•  366
    Holes as regions of spacetime
    with Andrew Wake and Joshua Spencer
    The Monist 90 (3): 372-378. 2007.
    We discuss the view that a hole is identical to the region of spacetime at which it is located. This view is more parsimonious than the view that holes are sui generus entities located at those regions surrounded by their hosts and it is more plausible than the view that there are no holes. We defend the spacetime view from several objections.
  •  146
    Propositions and Parthood: The Universe and Anti-Symmetry
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (3). 2012.
    It is plausible that the universe exists: a thing such that absolutely everything is a part of it. It is also plausible that singular, structured propositions exist: propositions that literally have individuals as parts. Furthermore, it is plausible that for each thing, there is a singular, structured proposition that has it as a part. Finally, it is plausible that parthood is a partial ordering: reflexive, transitive, and anti-symmetric. These plausible claims cannot all be correct. We canvass …Read more
  •  122
    Against the Primary Sound Account of Echoes
    Analysis 73 (3): 466-473. 2013.
    I argue against the Primary Sound Account of Echoes (PSAE) – the view that an echo of a sound just is that sound. I then argue that if my case against PSAE is successful, distal theories of sound are false. The upshot of my arguments, if they succeed, is that distal theories are false. Towards the end, I show how some distal theories can be modified to avoid this conclusion and note some open questions to which the modified theories give rise
  •  84
    A gunk-friendly maxcon
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (4). 2008.
    Hud Hudson has argued that if MaxCon, Ned Markosian's favoured answer to the Simple Question, is true, then there couldn't be gunky objects. If Hudson's argument succeeds, then those who believe that gunky objects are possible have a good reason to reject MaxCon. However, I show that Hudson's argument relies on substantive metaphysical claims that a proponent of MaxCon need not accept. Thus, one who endorses MaxCon need not reject the possibility of gunky objects and those who believe that gunky…Read more
  •  63
    Roy Sorensen has discussed a scenario he calls 'the Disappearing Act', introduced a puzzle based on this scenario, and offered a solution to this puzzle. We argue against Sorensen's solution and offer our own.
  •  7
    Simplicity or Priority?
    In Jonathan L. Kvanvig (ed.), Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion, Oxford University Press. 2015.
    This chapter is a work in applied metaphysics. Recent discussions of monism and metaphysical dependence are deployed to develop a view—the doctrine of divine priority (DDP)—that is a viable alternative to the doctrine of divine simplicity (DDS). DDS and the traditional motivation for it are introduced using an analogy involving Jonathan Schaffer’s distinction between two forms of monism. It is argued that DDP is an alternative to DDS by showing that it is consistent with the traditional motivati…Read more