Giampaolo Ghilardi

In this paper we want to analyze some philosophical and epistemological connections between a new kind of technology recently developed within robotics, and the previous mechanical approach. A new paradigm about machine-design in robotics, currently defined as ‘Embodied Intelligence’, has recently been developed. Here we consider the debate on the relationship between the hand and the intellect, from the perspective of the history of philosophy, aiming at providing a more suitable understanding of this paradigm. The new bottom-up approach to design is deeply rooted in a new kind of empiricism, which tries to overcome issues connected with the previous approach strongly committed with the Artificial Intelligence (AI) debate and its origin. Since Turing’s time, the AI debate showed a rationalistic bias which remained undisputed until now. The paradigm shift we are witnessing nowadays is a reply to that bias in order to achieve not only a better way to design robots, but also to understand some underlying epistemological remarks.

In the present article, we introduce an ethical evaluation methodology for clinical cases. Although rejecting proceduralism as a system, we develop a procedure that eventually could be formalized as a flow chart to help carry out an ethical evaluation for clinical cases. We clarify the elements that constitute an ethical evaluation: aim, integration, and how the action is performed. We leave aside the aspect of intentions, focusing on the object of a medical action, arguing that the internal aim of a clinical action carries a moral value per se. Our evaluation system takes into account only objects and circumstances and their intrinsic morality, since we are dealing with the evaluation of a clinical case, and not with a personal and complete clinical action. DOI: 10.5294/pebi.2016.20.1.5

Libet’s experimental setting has been criticized at length ever since its first appearance, under both methodological and empirical aspects. In this paper, the attention will be driven on a neglected underpinning theme which has not yet been investigated, central for the economy of the argument: the time of choices. The pivotal role played by mental chronometry at the beginning of psychology and neurophysiology will be pointed out, and how the lack of a proper definition of time affected the course of the following research on the subject. The Aristotelian definition of time will be considered in order to cast some light upon Libet’s empirical findings.