•  205
    Prospects for a Naive Theory of Classes
    with Hartry Field and Tore Fjetland Øgaard
    Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 58 (4): 461-506. 2017.
    The naive theory of properties states that for every condition there is a property instantiated by exactly the things which satisfy that condition. The naive theory of properties is inconsistent in classical logic, but there are many ways to obtain consistent naive theories of properties in nonclassical logics. The naive theory of classes adds to the naive theory of properties an extensionality rule or axiom, which states roughly that if two classes have exactly the same members, they are identi…Read more
  •  79
    Classical Opacity
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. forthcoming.
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, EarlyView.
  •  57
    Sense, reference and substitution
    with Jeremy Goodman
    Philosophical Studies 1-6. forthcoming.
    We show that, contrary to conventional wisdom, Frege’s distinction between sense and reference does not reconcile a classical logic of identity with apparent counterexamples to it involving proper names embedded under propositional attitude verbs.
  •  54
    Uncommon Knowledge
    Mind 127 (508): 1069-1105. 2018.
    Some people commonly know a proposition just in case they all know it, they all know that they all know it, they all know that they all know that they all know it, and so on. They commonly believe a proposition just in case they all believe it, they all believe that they all believe it, they all believe that they all believe that they all believe it, and so on. A long tradition in economic theory, theoretical computer science, linguistics and philosophy has held that people have some approximati…Read more
  •  38
    Can modalities save naive set theory?
    with Peter Fritz, Tiankai Liu, and Dana Scott
    Review of Symbolic Logic 11 (1): 21-47. 2018.
  •  37
    People with common priors can agree to disagree
    Review of Symbolic Logic 8 (1): 11-45. 2015.
  •  36
    Common Knowledge
    In Marija Jankovic & Kirk Ludwig (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Collective Intentionality, . pp. 181-195. 2018.
    An opinionated introduction to philosophical issues connected to common knowledge.
  •  31
    The coordinated attack scenario and the electronic mail game are two paradoxes of common knowledge. In simple mathematical models of these scenarios, the agents represented by the models can coordinate only if they have common knowledge that they will. As a result, the models predict that the agents will not coordinate in situations where it would be rational to coordinate. I argue that we should resolve this conflict between the models and facts about what it would be rational to do by rejectin…Read more
  •  30
    Extended Preferences and Interpersonal Comparisons of Well‐being
    with Hilary Greaves
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 636-667. 2016.
    An important objection to preference-satisfaction theories of well-being is that these theories cannot make sense of interpersonal comparisons of well-being. A tradition dating back to Harsanyi () attempts to respond to this objection by appeal to so-called extended preferences: very roughly, preferences over situations whose description includes agents’ preferences. This paper examines the prospects for defending the preference-satisfaction theory via this extended preferences program. We argue…Read more
  •  25
    Aggregating extended preferences
    with Hilary Greaves
    Philosophical Studies 174 (5): 1163-1190. 2017.
    An important objection to preference-satisfaction theories of well-being is that they cannot make sense of interpersonal comparisons. A tradition dating back to Harsanyi :434, 1953) attempts to solve this problem by appeal to people’s so-called extended preferences. This paper presents a new problem for the extended preferences program, related to Arrow’s celebrated impossibility theorem. We consider three ways in which the extended-preference theorist might avoid this problem, and recommend tha…Read more
  •  17
    Standard State Space Models of Unawareness
    Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge 15. 2015.
    The impossibility theorem of Dekel, Lipman and Rustichini has been thought to demonstrate that standard state-space models cannot be used to represent unawareness. We first show that Dekel, Lipman and Rustichini do not establish this claim. We then distinguish three notions of awareness, and argue that although one of them may not be adequately modeled using standard state spaces, there is no reason to think that standard state spaces cannot provide models of the other two notions. In fact, stan…Read more