• Mississippi State University
    Department of Philosophy & Religion
    Department of Arts and Sciences, Mississippi State University, Meridian
    Instructor
Mississippi State, Mississippi, United States of America
  •  1
    Do you believe that aliens feel pain? An empirical investigation of mental state attributions
    with Alana Knowles
    Cognition, Brain, Behavior. An Interdisciplinary Journal 27 (2): 199-213. 2023.
    On what basis do we attribute phenomenal states to others? One answer, defended by John Stuart Mill, appeals to an analogy between ourselves and the similar bodies and actions of others (1865, p. 208). Despite its intuitive plausibility, this position is often rejected (Arico et al., 2011; Buckwalter & Phelan, 2014; Knobe & Prinz, 2008). In line with Mill’s account, we propose that the primary factors used when making phenomenal state ascriptions are the appropriate display of functional and beh…Read more
  •  81
    A thorough and practical introduction to inductive logic with a focus on arguments and the rules used for making inductive inferences.
  •  123
    The relationship between psychological capacities and neurobiological activities
    European Journal for Philosophy of Science 2 (3): 453-480. 2012.
    This paper addresses the relationship between psychological capacities, as they are understood within cognitive psychology, and neurobiological activities. First, Lycan’s (1987) account of this relationship is examined and certain problems with his account are explained. According to Lycan, psychological capacities occupy a higher level than neurobiological activities in a hierarchy of levels of nature, and psychological entities can be decomposed into neurobiological entities. After discussing …Read more
  •  60
    LeDoux (1996) has identified a sub-cortical neural circuit that mediates fear responses in rats. The existence of this neural circuit has been used to support the claim that emotion is a non-cognitive process. In this paper I argue that this sub-cortical circuit cannot have a role in the explanation of emotions in humans. This worry is raised by looking at the properties of this neural pathway, which does not have the capacity to respond to the types of stimuli that are generally taken to trigge…Read more
  •  105
    Mechanisms and functional brain areas
    Minds and Machines 19 (2): 255-271. 2009.
    Explanations of how psychological capacities are carried out often invoke functional brain areas. I argue that such explanations cannot succeed. Psychological capacities are carried out by identifiable entities and their activities in the brain, but functional brain areas are not the relevant entities. I proceed by assuming that if functional brain areas did carry out psychological capacities, then these brain areas could be included in descriptions of mechanisms. And if functional brain areas p…Read more
  •  34
    Methodological functionalism and the description of natural systems
    Philosophical Psychology 29 (3): 374-389. 2016.
    The primary way that explanations are constructed in cognitive psychology is by methodological functionalism: in short, functionally defined components are proposed in order to explain how inputs are turned into behavior. But despite its close association with cognitive psychology, methodological functionalism is a technique that can be used to describe any natural system. I look at how methodological functionalism has fared when used by other special sciences and what lessons can be learned fro…Read more