•  108
    This section is a discussion of Joseph Raz's Conception of Normativity introduced by Georgios Pavlakos
  •  74
    Practice, reasons, and the agent's point of view
    Ratio Juris 22 (1): 74-94. 2009.
    Positivism, in its standard outlook, is normative contextualism: If legal reasons are content-independent, then their content may vary with the context or point of view. Despite several advantages vis-à-vis strong metaphysical conceptions of reasons, contextualism implies relativism, which may lead further to the fragmentation of the point of view of agency. In his Oxford Hart Lecture, Coleman put forward a fresh account of the moral semantics of legal content, one that lays claim to preserving …Read more
  •  72
    Law being a derivative feature of reality, it exists in virtue of more fundamental things, upon which it depends. This raises the question of what is the relation of dependence that holds between law and its more basic determinants. The primary aim of this paper is to argue that grounding is that relation. We first make a positive case for this claim, and then we defend it from the potential objection that the relevant relation is rather rational determination (Greenberg 2004, 2006). Against thi…Read more
  •  39
    There exists a widespread consensus amongst contemporary jurisprudents, positivists and non-positivists alike, that the meaning of ‘obligation’ should not radically shift from law to morality, or any of the other domains of practical reason. Yet there is limited effort in contemporary discussions of legal obligation to engage with the metaphysics of normativity with an eye to a well-founded account of those elements that deliver its non-conditional character. On a recent occasion I discussed the…Read more
  •  30
    The argument from the claim to correctness has been put forward by Robert Alexy to defend the view that normative utterances admit of objective answers. My purpose in this paper is to preserve this initial aspiration even at the cost of diverting from some of the original ideas in support of the argument. I begin by spelling out a full-blooded version of normative cognitivism, against which I propose to reconstruct the argument from the claim to correctness. I argue that the context of uttering …Read more
  •  25
    Autonomy and Normativity: Investigations of Truth, Right and Beauty
    Review of Metaphysics 56 (4): 908-910. 2003.
    Truth, right, and beauty are normative. In other words, our theoretical, practical, and aesthetic judgements are founded only if they correspond to standards for truth, rightness, or beauty respectively. The book at hand is not primarily interested in the differences between kinds of normativity—in fact, it treats normativity in a more or less unified way—nor does it spend much time on listing criteria for truth, right, or beauty. Rather, its primary aim is to discover what metaphysical status a…Read more
  •  22
    Jurisprudence or Legal Science?: A Debate About the Nature of Legal Theory (edited book)
    with Sean Coyle
    Hart Publishing. 2005.
    Are the scientific and juristic approaches in the end as rigidly distinct from one another as some have claimed?In a series of important new essays the authors ...
  •  16
    Constitutional Rights, Balancing and the Structure of Autonomy
    Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 24 (1): 129-153. 2011.
    The question of the character of constitutional rights norms is complex and admits of no easy answer. Without reducing the complexity of the issue, I attempt in this paper to formulate some clear views on the matter. I shall argue that constitutional rights reasoning is a species of rational practical reasoning that combines both balancing and the grounds as to why balancing is appropriate . Absent the latter type of reason, the application of constitutional principles remains a pure instance of…Read more
  •  10
    Normativity versus Ontologiy: Law, Facts and Practical Reason
    Rechtstheorie 34 (4): 393-419. 2003.
  •  6
    In this paper I discuss critically Mathias Risse's paper “Responsibility and Global Justice.” First, I argue that for Risse's pluralist account of the grounds of justice to hold together, there is need to presuppose a monist standpoint which ultimately contributes to grounding principles of justice. Second, I point out that Risse's understanding of obligations of accountability and justification is rather narrow in that it functions as an addendum to obligations of justice. Conversely, I will su…Read more
  •  6
    Jurisprudence 7 (2): 297-298. 2016.
  •  5
    On Second-Order Morality
    Jurisprudence 6 (2): 276-297. 2015.
  •  3
  •  1
    David Daiches Raphael, Concepts of Justice Reviewed by
    Philosophy in Review 22 (4): 301-303. 2002.
  •  1
    Reasons and Intentions in Law and Practical Agency (edited book)
    Cambridge University Press. 2015.
    This collection of new essays explores in depth how and why we act when we follow practical standards, particularly in connection with the authority of legal texts and lawmakers. The essays focus on the interplay of intentions and practical reasons, engaging incisive arguments to demonstrate both the close connection between them, and the inadequacy of accounts that downplay this important link. Their wide-ranging discussion includes topics such as legal interpretation, the paradox of intention,…Read more
  • David Daiches Raphael, Concepts of Justice (review)
    Philosophy in Review 22 301-303. 2002.
  • Practical Normativity. Essays on Reasons and Intentions in Law and Practical Reason (edited book)
    with Veronica Rodriguez Blanco
    Cambridge University Press. 2015.
  • Jürgen Habermas, The Liberating Power of Symbols (review)
    Philosophy in Review 21 334-336. 2001.