•  21
    Review of Paula Gottlieb, The Virtue of Aristotle's Ethics (review)
    Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2009 (9). 2009.
  •  158
    Plato on perceptual cognition
    Dissertation, Stockholm University. 2001.
    The aim of the study is to spell out and consider Plato' s views on perceptual cog­nition. It is argued that Plato is cornrnitted to the view that perceptual cognition can be rational, and that beliefs about the sensible world need not be confused or ill-founded. Plato' s interest in the matter arises from worries over the way in which his fore­runners and contemporaries conceived of perceptual cognition. They conceived of cognitive processes in terms of corporeal changes and attempted to explai…Read more
  •  85
    Two Kinds of Belief in Plato
    Journal of the History of Philosophy 51 (1): 1-19. 2013.
    In thesophist (263e10–264b4), Plato distinguishes between two kinds of belief. On the one hand, there is a kind of belief that occurs “according to thinking” (κατὰ διάνοιαν), being “the completion of thinking” (διανοίας ἀποτελεύτησις). This kind is called ‘doxa.’ On the other hand, there is another kind of belief that occurs “through sense perception” (δι᾽ αἰσθήσεως). This kind is called ‘phantasia,’ perhaps best rendered as “appearing.”1 The purpose of this paper is to uncover the distinction b…Read more
  •  75
    Listening to Reason in Aristotle's Moral Psychology
    Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 32 251-271. 2007.
  •  173
    Wish, Motivation and the Human Good in Aristotle
    Phronesis 60 (1): 60-87. 2015.
    _ Source: _Volume 60, Issue 1, pp 60 - 87 Aristotle invokes a specifically human desire, namely wish, to provide a teleological explanation of the pursuit of the specifically human good in terms of virtuous activity. Wish is a basic, unreasoned desire which, independently of other desires, or evaluative attitudes, motivates the pursuit of the human good. Even a person who pursues what she mistakenly believes to be good is motivated by wish for what in fact is good, although she is oblivious of i…Read more
  •  13
    Why Is Aristotle’s Vicious Person Miserable?
    In Rabbås Øyvind, Emilsson Eyjolfur Kjálar, Fossheim Hallvard & Fossheim Miira (eds.), The quest for the good life: Ancient philosophers on happiness, Oup. 2015.
    The question raised in this chapter is why Aristotle portrays the bad person as being in a miserable state. It is argued that the bad person suffers from a mental conflict, which consists of a clash between two different kinds of desire, and that fulfilling one of the desires violates values that she also desires. But in contrast to the akratic person, the bad person has no proper conception of the good. Nevertheless, although the bad person may succeed in achieving what she thinks is good, she …Read more
  •  13
    Paula Gottlieb: The Virtue of Aristotle's Etics
    Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 9 (37): 1-6. 2009.
  •  63
    Notes on Nicomachean Ethics 1173 a 2–5
    Classical Quarterly 66 (2). 2016.
    In Nicomachean Ethics (= Eth. Nic.) 10.2, Aristotle addresses Eudoxus’ argument that pleasure is the chief good in his characteristically dialectical manner. The argument is that pleasure is the chief good, since all creatures, rational (ἔλλογα) and non-rational (ἄλογα) alike, are perceived to aim at pleasure (1172b9–11).1 At 1172b35–1173a5, Aristotle turns to an objection against Eudoxus’ argument. For some object (οἱ δ᾽ἐνιστάμενοι) to the argument by questioning one of its premisses, namely th…Read more