Harald Wohlrapp

Fallacy theory has not been my particular concern until now – even if I spoke here and there about fallacies; mainly about the two specimens which I consider to be of the highest importance for argumentation theory. I mean “Ad baculum” and “Begging the question”. In fact I was not aware that a defense of fallacy theory was necessary because I had taken the criticisms of late to be mainly relying on a lack of clarity, confusion and exaggeration. Despite this estimation I will begin with stating that I agree with most of Aikin’s well minded proposals and solutions. Nevertheless I will provide some comments which hopefully can contribute to a fruitful discussion. They follow the sections of the paper.

The theoretical labor carried out over the past half-century in the field of argumentation theory has become so rich, heterogenous, and controversial by now that there is an urgent need for a philosophically reflected foundation. The present book attempts to deliver such a basis using, in particular, elements of dialectics and pragmatism. It approaches argumentation against the background of the conditio humana: as the medium of maintaining and improving orientation for all aspects of life. This perspective is more abstract than the usual way of addressing argument as a specific way of persuasive communication. However, that abstract philosophical perspective allows, on a concrete level, a more realistic theorization of the practice of argument. Thus, it exhibits some significant new traits, mainly concerning its subjective and its dynamic side.

Arguing that our attachment to Aristotelian modes of discourse makes a revision of their conceptual foundations long overdue, the author proposes the consideration of unacknowledged factors that play a central role in argument itself. These are in particular the subjective imprint and the dynamics of argumentation. Their inclusion in a four-dimensional framework and the focus on thesis validity allow for a more realistic view of our discourse practice. Exhaustive analyses of fascinating historical and contemporary arguments are provided. These range from Columbus’s advocacy of the Western Passage to India, over the trial of King Louis XVI during the French Revolution, to today’s highly charged controversies surrounding euthanasia and embryo research. Excavating foundational issues such as the purpose of argument itself and the contested role of argument as a generator of knowledge, the book culminates in a discussion of the relationship between rationality and reasonableness and criticizes the restrictions of ‘rational’ argument relying on fixed logical, economic or cultural criteria that in reality are mutable. Here, a true, open argument requires the infusion of Paul Lorenzen’s principle of ‘transsubjectivity’, which recognizes but transcends the partiality of the individual and which can be seen in the pragmatic and expanding consensus that humanity can control itself to safeguard the future of a fragile, damaged world.

The paper consists of three parts. The aim of the first part is to depict the concept of science in the analytic philosophy of science to point out its characteristic defects. The second part shows how the constructive philosophy of science is able to avoid these defects by honouring not special modes of research but speicial modes of foundation of results in research with its criteria for science. The third part finally refutes the main counter-arguments of analytic philosophy of science against the constructive