•  1538
    Religious Cognition as Social Cognition
    Studia Religiologica 48 (4): 301-312. 2015.
    In this paper, I examine the relationship between social cognition and religious cognition. Many cognitive theories of religion claim that these two forms are somehow related, but the details are usually left unexplored and insights from theories of social cognition are not taken on board. I discuss the three main (groups of) theories of social cognition, namely the theory-theory, the simulation theory and enactivist theories. Secondly, I explore how these theories can help to enrich a number of…Read more
  •  1056
    Where did the universe come from? Is life a result of chance, or design? If God is loving and all-powerful, why does evil still exist? Is religious belief just a byproduct of undirected evolutionary processes? Or did God make sure humans would evolve in such a way as to believe? Are philosophers closed-minded about religion? And why is so much of philosophy of religion about God-but not about gods? Introduction to Philosophy: Philosophy of Religion introduces students to some of the major tradit…Read more
  •  1032
    Is supernatural belief unreliably formed?
    International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 85 (2): 125-148. 2018.
    I criticize 5 arguments for the conclusion that religious belief is unreliably formed and hence epistemically tainted. The arguments draw on scientific evidence from Cognitive Science of Religion. They differ considerably as to why the evidence points to unreliability. Two arguments conclude to unreliability because religious belief is shaped by evolutionary pressures; another argument states that the mechanism responsible for religious belief produces many false god-beliefs; a similar argument …Read more
  •  895
    Most Peers Don’t Believe It, Hence It Is Probably False
    European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 9 (4): 87-112. 2017.
    Rob Lovering has recently argued that since theists have been unable, by means of philosophical arguments, to convince 85 percent of professional philosophers that God exists, at least one of their defining beliefs must be either false or meaningless. This paper is a critical examination of his argument. First we present Lovering’s argument and point out its salient features. Next we explain why the argument’s conclusion is entirely acceptable for theists, even if, as we show, there are multiple…Read more
  •  531
    Predictive coding and religious belief
    Filosofia Unisinos 19 (3). 2018.
    In this paper I investigate the epistemic implications of a recent theory of religious cognition that draws on predictive coding. The theory argues that certain experiences are heavily shaped by a subject’s prior (religious) beliefs and thereby makes religious believers prone to detect invisible agents. The theory is an update of older theories of religious cognition but departs from them in crucial ways. I will assess the epistemic implications by reformulating existing arguments based on other…Read more
  •  497
    It is widely acknowledged that the new emerging discipline cognitive science of religion has a bearing on how to think about the epistemic status of religious beliefs. Both defenders and opponents of the rationality of religious belief have used cognitive theories of religion to argue for their point. This paper will look at the defender-side of the debate. I will discuss an often used argument in favor of the trustworthiness of religious beliefs, stating that cognitive science of religion shows…Read more
  •  212
    What Cognitive Science of Religion Can Learn from John Dewey
    Contemporary Pragmatism 15 (3): 387-406. 2018.
    Cognitive science of religion is a fairly young discipline with the aim of studying the cognitive basis of religious belief. Despite the great variation in theories a number of common features can be distilled and most theories can be situated in the cognitivist and modular paradigm. In this paper, I investigate how cognitive science of religion (CSR) can be made better by insights from John Dewey. I chose Dewey because he offered important insights in cognition long before there was cognitive s…Read more
  •  199
    Are Design Beliefs Safe?
    Studia Humana 8 (1): 75-83. 2019.
    Recently, Del Ratzsch proposed a new version of the design argument. He argues that belief in a designer is often formed non-inferentially, much like perceptual beliefs, rather than formed by explicit reasoning. Ratzsch traces his argument back to Thomas Reid (1710-1796) who argues that beliefs formed in this way are also justified. In this paper, I investigate whether design beliefs that are formed in this way can be regarded as knowledge. For this purpose, I look closer to recent scientific st…Read more
  •  156
    This article discusses “explaining away” arguments in the cognitive science of religion. I distinguish two rather different ways of explaining away religion, one where religion is shown to be incompatible with scientific findings and one where supernatural entities are rendered superfluous by scientific explanations. After discussing possible objections to both varieties, I argue that the latter way offers better prospects for successfully explaining away religion but that some caveats must be m…Read more
  •  106
    There Is No Sensus Divinitatis
    Journal for the Study of Religions and Ideologies 15 (45): 24-40. 2016.
    Inspired by Alvin Plantinga, many philosophers of religion accept the existence of a sensus divinitatis, a cognitive mechanism that produces religious beliefs. In this paper I will argue that there are no good reasons to accept the existence of a sensus divinitatis and hence its existence should not be affirmed. Plantinga gives two arguments for its existence, one empirical and one from the nature of God. I will argue that the first argument fails because God’s nature makes it more likely that h…Read more
  •  65
    The Retreat Argument
    Heythrop Journal (3): 497-508. 2018.
    Some philosophers and scientists argue that as science progresses the religious domain shrinks ever more. They see the advance of science as an argument against religion and for naturalism. In what follows I construct the argument that is tacit in this line of reasoning and criticize it.
  •  36
    Religious belief as acquired second nature
    Zygon 55 (1): 185-206. 2020.
    Multiple authors in cognitive science of religion (CSR) argue that there is something about the human mind that disposes it to form religious beliefs. The dispositions would result from the internal architecture of the mind. In this article, I will argue that this disposition can be explained by various forms of (cultural) learning and not by the internal architecture of the mind. For my argument, I draw on new developments in predictive processing. I argue that CSR theories argue for the natura…Read more
  •  30
    Book Review on The Philosophical Challenge from China (review)
    Comparative Philosophy 7 (1). 2016.
    In this paper, I review the book The Philosophical Challenge from China, edited by Brian Bruya. I critically discuss each of the 13 contributions.
  •  24
    Spirit Beliefs Debunked?
    Science, Religion and Culture 5 (1): 73-82. 2018.
    I discuss and criticize an argument for the conclusion that belief in spirits is unreliably formed and hence unjustified. The argument is based on three scientific explanations for spirit-beliefs; hyperactive agency detection device, infrasound, and magnetic stimulation of the temporal lobe. I argue that the argument fails because the explanations are of too limited scope
  •  20
    Cognitive Science of Religion is still a rather young discipline. Depending on what one deems to be the first paper or book in the field, the discipline is now almost forty or almost thirty years old. Philosophical and theological discussion on CSR started in the late 2000s. From its onset, the main focus has been the epistemic consequences of CSR, and this focus is dominant even today. Some of those involved in the debate discussed the relevance of CSR for further issues in philosophy of religi…Read more
  •  18
    Talk of ‘brains deciding’, ‘brains inferring’ or ‘brains perceiving’ is common in contemporary cognitive science and neuroscience. A number of authors (most notably Peter Hacker and Maxwell Bennett) argue that such talk commits a category mistake; deciding, making inferences or perceiving are abilities properly ascribed to humans and not to human subsystems or subparts. Here I will argue that ascribing such properties to human brains or cognitive systems within the brain is proper. I will argue …Read more
  •  18
    This paper explores the relation between evolutionary explanations of religious belief and a core idea in both classical Christian theology and Reformed Epistemology, namely that humans have fallen into sin. In particular, it challenges the claim made by De Cruz and De Smedt that ‘ in the light of current evolutionary and cognitive theories, the Reformed epistemological view of NES [the noetic effects of sin] is in need of revision.’ Three possible solutions to this conundrum are examined, two o…Read more
  •  15
    Responding to Debunking Arguments
    Philosophia Reformata 87 (2): 195-207. 2022.
    In this response article, I argue that Launonen’s criticisms either are beyond the scope of my argument in chapter 5 of Arguing from Cognitive Science of Religion or wrongfully presume that evolutionary explanations exhaustively explain religious beliefs. I also criticize Launonen’s claim that arguments in terms of divine design are preferable to arguments in terms of truth-tracking cognitive mechanisms.
  •  15
    Kelly James Clark, God and the Brain: The Rationality of Belief
    Philosophia Reformata 86 (1): 1-5. 2020.
  •  14
    J. A. Van Slyke, The Cognitive Science of Religion, Ashgate Publishing, Ltd., 2011
    European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 8 (4): 231--233. 2016.
  •  10
    Review: ‘Minds Make Societies’ (review)
    Journal of Cognition and Culture 20 (1-2): 155-158. 2020.
  •  9
    An Epistemic Defense of Animism
    In Tiddy Smith (ed.), Animism and Philosophy of Religion, Springer Verlag. pp. 285-312. 2022.
    Contrary to theistic belief, the epistemic status of animistic belief is rarely discussed in contemporary philosophy of religion. I argue that animistic experiences can provide personal justification to subjects in the absence of defeating counterevidence. I also argue that recent, scientific attempts at explaining animistic experiences do not provide such counterevidence. Finally, I investigate if animistic belief can be justified on moral grounds.
  •  7
    This book assesses whether religious epistemology can be expanded to argue for the justification of belief in spirits. It focuses specifically on experiences of spirits, animistic beliefs and belief in possession. Most work in philosophy of religion exclusively deals with the existence of God or the epistemic status of belief in God. Spirit beliefs are often regarded as aberrations, and the falsity of such beliefs is often assumed. This book argues that various beliefs concerning spirits can be …Read more
  •  7
    Rob Lovering. God and Evidence. Bloomsbury, 2013
    European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 8 (1): 254--260. 2016.