Giulia Bistagnino

In Th e Order of Public Reason, Gerald Gaus defends an innovative and sophisticated convergence version of public reason liberalism. Th e crucial concept of his argumentative framework is that of “social morality”, intended as the set of rules apt to organize how individuals can make moral demands over each other. I claim that Gaus’s characterization of social morality and its rules is unstable because it rests on a rejection of the distinction between the normative and the descriptive. I argue that such rejection is motivated by certain practical aims Gaus wishes his theory to achieve. His method and his idea that morality needs to be understood both as the dictate of impartial reasoning and as a social and historical fact come from the need for his theory to perform the task of settling the problem of order. I discuss Gaus’s philosophical attitude and, finally, distinguishing between “therapeutic” and “evaluative” approaches, I present some points of discussion for understanding the role and scope of political philosophy in general.

In The Order of Public Reason, Gerald Gaus defends an innovative and sophisticated convergence version of public reason liberalism. The crucial concept of his argumentative framework is that of “social morality”, intended as the set of rules apt to organize how individuals can make moral demands over each other. I claim that Gaus’s characterization of social morality and its rules is unstable because it rests on a rejection of the distinction between the normative and the descriptive. I argue that such rejection is motivated by certain practical aims Gaus wishes his theory to achieve. His method and his idea that morality needs to be understood both as the dictate of impartial reasoning and as a social and historical fact come from the need for his theory to perform the task of settling the problem of order. I discuss Gaus’s philosophical attitude and, finally, distinguishing between “therapeutic” and “evaluative” approaches, I present some points of discussion for understanding the role and scope of political philosophy in general.

This paper addresses the problem of pluralism in democratic societies, by exploiting some insights from the debate about the epistemology of disagreement. First, by focusing on the permissibility of experiments on nonhuman animals for research purposes, we provide an epistemic analysis of deep normative disagreements. We understand that to mean disagreements in which epistemic peers disagree about both the substantive content of an ethical issue and the correct justificatory reasons for their contrary claims. Second, we argue for a compromise solution in which the reasons for reaching it are not prudential but grounded on the recognition of epistemic peerhood.

Kevin Vallier’s book, Liberal Politics and Public Faith. Beyond Separation, constitutes an essential reading for anyone interested in public reason liberalism and in the debate concerning the role of religion in contemporary democratic societies. Vallier argues for a strong version of convergence in public justification, aiming at defending an account of liberalism friendly towards religion and religious citizens. Against traditional forms of liberalism built on the idea of neutrality and embodied in a secularized view of social institutions, Vallier’s goal is to reconcile public reason liberalism with religion by showing that his theory “realizes foundational liberal values while according religion a prominent and powerful role in public life” .The topic of Vallier’s book is clearly of fundamental importance. That of the supposedly needed separation between religion and the state is not only one of the most long-standing issues in political philosophy, but it is also extremely r ..

In their book Healthy Eating Policy and Political Philosophy: A Public Reason Approach, Matteo Bonotti and Anne Barnhill defend a conception of public reason centred on the notion of accessibility and advance an ethical toolkit public health policy makers can use to ensure they are reasoning publicly when designing healthy eating policies. Finally, they propose to institutionalise the process of public reasoning informed by their ethics framework by designing certain procedures of consultation and deliberation. This article focuses on their institutionalisation and raises some doubts and concerns by arguing that the procedures designed by Bonotti and Barnhill may be counterproductive to some of their aims, in particular with respect to citizens’ control, epistemic injustice, and the conception of citizens as free and equal.

Is abortion morally permissible? Are homosexual relations morally wrong? Is economic equality more valuable than political freedom? Is it wrong to kill non-human animals for alimentary purposes, clothing, or scientific research? Should prostitution be legalized? Is death penalty wrong? Are there any intellectual property rights? Should freedom of speech be restricted? Democratic societies are characterized by deep and persistent disagreements, which may elicit conflicts and have a dangerous impact on the relations among citizens. The issue of how to deal with political disagreement is a complex one. In contemporary political philosophy, the theories of public reason liberalism and modus vivendi attempt to solve the problem by avoiding the search for truth. Indeed, scholars embracing such approaches consider appeals to some form of objective truth detrimental to the reaching of an agreement that is respectful towards pluralism and apt to provide some kind of stability. The book challenges this view and defends the idea of principled compromise, intended as a second-best solution based on reasons that are not prudential but principled in being epistemic in kind, grounded on the recognition of epistemic peerhood. L’interruzione volontaria di gravidanza è ammissibile? Il matrimonio tra persone dello stesso sesso è sbagliato? L’uguaglianza economica è più importante della libertà? È giusto utilizzare animali non-umani per fini scientifici e di ricerca? La prostituzione dovrebbe essere legale? La pena di morte è giusta? Esiste un diritto alla proprietà intellettuale? La libertà di espressione dovrebbe essere limitata? Non è certo un mistero che le società democratiche siano caratterizzate da disaccordi profondi e persistenti, capaci di fomentare divisioni e conflitti. È più complesso, invece, capire come tali disaccordi, che vertono su questioni che richiedono una decisione collettiva, debbano essere trattati a livello pubblico. Nel dibattito filosofico contemporaneo, le teorie della ragione pubblica e del modus vivendi tentano di risolvere il problema rinunciando alla ricerca della verità oggettiva, sostenendo che il disaccordo in politica possa essere superato, e così perdere la sua carica conflittuale, solo se viene tralasciata la ricerca di chi ha ragione. Contrariamente a tale convinzione, l’autrice difende una prospettiva che riconosce la ricerca della verità come fondamentale alla risoluzione del disaccordo e propone l’idea di compromesso di principio, ovvero di un accordo non ideale, ma stabilito per ragioni di principio, di natura epistemica, perché fondato sul riconoscimento reciproco della razionalità delle parti.