George Aulisio

Property dualism [PD], when adopted by physicalists, is the view that mental properties are irreducible and joined to the physical. Many property dualists who subscribe to physicalism hold epiphenomenalism—the view that the mind does not have a causal role in affecting physical events (e.g., bodily movements).1 In this paper, I examine two possible origins of mental properties and the entailments of those origins if one is committed to physicalism. First, mental properties have a generative origin (e.g., emergence, neurophysiological, etc.). Second, mental properties are fundamental. If mental properties have generative origins, then physicalism has an epistemological problem. Namely, if physical facts determine all mental facts, then we have exceedingly little evidence to favor the widespread existence of epiphenomenal minds over philosophers’ zombies.2 Briefly, the self has mental properties, but the irreducibility of mental properties and their causal inefficacy means that we cannot know the mental status of others. Whereas to claim mental properties as fundamental could entail panpsychism (or proto-panpsychism) and no physicalist method to determine what possesses mental properties. Fundamental mental properties entail the possibility of widespread epiphenomenal minds and the possession of mental properties by unexpected entities so that all biological material and some inanimate objects may have a near equal claim to possessing mental properties.

In the Optics, Descartes claims that telescopes and microscopes lead to morally certain knowledge. It is unclear, however, that Descartes’s expressed confidence in these instruments is warranted. In this article, I show how a limited range of telescope and microscope observations could lead to morally certain knowledge for Descartes, and how observations beyond this range admit of enough reasonable doubt to undermine moral certainty. I also explain moral certainty as a form of knowledge in Descartes’s scientific practices, his epistemic commitment to optical instruments, and I offer an explanation for why Descartes never used optical instruments in his scientific endeavours. ---- Dans la Dioptrique, Descartes prétend que les télescopes et les microscopes donnent accès à des connaissances moralement certaines. Cependant, il n’est pas certain que la confiance accordée par Descartes à ces instruments soit justifiée. Dans cet article, je montre comment une gamme limitée d’observations effectuées à l’aide d’instruments d’optique pourraient mener aux connaissances moralement certaines pour Descartes, et comment d’autres observations allant au-delà de cette gamme introduisent suffisamment de doute raisonnable pour saper cette certitude morale. Enfin, j’interprète la certitude morale comme une forme de connaissance dans l’empirisme de Descartes, j’explique son engagement épistémique envers les instruments d’optique, et j’éclaire les raisons pour lesquelles il n’a jamais employé d’instruments d’optique dans ses propres recherches scientifiques.

I show that Neo-Confucianism is practiced in two ways: (1) deontologically and (2) as a virtue ethical theory. When fully appreciated, Neo-Confucianism is a virtue ethical theory, but to set out on the path of the sage and behave like a junzi, Neo-Confucianism must first be practiced deontologically. I show this by examining the importance of Neo-Confucian metaphysics to ethical practice and by drawing out the major practical differences between “lesser learning” and “higher learning.” In my view, Neo-Confucianism can be practiced deontologically because some adherents may never move to practicing Neo-Confucianism as a virtue theory.

To the uninitiated, academic philosophy can be intimidating. Its extensive history (over two millennia) and seemingly all-encompassing breadth and depth of study makes knowing everything about philosophy impossible. Philosophers are fortunate because they are expected to specialize in specific areas, but librarians are not as fortunate. Librarians often have collection development responsibilities for a variety of academic disciplines. Collection development in philosophy can seem like a world unto itself in part because philosophical inquiry reaches into other academic disciplines. Amongst academic philosophers, there are different approaches or methodologies for doing philosophy, including eastern and western philosophy, as well as a divide between analytic and continental philosophers. In addition to growing the collection, the philosophy subject librarian may be called upon by philosophers and aspiring philosophers (i.e., students) for research assistance. To make matters more intimidating, philosophers seem to think and speak differently than others. The complex ideas and esoteric terminology that rarely finds its way outside of the philosophy classroom can make collection development, research services, and even simple faculty-to-librarian communication difficult. To succeed as a librarian subject specialist, you should work hard to develop an adequate understanding of the types of materials that are most valuable to your community. Cultivating this knowledge is critical because budgets are limited. This volume will help librarians thrust into the position of philosophy subject specialist to get up to speed and begin excelling in their new roles. The goal of this guide is to simplify collection development and research assistance for philosophy. To accomplish this, I will provide a brief overview of philosophy as a field and share the information you need to succeed in your role as the new philosophy selector. This volume will help to alleviate some of the communication barriers between philosophers and librarians and will provide practical advice, recommendations, and resources for building a strong philosophy collection.

To the uninitiated, academic philosophy can be intimidating. Its extensive history (over two millennia) and seemingly all-encompassing breadth and depth of study makes knowing everything about philosophy impossible. Philosophers are fortunate because they are expected to specialize in specific areas, but librarians are not as fortunate. Librarians often have collection development responsibilities for a variety of academic disciplines. Collection development in philosophy can seem like a world unto itself in part because philosophical inquiry reaches into other academic disciplines. Amongst academic philosophers, there are different approaches or methodologies for doing philosophy, including eastern and western philosophy, as well as a divide between analytic and continental philosophers. In addition to growing the collection, the philosophy subject librarian may be called upon by philosophers and aspiring philosophers (i.e., students) for research assistance. To make matters more intimidating, philosophers seem to think and speak differently than others. The complex ideas and esoteric terminology that rarely finds its way outside of the philosophy classroom can make collection development, research services, and even simple faculty-to-librarian communication difficult. To succeed as a librarian subject specialist, you should work hard to develop an adequate understanding of the types of materials that are most valuable to your community. Cultivating this knowledge is critical because budgets are limited. This volume will help librarians thrust into the position of philosophy subject specialist to get up to speed and begin excelling in their new roles. The goal of this guide is to simplify collection development and research assistance for philosophy. To accomplish this, I will provide a brief overview of philosophy as a field and share the information you need to succeed in your role as the new philosophy selector. This volume will help to alleviate some of the communication barriers between philosophers and librarians and will provide practical advice, recommendations, and resources for building a strong philosophy collection.