•  2
    Georges Rey presents a much-needed philosophical defense of Noam Chomsky's famous view of human language, as an internal, innate computational system. But he also offers a critical examination of problematic developments of this view, to do with innateness, ontology, intentionality, and other issues of interdisciplinary interest.
  •  2
    Blackwell Companion to Chomsky (edited book)
    Wiley-Blackwell. forthcoming.
  •  26
    Taking Consciousness Seriously-- as an Illusion
    Journal of Consciousness Studies 23 (11-12): 197-214. 2016.
    I supplement Frankish's defence of illusionism by pressing a point I've made elsewhere regarding how actual computational proposals in psychology for conscious processes could be run on desktop computers that most people wouldn't regard as conscious. I distinguish the w-consciousness of such a desktop from the s-consciousness people think humans but no such machines enjoy, which gives rise to an explanatory gap, invites first scepticism, unwanted analgesia, and is not supported by Cartesian intr…Read more
  •  18
    Analytic, A Priori, False - And Maybe Non-Conceptual
    European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 10 (2): 85-110. 2014.
    I argue that there are analytic claims that, if true, can be known a priori, but which also can turn out to be false: they are expressive of merely default instructions from the language faculty to the conceptual system, which may be overridden by pragmatic or scientific considerations, in which case, of course, they would not be known at all, a priori or otherwise. More surprisingly, I also argue that they might not be, strictly speaking, conceptual: concepts may be importantly different from t…Read more
  •  35
    Remembering Jerry Fodor and his work
    Mind and Language 33 (4): 321-341. 2018.
  •  63
    Resisting Primitive CompulsionsA Study of Concepts (review)
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (2): 419. 1996.
    I’m sympathetic to a great deal of Peacocke’s project: that possession of a concept should require it playing a certain role in thought; that semantic determination should be treated separately from concept possession; that certain concepts are defective by virtue of eluding sufficient determination or specification: such claims seems to me right, important, and too little appreciated on my side of the Atlantic.
  •  4
    The Turing thesis vs. the Turing test
    The Philosophers' Magazine 57 84-89. 2012.
  •  10
    The Unavailability of What We Mean: A Reply to Quine, Fodor and LePore
    Grazer Philosophische Studien 46 (1): 61-101. 1993.
    Fodor and LePore's attack on conceptual role semantics relies on Quine's attack on the traditional analytic/synthetic and a priori/a posteriori distinctions, which in turn consists of four arguments: an attack on truth by convention; an appeal to revisability; a claim of confirmation holism; and a charge of explanatory vacuity. Once the different merits of these arguments are sorted out, their proper target can be seen to be not the Traditional Distinctions, but an implicit assumption about thei…Read more
  •  5
    Dennett’s Unrealistic Psychology
    Philosophical Topics 22 (1/2): 259-289. 1994.
  •  17
    Block's philosophical anosognosia
    Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2): 266-267. 1995.
    Block's P-/A-consciousness distinction rules out P's involving a specific kind of cognitive access and commits him to a “strong” Pconsciousness. This not only confounds plausible research in the area but betrays an anosognosia about Wittgenstein's diagnosis about our philosophical “introspection” of mysterious inner processes.
  •  59
    Mind, Intentionality and Inexistence: an Overview of My Work
    Croatian Journal of Philosophy 5 (3): 389-415. 2005.
    The present article articulates the strategy of much of my work to date, which has been concerned to understand how we can possibly come to have any objective understanding of the mind. Generally, I align myself with those who think the best prospect of such an understanding lies in a causal/computational/representational theory of thought (CRTT). However, there is a tendency in recent developments of this and related philosophical views to burden the crucial property of intentionality with what…Read more
  •  49
    The Rashness of Traditional Rationalism and Empiricism
    Canadian Journal of Philosophy 34 (Supplement): 227-258. 2004.
  •  48
    A deflated intentionalist alternative to Clark's unexplanatory metaphysics
    Philosophical Psychology 17 (4): 519-540. 2004.
    Throughout his discussion, Clark speaks constantly of phenomenal and qualitative properties. But properties, like any other posited entities, ought to earn their explanatory keep, and this I don't think Clark's phenomenal or qualitative properties actually do. I argue that all the work he enlists for them could be done better by purely intentional contents of our sentient states; that is, they could better be regarded as mere intentional properties, not real ones. Clark eschews such intentionali…Read more
  •  10
    Idealized Conceptual Roles
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53 (3). 1993.
  •  18
    The effect of contrast on affective ratings in normal and anhedonic subjects
    with S. Dubal, K. Knoblauch, and R. Jouvent
    In Robert Schwartz (ed.), Perception, Blackwell. pp. 132. 2004.
  •  8
    I argue that, pace Chomsky (2000, 2003), standard theories of linguistic competence are committed to taking talk of representations seriously, in particular, to recognizing that the “of x” clause that invariably follows “representation” is a way of specifying that representation’s intentional content. One reason to insist upon intentional content in such cases is that the “x” in “of x” may not exist (as in "of Zeus"). This issue is especially relevant to linguistics since, recapitulating conside…Read more
  •  16
    Replies to Critics
    Croatian Journal of Philosophy 5 (3): 465-480. 2005.
  •  58
    Digging deeper for the a priori (review)
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (3). 2001.
    For all the inadequacies of empiricism that BonJour admirably sets out in his first three chapters, one wonders whether rationalism is any better off. I’m afraid I don’t find BonJour’s account reassuring. It seems to be precisely the one that has led so many to be wary of the a priori in the first place. I want here to reiterate the reasons for that wariness, and sketch what seems to me a more promising approach.
  •  84
    Wittgenstein’s views invite a modest, functionalist account of mental states and regularities, or more specifically a causal/computational, representational theory of the mind (CRTT). It is only by understandingWittgenstein’s remarks in the context of a theory like CRTT that his insights have any real force; and it is only by recognizing those insights that CRTT can begin to account for sensations and our thoughts about them. For instance, Wittgenstein’s (in)famous remark that “an inner process …Read more
  •  12
    Worries about Haugeland's worries
    Behavioral and Brain Sciences 1 (2): 246-248. 1978.
  •  10
  •  23
    The formal and the opaque
    Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (1): 90-92. 1980.
  •  94
    We argue that Recanati burdens his otherwise salutary “Mental File” account of singular thought with an “Actualist” assumption that he has inherited from the discussion of singular thought since at least Evans, according to which singular thoughts can only be about actual objects: apparent singular thoughts involving “empty” terms lack truth-valuable content. This assumption flies in the face of manifestly singular thoughts involving not only fictional and mistakenly postulated entities, such as…Read more
  •  17