•  61
    Imperatives and the More Generalised Tarski Thesis
    Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 3 (4): 314-320. 2014.
    J.C. Beall and Greg Restall's Generalised Tarski Thesis is a generalisation of the seemingly diverse conceptions of logical consequence. However, even their apparently general account of consequence makes necessary truth-preservation a necessary condition. Sentences in the imperative mood pose a problem for any truth-preservationist account of consequence, because imperatives are not truth-apt but seem to be capable of standing in the relation of logical consequence. In this paper, I show that a…Read more
  •  49
    Standard definitions of validity are designed to preserve truth from the premises to the conclusion. However, it seems possible to construct arguments that contain sentences in the imperative mood. Such sentences are incapable of being true or false, so the standard definitions cannot capture the validity of these imperative arguments. Bernard Williams offers an argument that imperative inference is impossible: two imperatives will always have different permissive presuppositions, so a speaker w…Read more
  •  14
    The interrelated logical concepts of validity, entailment, and consequence are all standardly defined in terms of truth preservation. However, imperative sentences can stand in these relations, but they are not truth-apt. This puzzle can be understood as an inconsistent triad: T1 Imperatives can be the relata of the consequence relation. T2 Imperatives are not truth-apt. T3 The relata of the consequence relation must be truth-apt. These three claims cannot all be true. So, to solve the problem o…Read more
  •  1
    Hilary Putnam had a great fall
    Emergent Australasian Philosophers 2 (1): 1-13. 2009.
    Hilary Putnam's Model-Theoretic argument attempts to dispose of the view that science provides us with a literally true description of the world. It uses the Löwenheim-Skolem Theorem to show that all consistent scientific theories are true of the real world, even if they contradict each other. This is incompatible with the realist conception of truth, which allows only for one version of reality. So, Putnam rejected this conception of truth in favour of his own 'internal realism,' which claims t…Read more