and Ora Matushansky on appellative constructions like ‘Mirka called Roger handsome’, I argue that if Millianism about proper names is true, then the quantifier ‘something’ in ‘Mirka called Roger something’ is best understood as a kind of substitutional quantifier. Any adequate semantics for such quantifiers must explain both the logical behavior of ‘Mirka called Roger something’ and the acceptability of ‘so’-anaphora in ‘Mirka called Roger something, a…Read more
  •  50
    Demonstratives and Indexicals
    Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 2015.
    Demonstratives and Indexicals In the philosophy of language, an indexical is any expression whose content varies from one context of use to another. The standard list of indexicals includes pronouns such as “I”, “you”, “he”, “she”, “it”, “this”, “that”, plus adverbs such as “now”, “then”, “today”, “yesterday”, “here”, and “actually”. Other candidates include the tenses … Continue reading Demonstratives and Indexicals →.
  •  82
    A propositional semantics for substitutional quantification
    Philosophical Studies 172 (5): 1183-1200. 2015.
    The standard truth-conditional semantics for substitutional quantification, due to Saul Kripke, does not specify what proposition is expressed by sentences containing the particular substitutional quantifier. In this paper, I propose an alternative semantics for substitutional quantification that does. The key to this semantics is identifying an appropriate propositional function to serve as the content of a bound occurrence of a formula containing a free substitutional variable. I apply this se…Read more
  •  64
    Logic for Languages Containing Referentially Promiscuous Expressions
    Journal of Philosophical Logic 44 (4): 429-451. 2015.
    Some expressions of English, like the demonstratives ‘this’ and ‘that’, are referentially promiscuous: distinct free occurrences of them in the same sentence can differ in content relative to the same context. One lesson of referentially promiscuous expressions is that basic logical properties like validity and logical truth obtain or fail to obtain only relative to a context. This approach to logic can be developed in just as rigorous a manner as David Kaplan’s classic logic of demonstratives. …Read more
  •  2
    Reference and Ambiguity in Complex Demonstratives
    In William P. Kabasenche, Michael O'Rourke & Matthew H. Slater (eds.), Reference and Referring: Topics in Contemporary Philosophy, Volume 10, Mit Press. pp. 357-384. 2012.
  •  69
    Philosophy of Language: An Introduction, by Chris Daly (review)
    Teaching Philosophy 38 (2): 237-239. 2015.