•  33
    Debate: Taking Offense
    Journal of Political Philosophy 28 (3): 332-342. 2020.
    Journal of Political Philosophy, EarlyView.
  •  2
    How do we punish others socially, and should we do so? In her 2018 Descartes Lectures for Tilburg University, Linda Radzik explores the informal methods ordinary people use to enforce moral norms, such as telling people off, boycotting businesses, and publicly shaming wrongdoers on social media. Over three lectures, Radzik develops an account of what social punishment is, why it is sometimes permissible, and when it must be withheld. She argues that the proper aim of social punishment is to put …Read more
  •  7
    Moral Thinking: Its Levels, Method, and Point
    Noûs 18 (1): 179-184. 1984.
  •  11
    Punishment as Societal Defense
    Philosophical and Phenomenological Research 59 (2): 548-550. 1999.
  •  26
    Confessions of a Quidnunc
    American Journal of Jurisprudence 63 (1): 49-61. 2018.
  •  47
    Responsibility Matters.Retribution Reconsidered: More Essays in the Philosophy of Law.Desert
    with Michael J. Zimmerman, Peter A. French, and Jeffrie G. Murphy
    Noûs 29 (2): 248. 1995.
  • Me, You, Us: Essays
    Oup Usa. 2017.
    Me, You, Us addresses a range of issues in moral and political philosophy and moral psychology, but are unified by their starkly individualistic view of the moral subject. They challenge recent tendencies to conceptualize normative issues in terms of relationships, collectivities, and social meanings.
  •  3
    Utilitarianism: And the 1868 Speech on Capital Punishment (edited book)
    Hackett Publishing Company. 2002.
    This expanded edition of John Stuart Mill's _Utilitarianism_ includes the text of his 1868 speech to the British House of Commons defending the use of capital punishment in cases of aggravated murder. The speech is significant both because its topic remains timely and because its arguments illustrate the applicability of the principle of utility to questions of large-scale social policy.
  •  4
    The Utilitarianism (edited book)
    Hackett Publishing Company. 2002.
    This expanded edition of John Stuart Mill's _Utilitarianism_ includes the text of his 1868 speech to the British House of Commons defending the use of capital punishment in cases of aggravated murder. The speech is significant both because its topic remains timely and because its arguments illustrate the applicability of the principle of utility to questions of large-scale social policy.
  • Desert
    Ethics 101 (2): 409-411. 1991.
  • Desert
    Ethics 99 (2): 426-428. 1989.
  • Reasons, Actions, and Determinism
    Dissertation, Columbia University. 1972.
  • Marxist Humanism and Praxis
    Studies in Soviet Thought 25 (1): 42-44. 1983.
  •  2
    Effort and imagination
    In Serena Olsaretti (ed.), Desert and Justice, Clarendon Press. pp. 205--217. 2003.
    Serena Olsaretti brings together new essays by leading moral and political philosophers on the nature of desert and justice, their relations with each other and with other values.
  •  11
    Health Care and the 'Deserving Poor'
    Hastings Center Report 13 (1): 9-12. 1983.
    The idea that some poor persons "deserve" to be helped while others do not has long been influential in the USA. In the nineteenth century, "paupers" were relegated to poorhouse and subjected to onerous conditions for relief, while the blind, the deaf-mute, and others were helped in much less humiliating ways. A similar distinction underlay the categories of the comprehensive social Security Act of 1935; and its continuation has motivated various attempts to revise the welfare system by redrawin…Read more
  •  32
    Armstrong and the interdependence of the mental
    Philosophical Quarterly 27 (July): 227-235. 1977.
  •  93
    Sentences in the brain
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 36 (September): 94-99. 1975.
  •  52
    Kripke, cartesian intuitions, and materialism
    Canadian Journal of Philosophy 7 (2): 227-38. 1977.
    In his influential “Naming and Necessity,” Saul Kripke has deployed a new sort of analytical apparatus in support of the classical Cartesian argument that minds and bodies must be distinct because they can be imagined separately. In the initial section of this paper, I shall first paraphrase Kripke's version of that argument, and then suggest a way in which even one who accepts all of its philosophical presuppositions may avoid its conclusion. In the second section, I shall defend this suggestio…Read more
  • In this engaging and provocative book, Sher explores the normative moral and social problems that arise from living in a decidedly non-ideal world_a world that contains immorality, evil, and injustice, and in which resources are often inadequate. Sher confronts difficult issues surrounding preferential treatment and equal opportunity, compensatory justice and punishment, the allocation of goods, and moral compromise
  •  22
    Liberal Purposes by William A. Galston (review)
    Journal of Philosophy 90 (1): 49-52. 1993.
  •  2
    Perfectionism and Neutrality: Essays in Liberal Theory
    with Bruce Ackerman, Richard J. Arneson, Ronald W. Dworkin, Gerald F. Gaus, Kent Greenawalt, Vinit Haksar, Thomas Hurka, George Klosko, Charles Larmore, Stephen Macedo, Thomas Nagel, John Rawls, and Joseph Raz
    Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. 2003.
    Editors provide a substantive introduction to the history and theories of perfectionism and neutrality, expertly contextualizing the essays and making the collection accessible
  •  45
    Hare, abortion, and the golden rule
    Philosophy and Public Affairs 6 (2): 185-190. 1977.
  •  78
    Who Knew?: Responsiblity Without Awareness
    Oxford University Press USA. 2009.
    To be responsible for their acts, agents must both perform those acts voluntarily and in some sense know what they are doing. Of these requirements, the voluntariness condition has been much discussed, but the epistemic condition has received far less attention. In Who Knew? George Sher seeks to rectify that imbalance. The book is divided in two halves, the first of which criticizes a popular but inadequate way of understanding the epistemic condition, while the second seeks to develop a more ad…Read more
  •  165
    Diversity
    Philosophy and Public Affairs 28 (2): 85-104. 1999.
  •  14
    Reasons and intensionality
    Journal of Philosophy 66 (6): 164-168. 1969.