Guido Parietti

Starting from considering how radical Hobbes' rejection of teleology was, this paper presents a coherent reading of Hobbesian reason, as applied to the justification of political obligation, striking a more perspicuous third way between the ‘orthodox’ and the ‘revisionist’ readings. Both families of interpretations are partial to some elements of Hobbes' thought, therefore incapable of providing a coherent reading of its whole. A precise rendering of Hobbes' deontological reason allows a better hermeneutical understanding of his philosophy as well as a keener appreciation of its relevance for past and present political thought.

There is a wide consensus that politics should not be considered as an end in itself, being instead instrumentally valuable, provided it is capable of producing good outcomes, however defined. Even when some intrinsic value is accorded to politics, it is thought to be dependent on some broader instrumental character. I shall argue for the reverse: that politics ought to be considered autotelic, and that the very possibility of any good outcomes depends on that. I will begin with a brief summary of how deep and widespread this rejection of the autotelic character of politics is. Then, mainly drawing on Arendt, I shall argue for a restatement of the question, which will clarify why and how a meaningful and coherent concept of politics should be autotelic. Eventually, I will sketch some of the implications for normative political theory