Guido Imaguire

The Problem of Universals is one of the oldest problems of metaphysics. And still, there is no agreement, neither about its nor about its. What is the most adequate formulation of the problem? And what kind of explanation does it require? My aim in this paper is to offer an overview of these two basic questions in the contemporary debate. I will present the four most important formulations (section 1), discuss their connections (section 2) and how the three most prominent are related to these formulations (section 3). We will see that, despite the long history of the problem, in recent years new formulations and approaches have been proposed which may open up original perspectives on its solution.

Peter van Inwagen has given a probabilistic answer to the fundamental question ‘why is there something rather than nothing?’: There is something, because the probability of there being nothing is 0. Some philosophers have recently examined van Inwagen's argument and concluded that it does not really work. Three points are central in their criticism: the premise which states that there is only one empty possible world is false, the premise which states that all possible worlds have the same probability is not plausible and the argument is not significant for the question it sets out to answer. In this paper, I shall show that even if there are many empty worlds, this does not necessarily invalidate the argument in its general lines, the examples they offer to support the intuition that possible worlds may have different probabilities fail, and even if the conclusion of the argument does not really answer the question van Inwagen sets out to answer, it is still not an insignificant response to the question.

Resumo Neste artigo o autor apresenta cinco abordagens diferentes ao debate entre o platonismo e o nominalismo: a quantificacional, a reducionista, a dependência da mente / linguagem, a extensional versus intensional, a hierárquica. Cada uma apresenta suas vantagens e desvantagens que devem ser discutidas em detalhe. Palavras-chave : existência, meta-metafísica, nominalismo, platonismoIn this paper I present five different approaches to the debate between Platonism and Nominalism: the quantifier approach, the reductionist approach, the mind / language dependence approach, the extension versus intension approach and the hierarchichal approach. Each one has its advantages and disadvantages that have to be discussed in detail. Keywords : existence, metametaphysics, nominalism, platonism

The present special issue of Disputatio brings together some of the best work recently done in Brazil and Portugal in the tradition of analytic philosophy (broadly conceived). Over the past ten years or so we have witnessed an impressive growth of analytic philosophy in both countries, either in terms of quantity or in terms of quality of the produced philosophy. We hope that this volume capture, at least partly, the dynamics and strength of such development. The range of philosophical problems and topics covered by the contributed essays is vast, cutting across several philosophical disciplines. Indeed, one can find therein issues in philosophical logic, meta-philosophy, ethics, aesthetics, philosophy of science, philosophy of language, philosophy of mathematics and metaphysics. Such variety of subject-matter is also a trait of recent Luso-Brazilian analytic philosophy.

This monograph details a new solution to an old problem of metaphysics. It presents an improved version of Ostrich Nominalism to solve the Problem of Universals. This innovative approach allows one to resolve the different formulations of the Problem, which represents an important meta-metaphysical achievement. In order to accomplish this ambitious task, the author appeals to the notion and logic of ontological grounding. Instead of defending Quine’s original principle of ontological commitment, he proposes the principle of grounded ontological commitment. This represents an entirely new application of grounding. Some metaphysicians regard Ostrich Nominalism as a rejection of the problem rather than a proper solution to it. To counter this, the author presents solutions for each of the formulations. These include: the problem of predication, the problem of abstract reference, and the One Over Many as well as the Many Over One and the Similar but Different variants. This book will appeal to anyone interested in contemporary metaphysics. It will also serve as an ideal resource to scholars working on the history of philosophy. Many will recognize in the solution insights resembling those of traditional philosophers, especially of the Middle Ages.

The current interest in the notions of ontological dependence and metaphysical grounding is usually associated with a renewal of interest in Aristotelian metaphysics. Curiously, some authors have recently argued that the Aristotelian view of universals, according to which universals depend for their existence on their exemplifiers, is incoherent from a grounding perspective. In this paper I argue that such criticism is misleading. I shall examine their arguments and clarify the supposed incoherence.

There are different ways we use the expressions “extension” and “intension”. I specify in the first part of this paper two basic senses of this distinction, and try to show that the old metaphysical sense, by means of particular instance vs. universal, is more fundamental than the contemporary sense by means of substitutivity. In the second part, I argue that logic in general is essentially intensional, not only because logic is a rule-guided activity, but because even the extensional definition of a logic system presupposes an intensional notion of logical consequence.

Which categories of entities qualify as ontological categories? Which combinations of categories qualify as adequate systems of ontological categories? These are the two questions the author focuses on in this article. Contrary to the usual praxis in contemporary ontological literature, he addresses both questions conjointly. First, the author presents some problems of characterizing ontological categories in purely extensional terms, i.e. as widely inclusive natural classes. Second, he introduces the transversality requirement: ontological categories should be individually and naturally domain-transversal, i.e. ontological categories must be neutral concerning different scientific disciplines like physics, biology and mathematics. As a result, ontological categories must have instances in any domain of reality. Finally, the author checks the adequacy of some systems of ontological categories according to this criterion and meets some possible objections.

In Logical Forms II Chateaubriand puts the simple question: Why should we accept Ockham’s razor? He blames the principle of reduction as an unjustified dogma of nominalism. In this paper I present a justification for it. Contrary to Russell`s conception of reduction as elimination, I propose the thesis that reduction is explanation.Em Logical Forms II, Chateaubriand levanta a questão: Por que deveríamos aceitar a navalha de Ockham? Ele critica esse princípio de redução como um dogma não justificado do nominalismo. Neste artigo apresento uma justificativa para o princípio. Ao contrário da concepção de Russell de redução como eliminação, eu proponho a tese de que redução é explanação

Este artigo pretende ser uma exposição crítica da teoria de ter-mos singulares de Russell. Nos seus textos sobre a semântica dos nomes próprios Russell defende uma forma mista de descritivismo . Infelizmente esses textos são extremamente imprecisos. Minha principal crítica será a con-fusão de Russell entre aspectos semânticos e epistemológicos.This paper is intended as a critical exposition of Russell’s theory of singular terms. In his texts about the semantics of proper names Rus-sell defends a mixted form of descritivism . Unfortunately these texts are extremely imprecise. My main criticism aims Russell’s confusion between semantical and epistemological issues

It is a well known fact that the beginning of analytic philosophy is grounded in Moore's and Russell's rebellion against the idealism of 19 century England. Despite of Russell's sharp criticism of his own idealistic phase, some important theses of his later realistic philosophy can only be understood in the context of a critical discussion of his own earlier idealistic philosophy. In this paper I will analyse the concept of the. This is the central logical and philosophical concepts of Russell's only philosophically relevant book of that time. According to Russell, both time and space are the fundamental forms of externality of our world. I will analyse and criticise his arguments in support of this claim. I will end the paper by showing that Russell's theory of relations – one of his most important legacies to analytic philosophy – arises out of his work on the foundations of geometry.

There are different ways we use the expressions “extension” and “intension”. I specify in the first part of this paper two basic senses of this distinction, and try to show that the old metaphysical sense, by means of particular instance vs. universal, is more fundamental than the contemporary sense by means of substitutivity. In the second part, I argue that logic in general is essentially intensional, not only because logic is a rule-guided activity, but because even the extensional definition of a logic system presupposes an intensional notion of logical consequence. DOI:10.5007/1808-1711.2010v14n1p111