Charlottesville, Virginia, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
Epistemology
Philosophy of Mind
Areas of Interest
Epistemology
Philosophy of Mind
  •  28
    I argue that intentionalist theories of perceptual experience are unable to explain the phenomenal character of perceptual experience. I begin by describing what is involved in explaining phenomenal character, and why it is a task of philosophical theories of perceptual experience to explain it. I argue that reductionist versions of intentionalism are unable to explain the phenomenal character of perceptual experience because they mischaracterize its nature; in particular, they fail to recognize…Read more
  •  46
    Nietzsche and value creation: subjectivism, self-expression, and strength
    Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 61 (1): 100-113. 2018.
    For Nietzsche, the creation of value is of such great importance because it is the only means by which value can come to exist in the world. In this paper, I examine Nietzsche’s views about how value is created. For Nietzsche, value is created through valuing, and in section ‘Valuing’, I provide a Nietzschean account of valuing. Specifically, I argue that those who share Nietzsche’s view that there are no objective values can value things by representing them to have relative value. In section ‘…Read more
  •  86
    Strategy for dualists
    Metaphilosophy 32 (4): 395-418. 2001.
  •  104
    The theory of appearing defended
    Philosophical Studies 87 (1): 33-59. 1997.
  •  102
    Experiences, thoughts, and qualia
    Philosophical Studies 99 (3): 269-295. 2000.
  •  116
    Why pains are mental objects
    Journal of Philosophy 92 (6): 303-13. 1995.
  • Towards a Kantian Theory of Intentionality
    Dissertation, Princeton University. 1994.
    Thoughts have content; for instance, the content of the thought that Plato is a great philosopher is that a certain person, Plato, has a certain property, the property of being a great philosopher. In thinking this thought, I become related in a certain manner to this person, Plato, and to the property of being a great philosopher. In this dissertation, I begin to develop a theory of how such relations come to obtain. ;In chapter 1, I examine and ultimately reject the two approaches to intention…Read more
  •  14
    Kant, Hume, and Our Ordinary Concept of Causation
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54 (3): 625-647. 1994.
  •  53
    Consciousness, experience, and justification
    Canadian Journal of Philosophy 31 (1): 1-28. 2002.
    I think it is important to try to make sense of these thoughts concerning the justificatory role of experiences, for I suspect that we are losing the ability to see why philosophers have traditionally been attracted to such thoughts. Coherentism and reliabilism, perhaps the two most currently popular theories of epistemic justification, appear simply to reject the idea that experiences can justify beliefs. Thus according to coherentism, the view that ‘a belief is justified by its coherence with …Read more
  •  5
    Why Colours
    Philosophical Quarterly 50 (198): 68-75. 2000.
  •  6
    Risks and Wrongs
    with Jules L. Coleman
    Philosophical Review 104 (3): 477. 1995.
  •  74
    A Defense of McDowell’s Response to the Sceptic
    Acta Analytica 29 (1): 43-59. 2014.
    Crispin Wright argues that John McDowell’s use of disjunctivism to respond to the sceptic misses the point of the sceptic’s argument, for disjunctivism is a thesis about the differing metaphysical natures of veridical and nonveridical experiences, whereas the sceptic’s point is that our beliefs are unjustified because veridical and nonveridical experiences can be phenomenally indistinguishable. In this paper, I argue that McDowell is responsive to the sceptic’s focus on phenomenology, for the po…Read more
  •  12
    Why Pains are Mental Objects
    Journal of Philosophy 92 (6): 303. 1995.
  •  75
    The intuitive case for naïve realism
    Philosophical Explorations 20 (1): 106-122. 2017.
    Naïve realism, the view that perceptual experiences are irreducible relations between subjects and external objects, has intuitive appeal, but this intuitive appeal is sometimes thought to be undermined by the possibility of certain kinds of hallucinations. In this paper, I present the intuitive case for naïve realism, and explain why this intuitive case is not undermined by the possibility of such hallucinations. Specifically, I present the intuitive case for naïve realism as arguing that the o…Read more
  •  4
    Consciousness, Experience, and Justification
    Canadian Journal of Philosophy 32 (1): 1-28. 2002.
    I think it is important to try to make sense of these thoughts concerning the justificatory role of experiences, for I suspect that we are losing the ability to see why philosophers have traditionally been attracted to such thoughts. Coherentism and reliabilism, perhaps the two most currently popular theories of epistemic justification, appear simply to reject the idea that experiences can justify beliefs. Thus according to coherentism, the view that ‘a belief is justified by its coherence with …Read more
  •  68
    Why colours do look like dispositions
    Philosophical Quarterly 50 (198): 68-75. 2000.
  •  126
    In this paper, I argue that what underlies internalism about justification is a rationalist conception of justification, not a deontological conception of justification, and I argue for the plausibility of this rationalist conception of justification. The rationalist conception of justification is the view that a justified belief is a belief that is held in a rational way; since we exercise our rationality through conscious deliberation, the rationalist conception holds that a belief is justifie…Read more
  •  50
    Kant's compatibilism and his two conceptions of truth
    Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 81 (2). 2000.
    In this paper, I explain how Kant's views can be reconciled, and I argue that the relevance of transcendental idealism here is that it shows that determinism is known to be true, not in accordance with the familiar correspondence notion of truth, but only in accordance with a weaker notion of truth, Kant's empirical notion of truth, which is a kind of coherence notion of truth. (edited)
  •  52
    A Defense of Restricted Phenomenal Conservatism
    Philosophical Papers 42 (3). 2013.
    In this paper, I criticize Michael Huemer's phenomenal conservatism, the theory of justification according to which if it seems to S that p, then in the absence of defeaters, S thereby has at least some degree of justification for believing that p. Specifically, I argue that beliefs and hunches provide counterexamples to phenomenal conservatism. I then defend a version of restricted phenomenal conservatism, the view that some but not all appearances confer prima facie justification on their prop…Read more
  •  297
  •  115
    Externalism, self-knowledge, and inner observation
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy 80 (1): 42-61. 2002.
    There is a continuing debate as to whether externalism about mental content is compatible with certain commonly accepted views about the nature of self-knowledge. Both sides to this debate seem to agree that externalism is _not compatible with the traditional view that self-knowledge is acquired by means of observation. In this paper, I argue that externalism is compatible with this traditional view of self-knowledge, and that, in fact, we have good reason to believe that the self-knowledge at i…Read more
  •  113
    Why I believe in an external world
    Metaphilosophy 37 (5): 652-672. 2006.
  •  45
    Real materialism and other essays * by Galen Strawson
    Analysis 69 (4): 779-781. 2009.
    A perennial criticism of analytic philosophy is that it fails to engage with our deepest and most basic human concerns, and has thereby rendered itself irrelevant to the larger culture. In my own thinking about philosophy, I am inclined to dismiss this criticism; after all, different philosophers will find different issues to be interesting and important and will philosophize accordingly; surely it is not the philosopher's job to indulge a corrupted culture by anticipating what it will judge to …Read more
  •  17
    In this book, Harold Langsam argues that consciousness is intelligible -- that there are substantive facts about consciousness that can be known a priori -- and that it is the intelligibility of consciousness that is the source of its ...