Frankfurt School Of Finance And Management
  •  664
    Coherence and Confirmation through Causation
    with Richard Scheines
    Mind 122 (485): 135-170. 2013.
    Coherentism maintains that coherent beliefs are more likely to be true than incoherent beliefs, and that coherent evidence provides more confirmation of a hypothesis when the evidence is made coherent by the explanation provided by that hypothesis. Although probabilistic models of credence ought to be well-suited to justifying such claims, negative results from Bayesian epistemology have suggested otherwise. In this essay we argue that the connection between coherence and confirmation should be …Read more
  •  481
    Is there a logic of information?
    Journal of Theoretical and Applied Artificial Intelligence 27 (1): 95-98. 2015.
    Information-based epistemology maintains that ‘being informed’ is an independent cognitive state that cannot be reduced to knowledge or to belief, and the modal logic KTB has been proposed as a model. But what distinguishes the KTB analysis of ‘being informed’, the Brouwersche schema (B), is precisely its downfall, for no logic of information should include (B) and, more generally, no epistemic logic should include (B), either.
  •  465
    Scoring Imprecise Credences: A Mildly Immodest Proposal
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92 (1): 55-78. 2016.
    Jim Joyce argues for two amendments to probabilism. The first is the doctrine that credences are rational, or not, in virtue of their accuracy or “closeness to the truth” (1998). The second is a shift from a numerically precise model of belief to an imprecise model represented by a set of probability functions (2010). We argue that both amendments cannot be satisfied simultaneously. To do so, we employ a (slightly-generalized) impossibility theorem of Seidenfeld, Schervish, and Kadane (2012), wh…Read more
  •  376
    Demystifying Dilation
    with Arthur Paul Pedersen
    Erkenntnis 79 (6): 1305-1342. 2014.
    Dilation occurs when an interval probability estimate of some event E is properly included in the interval probability estimate of E conditional on every event F of some partition, which means that one’s initial estimate of E becomes less precise no matter how an experiment turns out. Critics maintain that dilation is a pathological feature of imprecise probability models, while others have thought the problem is with Bayesian updating. However, two points are often overlooked: (1) knowing that …Read more
  •  185
    Machine Epistemology and Big Data
    In Lee McIntyre & Alex Rosenburg (eds.), Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Social Science, Routledge. 2016.
    In the age of big data and a machine epistemology that can anticipate, predict, and intervene on events in our lives, the problem once again is that a few individuals possess the knowledge of how to regulate these activities. But the question we face now is not how to share such knowledge more widely, but rather of how to enjoy the public benefits bestowed by this knowledge without freely sharing it. It is not merely personal privacy that is at stake but a range of unsung benefits that come from i…Read more
  •  172
    A sound and complete axiomatization of two tabloid blogs is presented, Leiter Logic (KB) and Deontic Leiter Logic (KDB), the latter of which can be extended to Shame Game Logic for multiple agents. The (B) schema describes the mechanism behind this class of tabloids, and illustrates the perils of interpreting a provability operator as an epistemic modal. To mark this difference, and to avoid sullying Brouwer's good name, the (B) schema for epistemic modals should be called the Blog Schema.
  •  167
    In this chapter we draw connections between two seemingly opposing approaches to probability and statistics: evidential probability on the one hand and objective Bayesian epistemology on the other
  •  148
    Methodological naturalism and epistemic internalism
    with Luís Moniz Pereira
    Synthese 163 (3): 315-328. 2008.
    Epistemic naturalism holds that the results or methodologies from the cognitive sciences are relevant to epistemology, and some have maintained that scientific methods are more compatible with externalist theories of justification than with internalist theories. But practically all discussions about naturalized epistemology are framed exclusively in terms of cognitive psychology, which is only one of the cognitive sciences. The question addressed in this essay is whether a commitment to naturali…Read more
  •  146
    Models, Models, and Models
    Metaphilosophy 44 (3): 293-300. 2013.
    Michael Dummett famously maintained that analytic philosophy was simply philosophy that followed Frege in treating the philosophy of language as the basis for all other philosophy (1978, 441). But one important insight to emerge from computer science is how difficult it is to animate the linguistic artifacts that the analysis of thought produces. Yet, modeling the effects of thought requires a new skill that goes beyond analysis: procedural literacy. Some of the most promising research in philos…Read more
  •  144
    Focused Correlation, Confirmation, and the Jigsaw Puzzle of Variable Evidence
    with Maximilian Schlosshauer
    Philosophy of Science 78 (3): 376-92. 2011.
    Focused correlation compares the degree of association within an evidence set to the degree of association in that evidence set given that some hypothesis is true. A difference between the confirmation lent to a hypothesis by one evidence set and the confirmation lent to that hypothesis by another evidence set is robustly tracked by a difference in focused correlations of those evidence sets on that hypothesis, provided that all the individual pieces of evidence are equally, positively relevant …Read more
  •  144
    Henry Kyburg’s lottery paradox (1961, p. 197) arises from considering a fair 1000 ticket lottery that has exactly one winning ticket. If this much is known about the execution of the lottery it is therefore rational to accept that one ticket will win. Suppose that an event is very likely if the probability of its occurring is greater than 0.99. On these grounds it is presumed rational to accept the proposition that ticket 1 of the lottery will not win. Since the lottery is fair, it is rational t…Read more
  •  130
    Why the Hardest Logic Puzzle Ever Cannot Be Solved in Less than Three Questions
    with Pedro Barahona
    Journal of Philosophical Logic 41 (2): 493-503. 2012.
    Rabern and Rabern (Analysis 68:105–112 2 ) and Uzquiano (Analysis 70:39–44 4 ) have each presented increasingly harder versions of ‘the hardest logic puzzle ever’ (Boolos The Harvard Review of Philosophy 6:62–65 1 ), and each has provided a two-question solution to his predecessor’s puzzle. But Uzquiano’s puzzle is different from the original and different from Rabern and Rabern’s in at least one important respect: it cannot be solved in less than three questions. In this paper we solve Uzquiano…Read more
  •  120
    Objective Bayesian Calibration and the Problem of Non-convex Evidence
    British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 63 (4): 841-850. 2012.
    Jon Williamson's Objective Bayesian Epistemology relies upon a calibration norm to constrain credal probability by both quantitative and qualitative evidence. One role of the calibration norm is to ensure that evidence works to constrain a convex set of probability functions. This essay brings into focus a problem for Williamson's theory when qualitative evidence specifies non-convex constraints.
  •  106
    Epistemic decision theory (EDT) employs the mathematical tools of rational choice theory to justify epistemic norms, including probabilism, conditionalization, and the Principal Principle, among others. Practitioners of EDT endorse two theses: (1) epistemic value is distinct from subjective preference, and (2) belief and epistemic value can be numerically quantified. We argue the first thesis, which we call epistemic puritanism, undermines the second.
  •  103
    Conditionals and consequences
    with Henry E. Kyburg and Choh Man Teng
    Journal of Applied Logic 5 (4): 638-650. 2007.
    We examine the notion of conditionals and the role of conditionals in inductive logics and arguments. We identify three mistakes commonly made in the study of, or motivation for, non-classical logics. A nonmonotonic consequence relation based on evidential probability is formulated. With respect to this acceptance relation some rules of inference of System P are unsound, and we propose refinements that hold in our framework.
  •  101
    Summary. This paper proposes a common framework for various probabilistic logics. It consists of a set of uncertain premises with probabilities attached to them. This raises the question of the strength of a conclusion, but without imposing a particular semantics, no general solution is possible. The paper discusses several possible semantics by looking at it from the perspective of probabilistic argumentation.
  •  98
    Error statistics and Duhem's problem
    Philosophy of Science 67 (3): 410-420. 2000.
    No one has a well developed solution to Duhem's problem, the problem of how experimental evidence warrants revision of our theories. Deborah Mayo proposes a solution to Duhem's problem in route to her more ambitious program of providing a philosophical account of inductive inference and experimental knowledge. This paper is a response to Mayo's Error Statistics (ES) program, paying particular attention to her response to Duhem's problem. It turns out that Mayo's purported solution to Duhem's pro…Read more
  •  97
    Two compelling principles, the Reasonable Range Principle and the Preservation of Irrelevant Evidence Principle, are necessary conditions that any response to peer disagreements ought to abide by. The Reasonable Range Principle maintains that a resolution to a peer disagreement should not fall outside the range of views expressed by the peers in their dispute, whereas the Preservation of Irrelevant Evidence Principle maintains that a resolution strategy should be able to preserve unanimous judgm…Read more
  •  95
    Formal Epistemology
    In Andrew Cullison (ed.), Contiuum Companion to Epistemology, Contiuum. 2011.
    Yet, in broader terms, formal epistemology is not merely a methodological tool for epistemologists, but a discipline in its own right. On this programmatic view, formal epistemology is an interdisciplinary research program that covers work by philosophers, mathematicians, computer scientists, statisticians, psychologists, operations researchers, and economists who aim to give mathematical and sometimes computational representations of, along with sound strategies for reasoning about, knowledge, …Read more
  •  94
    Causation, Association, and Confirmation
    with Richard Scheines
    In Stephan Hartmann, Marcel Weber, Wenceslao Gonzalez, Dennis Dieks & Thomas Uebe (eds.), Explanation, Prediction, and Confirmation: New Trends and Old Ones Reconsidered, Springer. pp. 37--51. 2010.
    Many philosophers of science have argued that a set of evidence that is "coherent" confirms a hypothesis which explains such coherence. In this paper, we examine the relationships between probabilistic models of all three of these concepts: coherence, confirmation, and explanation. For coherence, we consider Shogenji's measure of association (deviation from independence). For confirmation, we consider several measures in the literature, and for explanation, we turn to Causal Bayes Nets and resor…Read more
  •  92
    Focused correlation and confirmation
    British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 60 (1): 79-100. 2009.
    This essay presents results about a deviation from independence measure called focused correlation . This measure explicates the formal relationship between probabilistic dependence of an evidence set and the incremental confirmation of a hypothesis, resolves a basic question underlying Peter Klein and Ted Warfield's ‘truth-conduciveness’ problem for Bayesian coherentism, and provides a qualified rebuttal to Erik Olsson's claim that there is no informative link between correlation and confirmati…Read more
  •  84
    Epistemology and Artificial Intelligence
    with Luis Moniz Pereira
    Journal of Applied Logic 2 (4): 469-93. 2004.
    In this essay we advance the view that analytical epistemology and artificial intelligence are complementary disciplines. Both fields study epistemic relations, but whereas artificial intelligence approaches this subject from the perspective of understanding formal and computational properties of frameworks purporting to model some epistemic relation or other, traditional epistemology approaches the subject from the perspective of understanding the properties of epistemic relations in terms of thei…Read more
  •  82
    Probabilistic Logics and Probabilistic Networks
    with Rolf Haenni, Jan-Willem Romeijn, and Jon Williamson
    Synthese Library. 2010.
    Additionally, the text shows how to develop computationally feasible methods to mesh with this framework.
  •  80
    Modeling of Phenomena and Dynamic Logic of Phenomena
    with Boris Kovalerchuk and Leonid Perlovsky
    Journal of Applied Non-Classical Logic 22 (1): 1-82. 2011.
    Modeling a complex phenomena such as the mind presents tremendous computational complexity challenges. Modeling field theory (MFT) addresses these challenges in a non-traditional way. The main idea behind MFT is to match levels of uncertainty of the model (also, a problem or some theory) with levels of uncertainty of the evaluation criterion used to identify that model. When a model becomes more certain, then the evaluation criterion is adjusted dynamically to match that change to the model. Th…Read more
  •  78
    NO Revision and NO Contraction
    with Marco Alberti
    Minds and Machines 21 (3): 411-430. 2011.
    One goal of normative multi-agent system theory is to formulate principles for normative system change that maintain the rule-like structure of norms and preserve links between norms and individual agent obligations. A central question raised by this problem is whether there is a framework for norm change that is at once specific enough to capture this rule-like behavior of norms, yet general enough to support a full battery of norm and obligation change operators. In this paper we propose an an…Read more
  •  75
    Dilation, Disintegrations, and Delayed Decisions
    with Arthur Paul Pedersen
    In Thomas Augistin, Serena Dora, Enrique Miranda & Erik Quaeghebeur (eds.), Proceedings of the 9th International Symposium on Imprecise Probability: Theories and Applications (ISIPTA 2015), Aracne Editrice. 2015.
    Both dilation and non-conglomerability have been alleged to conflict with a fundamental principle of Bayesian methodology that we call \textit{Good's Principle}: one should always delay making a terminal decision between alternative courses of action if given the opportunity to first learn, at zero cost, the outcome of an experiment relevant to the decision. In particular, both dilation and non-conglomerability have been alleged to permit or even mandate choosing to make a terminal decision in …Read more
  •  71
    Explaining the limits of Olsson's impossibility result
    Southern Journal of Philosophy 50 (1): 136-150. 2012.
    In his groundbreaking book, Against Coherence (2005), Erik Olsson presents an ingenious impossibility theorem that appears to show that there is no informative relationship between probabilistic measures of coherence and higher likelihood of truth. Although Olsson's result provides an important insight into probabilistic models of epistemological coherence, the scope of his negative result is more limited than generally appreciated. The key issue is the role conditional independence conditions p…Read more
  •  68
    The structural view of rational acceptance is a commitment to developing a logical calculus to express rationally accepted propositions sufficient to represent valid argument forms constructed from rationally accepted formulas. This essay argues for this project by observing that a satisfactory solution to the lottery paradox and the paradox of the preface calls for a theory that both (i) offers the facilities to represent accepting less than certain propositions within an interpreted artificial…Read more
  •  64
    Dilation and Asymmetric Relevance
    Proceedings in Machine Learning Research, Vol. 103. 2019.
    A characterization result of dilation in terms of positive and negative association admits an extremal counterexample, which we present together with a minor repair of the result. Dilation may be asymmetric whereas covariation itself is symmetric. Dilation is still characterized in terms of positive and negative covariation, however, once the event to be dilated has been specified.