•  31
    A Teacher's Life: Essays for Steven M. Cahn (edited book)
    Lexington Books. 2009.
    This is a collection of 13 essays honoring Steven Cahn, presented to him on the occasion of his 25th year as Professor of Philosophy at the City University of New York. The essays address issues concerning the teaching of philosophy, the responsibilities of professors, and the good life.
  •  6
    Teleology
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 38 (1): 136-137. 1977.
  •  112
    A Wild West of the Mind
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy 97 (3): 483-496. 2019.
    abstractThis paper addresses the relation between morality and private thought. It is widely agreed that government and society have no business trying to control our thoughts—that, as long as we d...
  •  7
    Women and Moral Theory
    with Eva Feder Kittay, Carol Gilligan, Annette C. Baier, Michael Stocker, Christina H. Sommers, Kathryn Pyne Addelson, Virginia Held, Thomas E. Hill Jr, Seyla Benhabib, Marilyn Friedman, Jonathan Adler, Sara Ruddick, Mary Fainsod, David D. Laitin, Lizbeth Hasse, and Sandra Harding
    Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. 1989.
    To find more information about Rowman and Littlefield titles, please visit www.rowmanlittlefield.com
  •  15
    You're Not Trying
    Journal of the American Philosophical Association 7 (3): 387-397. 2021.
    At one point or another, most of us have been accused of not trying our hardest, and most of us have leveled similar accusations at others. The disputes that result are often intractable and raise difficult questions about effort, ability, and will. This essay addresses some of these questions by examining six representative cases in which the accusation is leveled. The questions discussed include what trying one's hardest involves, and the conditions under which complaints about lack of effort …Read more
  •  41
    Debate: Taking Offense
    Journal of Political Philosophy 28 (3): 332-342. 2020.
    Journal of Political Philosophy, EarlyView.
  •  23
    The Ethics of Social Punishment: The Enforcement of Morality in Everyday Life
    with Linda Radzik, Christopher Bennett, and Glen Pettigrove
    Cambridge University Press. 2020.
    How do we punish others socially, and should we do so? In her 2018 Descartes Lectures for Tilburg University, Linda Radzik explores the informal methods ordinary people use to enforce moral norms, such as telling people off, boycotting businesses, and publicly shaming wrongdoers on social media. Over three lectures, Radzik develops an account of what social punishment is, why it is sometimes permissible, and when it must be withheld. She argues that the proper aim of social punishment is to put …Read more
  •  8
    Moral Thinking: Its Levels, Method, and Point
    Noûs 18 (1): 179-184. 1984.
  •  14
    Punishment as Societal Defense
    Philosophical and Phenomenological Research 59 (2): 548-550. 1999.
  •  28
    Confessions of a Quidnunc
    American Journal of Jurisprudence 63 (1): 49-61. 2018.
  • Me, You, Us: Essays
    Oup Usa. 2017.
    Me, You, Us addresses a range of issues in moral and political philosophy and moral psychology, but are unified by their starkly individualistic view of the moral subject. They challenge recent tendencies to conceptualize normative issues in terms of relationships, collectivities, and social meanings.
  •  37
    Utilitarianism: And the 1868 Speech on Capital Punishment (edited book)
    Hackett Publishing Company. 2001.
    This expanded edition of John Stuart Mill's _Utilitarianism_ includes the text of his 1868 speech to the British House of Commons defending the use of capital punishment in cases of aggravated murder. The speech is significant both because its topic remains timely and because its arguments illustrate the applicability of the principle of utility to questions of large-scale social policy.
  •  5
    The Utilitarianism (edited book)
    Hackett Publishing Company. 2001.
    This expanded edition of John Stuart Mill's _Utilitarianism_ includes the text of his 1868 speech to the British House of Commons defending the use of capital punishment in cases of aggravated murder. The speech is significant both because its topic remains timely and because its arguments illustrate the applicability of the principle of utility to questions of large-scale social policy.
  • Desert
    Ethics 101 (2): 409-411. 1991.
  • Reasons, Actions, and Determinism
    Dissertation, Columbia University. 1972.
  •  3
    Effort and imagination
    In Serena Olsaretti (ed.), Desert and Justice, Clarendon Press. pp. 205--217. 2003.
    Serena Olsaretti brings together new essays by leading moral and political philosophers on the nature of desert and justice, their relations with each other and with other values.
  •  11
    Health Care and the 'Deserving Poor'
    Hastings Center Report 13 (1): 9-12. 1983.
    The idea that some poor persons "deserve" to be helped while others do not has long been influential in the USA. In the nineteenth century, "paupers" were relegated to poorhouse and subjected to onerous conditions for relief, while the blind, the deaf-mute, and others were helped in much less humiliating ways. A similar distinction underlay the categories of the comprehensive social Security Act of 1935; and its continuation has motivated various attempts to revise the welfare system by redrawin…Read more
  •  32
    Armstrong and the interdependence of the mental
    Philosophical Quarterly 27 (July): 227-235. 1977.
  •  93
    Sentences in the brain
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 36 (September): 94-99. 1975.
  •  55
    Kripke, cartesian intuitions, and materialism
    Canadian Journal of Philosophy 7 (2): 227-38. 1977.
    In his influential “Naming and Necessity,” Saul Kripke has deployed a new sort of analytical apparatus in support of the classical Cartesian argument that minds and bodies must be distinct because they can be imagined separately. In the initial section of this paper, I shall first paraphrase Kripke's version of that argument, and then suggest a way in which even one who accepts all of its philosophical presuppositions may avoid its conclusion. In the second section, I shall defend this suggestio…Read more
  •  179
    Real-world luck egalitarianism
    Social Philosophy and Policy 27 (1): 218-232. 2010.
    Luck egalitarians maintain that inequalities are always unjust when they are due to luck, but are not always unjust when they are due to choices for which the parties are responsible. In this paper, I argue that the two halves of this formula do not fit neatly together, and that we arrive at one version of luck egalitarianism if we begin with the notion of luck and interpret responsible choice in terms of its absence, but a very different version if we begin with the notion of responsible choice…Read more
  •  30
    Predicting Performance
    Social Philosophy and Policy 5 (1): 188. 1987.
    Equal opportunity requires that persons be selected for desirable positions on the basis of their qualifications. To assess an applicant's qualifications, we must both predict how well he would perform if chosen, and compare his projected performance with that of his rivals. Since we lack direct access to future performance, all such predictions must be based on some past– or present-tense information about the applicants, together with some relevant supporting information. But is any and every …Read more
  •  83
    Blame for traits
    Noûs 35 (1). 2001.
  •  40
    My Profession and Its Duties
    The Monist 79 (4): 471-487. 1996.
    Much that is written about professional ethics concerns the requirements imposed by specific roles. We are often told what professionals such as doctors, lawyers, and teachers should do—or, alternatively, what a good doctor, lawyer, or teacher will do. In this paper, I shall try to clarify these claims as they pertain to one particular role—that of a faculty member at a college or university—by asking what special requirements the role imposes, and why faculty members are obligated to live up to…Read more
  •  30
    Antecedentialism
    Ethics 94 (1): 6-17. 1983.
  •  17
  •  29
    Why the past matters
    Philosophical Studies 43 (2). 1983.