-
152Moral Psychology and Human Action in Aristotle (edited book)Oxford University Press. 2011.This volume aims to bring the two streams of research together, offering a fresh infusion of Aristotelian insights into moral psychology and philosophy of ...
-
82Does the Fearless Phobic really fear the squeak of mice ‘too much’?Ancient Philosophy 26 (1): 81-91. 2006.
-
81Aristotle on DesireCambridge University Press. 2012.Desire is a central concept in Aristotle's ethical and psychological works, but he does not provide us with a systematic treatment of the notion itself. This book reconstructs the account of desire latent in his various scattered remarks on the subject and analyses its role in his moral psychology. Topics include: the range of states that Aristotle counts as desires ; objects of desire and the relation between desires and envisaging prospects; desire and the good; Aristotle's three species of de…Read more
-
66XIV—What Are Sources of Motivation?Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 115 (3pt3): 255-276. 2015.Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 115, Issue 3pt3, Page 255-276, December 2015.
-
57'Aristotle on acting unjustly without being unjust'Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 30 211-233. 2006.
-
34'Non-rational desire and Aristotle's moral psychology'In J. Miller (ed.), Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics: A Critical Guide, Cambridge University Press. 2011.
-
19'Aristotle and Scanlon on desire and motivation'In Michael Pakaluk & Giles Pearson (eds.), Moral Psychology and Human Action in Aristotle, Oxford University Press. 2011.
-
14Colloquium 2 How to Argue about Aristotle about Practical ReasonProceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium of Ancient Philosophy 35 (1): 31-58. 2020.In this paper, I consider Aristotle’s views in relation to the Humean theory of motivation. I distinguish three principles which HTM is committed to: the ‘No Besires’ principle, the ‘Motivation Out—Desire In’ principle, and the ‘Desire Out—Desire In’ principle. To reject HTM, one only needs to reject one of these principles. I argue that while it is plausible to think that Aristotle accepts the first two principles, there are some grounds for thinking that he might reject the third.
-
3'Aristotle: Psychology'In F. Sheffield & J. Warren (eds.), The Routledge Companion to Ancient Philosophy, Routledge. pp. 304-318. 2013.
-
2'Phronêsis as a mean in the Eudemian Ethics'Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 32 273-295. 2007.
-
1Aristotle on Being-as-TruthIn David Sedley (ed.), Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy Xxviii: Summer 2005, Oxford University Press. 2005.
-
'Emotions in Ancient and Medieval Philosophy, by Simo Knuuttila (Oxford, 2004)' (review)Philosophical Quarterly 56 (225). 2006.
-
Aristotle on Acting Unjustly without Being UnjustIn David Sedley (ed.), Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy Xxx: Summer 2006, Oxford University Press. 2006.
