Giorgio Marchetti

In this article, I argue that consciousness is a unique way of processing information, in that: it produces information, rather than purely transmitting it; the information it produces is meaningful for us; the meaning it has is always individuated. This uniqueness allows us to process information on the basis of our personal needs and ever-changing interactions with the environment, and consequently to act autonomously. Three main basic cognitive processes contribute to realize this unique way of information processing: the self, attention and working memory. The self, which is primarily expressed via the central and peripheral nervous systems, maps our body, the environment, and our relations with the environment. It is the primary means by which the complexity inherent to our composite structure is reduced into the “single voice” of a unique individual. It provides a reference system that (albeit evolving) is sufficiently stable to define the variations that will be used as the raw material for the construction of conscious information. Attention allows for the selection of those variations in the state of the self that are most relevant in the given situation. Attention originates and is deployed from a single locus inside our body, which represents the center of the self, around which all our conscious experiences are organized. Whatever is focused by attention appears in our consciousness as possessing a spatial quality defined by this center and the direction toward which attention is focused. In addition, attention determines two other features of conscious experience: periodicity and phenomenal quality. Self and attention are necessary but not sufficient for conscious information to be produced. Complex forms of conscious experiences, such as the various modes of givenness of conscious experience and the stream of consciousness, need a working memory mechanism to assemble the basic pieces of information selected by attention.

This book presents a comprehensive theoretical framework that explains both human consciousness and meanings through the working of attention. By arguing for a first-person approach to consciousness, this book offers a critical overview of the major theories and empirical findings on consciousness and attention, and exemplifies how one of the most difficult and fundamental conscious experiences to account for, that is, time, can be analyzed by adopting the kind of semantics developed within the presented theoretical framework: Attentional Semantics.

Among the cognitive processes involved in the construction of any kind of meaning, attention is fundamental in determining why, how and what we mean. Attention plays a primary role in the process of learning the meanings of words and more generally of acquiring knowledge; signification, discourse and persuasion; perceiving, representing and (re)framing reality; shaping the attitudes of the audience; conveying values and ideologies. Conversely, the meanings of words and more generally, of signs, convey the condensed instructions for the attentional operations one has to perform in order to consciously experience what is expressed through and by them. Language, by addressing and guiding attention in specific ways, helps to select, amplify and support certain semantic components and concepts, and construct and communicate knowledge and values. This book is the first to present a comprehensive overview of the extant research on the relationships between attention and meaning. The contributions collected here offer an overview of the most prominent theories and models developed so far that aim to explain how attention determines meaning construction. This book will be of interest to students, researchers and teachers in the realm of linguistics, semantics, discourse studies, semiotics, psycholinguistics, computational linguistics, linguistic development, cognitive architectures of language, neuropsychology of linguistic function and social psychology.

The interaction between brain and language has been investigated by a vast amount of research and different approaches, which however do not offer a comprehensive and unified theoretical framework to analyze how brain functioning performs the mental processes we use in producing language and in understanding speech. This Special Issue addresses the need to develop such a general theoretical framework, by fostering an interaction among the various scientific disciplines and methodologies, which centres on investigating the functional architecture of brain, mind and language, and is articulated along the following main dimensions of research: (a) Language as a regulatory contour of brain and mental processes; (b) Language as a unique human phenomenon; (c) Language as a governor of human behaviour and brain operations; (d) Language as an organizational factor of ontogenesis of mentation and behaviour

The primary determinant of the self (S) is the conscious experience (CE) we have of it. Therefore, it does not come as a surprise that empirical research on S mainly resorts to the CE (or lack of CE) that subjects have of their S. What comes as a surprise is that empirical research on S does not tackle the problem of how CE contributes to building S. Empirical research investigates how S either biases the cognitive processing of stimuli or is altered through a wide range of means (meditation, hypnosis, etc.). In either case, even for different reasons, considerations of how CE contributes to building S are left unspecified in empirical research. This article analyzes these reasons and proposes a theoretical model of how CE contributes to building S. According to the proposed model, the phenomenal aspect of consciousness is produced by the modulation—engendered by attentional activity—of the energy level of the neural substrate (that is, the organ of attention) that underpins attentional activity. The phenomenal aspect of consciousness supplies the agent with a sense of S and informs the agent on how its S is affected by the agent’s own operations. The phenomenal aspect of consciousness performs its functions through its five main dimensions: qualitative, quantitative, hedonic, temporal, and spatial. Each dimension of the phenomenal aspect of consciousness can be explained by a specific aspect of the modulation of the energy level of the organ of attention. Among other advantages, the model explains the various forms of S as outcomes resulting from the operations of a single mechanism and provides a unifying framework for empirical research on the neural underpinnings of S.

Despite allowing for the unprecedented visualization of brain functional activity, modern neurobio-logical techniques have not yet been able to provide satisfactory answers to important questions about the relationship between brain and mind. The aim of this paper is to show how two different but complementary approaches, Mind Operational Semantics (OS) and Brain Operational Architectonics (OA), can help bridge the gap between a specific kind of mental activity—the higher-order reflective thought or linguistic thought—and brain. The fundamental notion that allows the two different ap-proaches to be jointly used under a common framework is that of operation. According to OS, which is based on introspection and linguistic data, the meanings of words can be analyzed in terms of elemental mental operations (EOMC), amongst which those of attention play a key role. Linguistic thought is made possible by special kinds of elements, which OS calls “correlators”, which have the function of tying together the other elements of thought, which OS calls “correlata” (a "correlational network” that is, a sentence, is so formed). Therefore, OS conceives of linguistic thought as a hierarchy of operations of increasing complexity. Likewise, according to OA, which is based on the joint analysis of cognitive and electromagnetic data (EEG and MEG), every conscious phenomenon is brought to existence by the joint operations of many functional and transient neuronal assemblies in the brain. According to OA, the functioning of the brain is always operational (made up of operations), and its structure is characterized by a hierarchy of operations of increasing complexity: single neurons, single assemblies of neurons, syn-chronized neuronal assemblies or Operational Modules (OM), integrated or complex OMs. The authors put forward the hypothesis that the whole level of OS’s description (EOMC, correlators, and correlational networks) corresponds to the level of OMs (or set of them) of different complexity within OA’s theory: EOMC could correspond to simple OMs, correlators to complex OMs and the correlational network to a set of simple and complex OMs. Finally, a set of experiments is proposed to verify the putative correspondence between OS and OA and prove the existence of an integrated continuum between brain and mind

Various kinds of observations show that the ability of human beings to both consciously relive past events – episodic memory – and conceive future events, entails an active process of construction. This construction process also underpins many other important aspects of conscious human life, such as perceptions, language and conscious thinking. This article provides an explanation of what makes the constructive process possible and how it works. The process mainly relies on attentional activity, which has a discrete and periodic nature, and working memory, which allows for the combination of discrete attentional operations. An explanation is also provided of how past and future events are constructed.

Negrotti's theory of the artificial is based on the fundamental assumption that the human being cannot select more than one observation level per unit of time. Since this assumption has important consequences for the theory of knowledge — knowledge cannot be synthesised but only further differentiated — its plausibility is tested against two aspects that characterise any theory of knowledge: knowledge production and knowledge application. The way in which the human being produces and applies knowledge is analysed, and a model of mind based on the transitoriness of its elements is proposed. The analysis confirms that only one observation level can be selected per unit of time.

Global development, diffusion and implementation of the human-centredness paradigm can be performed at best when supported by a study of our mental activity. By analysing our mental operations, we can understand how human needs, interests, values and creativity take form, what each consists of, how it is possible to expand, modify and generate them. The proposed model of mental activity is based on attentional movement. The new opportunities, both ethical and social, offered by such a study are presented

Come in una partita a scacchi, i due protagonisti e per certi versi antagonisti, si interrogano sul ruolo del visibile e dell’invisibile nel raggiungimento della conoscenza, muovendo i loro pezzi uno dalla Finlandia, l’altro dall’Italia. È prevalente il visibile o l’invisibile? Si può penetrare l’invisibile attraverso il visibile o il visibile esiste grazie all’invisibile? Come in un’osteria del borgo ha preso inizio la partita, continuata poi in tutte le altre, così pure in un’osteria finisce la vicenda. È la ragione o è la fantasia che porta alla conoscenza? Si può dare una risposta risolutiva? All’apparenza sì, ma solo all’apparenza. Perché, come si legge nella prefazione, nel gioco degli scacchi esiste anche lo stallo.

What distinguishes conscious information processing from other kinds of information processing is its phenomenal aspect (PAC), the-what-it-is-like for an agent to experience something. The PAC supplies the agent with a sense of self, and informs the agent on how its self is affected by the agent’s own operations. The PAC originates from the activity that attention performs to detect the state of what I define “the self” (S). S is centered and develops on a hierarchy of innate and acquired values, and is primarily expressed via the central and peripheral nervous systems; it maps the agent’s body and cognitive capacities, and its interactions with the environment. The detection of the state of S by attention modulates the energy level of the organ of attention (OA), i.e., the neural substrate that underpins attention. This modulation generates the PAC. The PAC can be qualified according to five dimensions: qualitative, quantitative, hedonic, temporal and spatial. Each dimension can be traced back to a specific feature of the modulation of the energy level of the OA.

Dopo la loro prima esperienza di scrittura a quattro mani, sfociata nel volume "Il visibile o l'Invisibile? Dialoghi tra il serio e il faceto sulla conoscenza", gli autori hanno deciso di intraprendere in comune una nuova avventura letteraria. Ne Il visibile o l'invisibile? Dialoghi tra il serio e il faceto sulla conoscenza, gli interventi dei due autori si alternavano in capitoli scritti singolarmente da ognuno dei due. Questa nuova opera, invece, vede esplicitarsi il loro pensiero in compresenza in ogni capitolo. Nel loro primo lavoro, l'oggetto era stato la ricerca della verità: una ricerca che i due autori hanno effettuato esplorando il visibile e l'invisibile, nello sforzo di capire quale dei due consenta di raggiungerla, in un continuo esercizio mentale lungo il pensiero dei filosofi, degli scrittori, degli scienziati, dei pittori e dei musicisti che hanno puntellato la storia dell'umanità. In questa seconda opera, gli autori, consapevoli dell’enorme importanza che il linguaggio orale e scritto riveste per l’espressione del pensiero, si sono soffermati sulle regole della Grammatica, senza le quali la comunicazione con gli altri risulterebbe impossibile. Onde risparmiarsi un lavoro ciclopico e soprattutto onde evitare di tediare oltremodo i gentili lettori, gli autori si sono limitati alla sola Grammatica della lingua italiana e alle sue principali voci, benché le considerazioni che essi svolgono possano essere tranquillamente estese anche alle altre lingue. Come nel precedente libro, uno dei due, Giorgio, procede con un esame scientifico degli argomenti trattati, mentre Pier Celeste, pur affrontando gli stessi argomenti, esercita la sua sconfinata fantasia, dalla quale emergono gli aspetti particolari non meno importanti delle regole, le eccezioni. Il pensiero di Giorgio è affidato a due dei quattro protagonisti dell’opera: il signor Punto e la sua consorte, la signora Spunto; il pensiero di Pier Celeste è affidato agli altri due protagonisti: Grevisse e la moglie Pratica. I nomi scelti per i protagonisti rispettano lo spirito di ognuno di essi. Grevisse è il nome dell'autore di una Grammatica della lingua francese, considerata la Bibbia del Francese moderno. Punto è un nome che indica la precisa puntualità nell'esame delle varie voci della Grammatica italiana stessa. La signora Spunto è così chiamata perché prende sempre lo spunto da ciò che dicono Grevisse e Punto, per intervenire nel dibattito. Pratica, invece, è così chiamata perché della compagnia è colei che si limita all'aspetto pratico della vicenda, che si svolge in un paesino delle Prealpi bellunesi dove i quattro sono impegnati in un'interminabile partita di canasta, occupandosi di rifornire gli sfidanti del supporto in bibite e cibarie necessarie per mantenerli in vita. Il tutto trae origine dalla Grammatica e Logica di Port-Royal, da cui sono nate tutte le grammatiche moderne, ma non meno importanti sono i lavori degli altri studiosi a cui i due autori spesso si riferiscono durante le loro discussioni. Il lettore potrà trovare i riferimenti bibliografici dei vari lavori citati in una sezione a parte alla fine del libro.

Per quanto la disprezziamo e condanniamo, la menzogna accompagna da sempre e inevitabilmente la nostra vita. Mentiamo sin da bambini e continuiamo a mentire da adulti. Mentiamo a tutti, alle persone più care come agli sconosciuti e ancor di più ai nostri nemici. Mentiamo persino a noi stessi. Mentiamo in mille modi: quando raccontiamo una bugia, quando illudiamo noi stessi e gli altri, quando truffiamo, imbrogliamo e fingiamo. Mentiamo a parole e gesti. Mentiamo per far del male ma anche a fin di bene. La capacità di mentire, come la speculare capacità di riconoscere la menzogna, fanno parte integrante del nostro bagaglio cognitivo: senza di esse ci sarebbe impossibile condurre una normale vita sociale. Altrettanto utile, pervasiva, a volte invasiva e persino scomoda è la verità, necessaria controparte della menzogna. L’una non potrebbe esistere senza l’altra. Ma dove incomincia l’una e dove finisce l’altra? Come nelle loro precedenti opere, i due autori affrontano il problema dai loro singolari punti di vista, cercando di dare una risposta, che non sarà però mai definitiva.

This introduction to Learnable Theory and Analysis leverages several contributions that Italian researchers and research centers have provided in Philosophy, Linguistics and Neurosciences. Contributions which appear particularly relevant in the construction of a solid link between Philosophy and Business Studies. A link which has the ambition to guide both Academics and Practitioners of Management across the tumultuous waters of Philosophy, Linguistics and Neurosciences, whose investigations the authors here present and develop in view of new opportunities of deeper understanding and broader interventions. Contributions of scholars such as Giacomo Rizzolatti and Silvio Ceccato, as well as the work of others who have been following their tracks and, in some cases, even drastically reconsidered their propositions, are here highly leveraged and celebrated together with Roy Bhaskar’s revolutionary ontological framework and George Lakoff’s and Mark Johnson’s enlightening studies on metaphors.

Attention plays a central role in the production of conscious experience (CE): there cannot be CE without some form of attention. Equally important for the production of CE are the cognitive processes that feed and pilot attention. These processes are performed by the self. The self provides the input for attentional processing. CE arises when attention processes the input provided by the self. Any research intended to analyze how CE is produced, including the CE of linguistic meaning (LM), must take into account the operations performed by attention and the self. The awareness of the role played for CE production by attention and the self opens a new perspective for semantic studies. From this perspective, LMs can be seen as condensed instructions on the operations that attention and self must perform in order to produce the relevant CEs. Consequently, LMs can be analysed in terms of these operations.