Gerard De Vries

A cursory view of the history of ethical thinking shows the presence of a limited variety of 'styles of ethical reasoning', a term used in analogy of Crombie's 'styles of scientific reasoning' for systems of thought that set their own standards and techniques for providing evidence. Each style of reasoning tends to suggest a specific role for ethicists. Styles are appropriate relative to particular contexts of problems and require special institutions to flourish. Herman De Dijn's discussion in Taboes, monsters en loterijen of the problems hybridsproduced in biomedicine and biotechnology pose for the symbolic order is shown to rest on two 'styles of ethical reasoning', viz, 'postulation of principles' and 'hermeneutics'. It is argued that both styles fall short, but for different reasons. 'Postulation of principles' is ill-equipped to answer problems posed by a world of change. Hermeneutics requires a pace of time and institutions not available in current society. Confronted with the problems De Dijn discusses, therefore two separate problems arise. Ethicistsnot only have to learn how to account for the hybrids that biomedicine and biotechnology produce, they also have to think about and contribute to institutional innovation. Rather than opening a space for discussing both tasks, De Dijn's styles of reasoning close off this matter

Humans do two types of actions, polimorphic actions and mimeomorphic actions. The ability to carry out polimorphic actions cannot be mastered outside of socialization. Mimeomorphic actions, however, can be learned in other ways; sometimes, they can be learned away from the context of practice. Polimorphic actions cannot be mimicked by machines, but some mimeomorphic actions can. Other mimeomorphic actions are too complex to mechanize. Actions that cannot be mechanized because they are physically complicated should not be confused with actions that cannot be mechanized because socialization is needed to master them. The analysis has implications for recent debates concerning the differences and similarities between humans and machines. The implica tion of the analysis is that much more can be understood about the relationship between humans and machines if the difference is treated as being a consequence of the unique properties of human societies. In this article, the analysis is applied to cardiac catheteriza tion, pacemaker implantation, simulation of bodies, and work in a medical "SkillsLab."

Bruno Latour is among the most important figures in contemporary philosophy and social science. His ethnographic studies have revolutionized our understanding of areas as diverse as science, law, politics and religion. To facilitate a more realistic understanding of the world, Latour has introduced a radically fresh philosophical terminology and a new approach to social science, ‘Actor-Network Theory’. In seminal works such as Laboratory Life, We Have Never Been Modern and An Inquiry into Modes of Existence, Latour has outlined an alternative to the foundational categories of ‘modern’ western thought Ð particularly its distinction between society and nature Ð that has major consequences for our understanding of the ecological crisis and of the role of science in democratic societies. Latour’s ‘empirical philosophy’ has evolved considerably over the past four decades. In this lucid and compelling book, Gerard de Vries provides one of the first overviews of Latour’s work. He guides readers through Latour’s main publications, from his early ethnographies to his more recent philosophical works, showing with considerable skill how Latour’s ideas have developed. This book will be of great value to students and scholars attempting to come to terms with the immense challenge posed by Latour’s thought. It will be of interest to those studying philosophy, anthropology, sociology, science and technology studies, and almost all other branches of the social sciences and humanities.

[Dutch] The division of science into Natural Sciences, Social Sciences and Humanities may seem matter-of-course, but is in fact a fairly recent and by no means undebated one. This book describes how these different visions on science came to be and what ideals of knowledge and styles of argumentation they suppose. It also discusses the nature, structure and development of the Humanities. It delves into the history of these fields and the varying notions on their cultural place and function. The book displays a broad scale of twentieth century philosophical and methodological movements and therefore offers not only students of the Humanities a great insight into the background of their field, but also shows students of Social or Natural Sciences a wider vision on the historical and philosophical aspects of the Sciences.