•  1031
    Sensory Measurements: Coordination and Standardization
    Biological Theory 10 (3): 200-211. 2015.
    Do sensory measurements deserve the label of “measurement”? We argue that they do. They fit with an epistemological view of measurement held in current philosophy of science, and they face the same kinds of epistemological challenges as physical measurements do: the problem of coordination and the problem of standardization. These problems are addressed through the process of “epistemic iteration,” for all measurements. We also argue for distinguishing the problem of standardization from the pro…Read more
  •  331
    Preservative realism and its discontents: Revisiting caloric
    Philosophy of Science 70 (5): 902-912. 2003.
    A popular and plausible response against Laudan's “pessimistic induction” has been what I call “preservative realism,” which argues that there have actually been enough elements of scientific knowledge preserved through major theory‐change processes, and that those elements can be accepted realistically. This paper argues against preservative realism, in particular through a critical review of Psillos's argument concerning the case of the caloric theory of heat. Contrary to his argument, the his…Read more
  •  274
    The Philosophical Grammar of Scientific Practice
    International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 25 (3): 205-221. 2011.
    I seek to provide a systematic and comprehensive framework for the description and analysis of scientific practice—a philosophical grammar of scientific practice, ‘grammar’ as meant by the later Wittgenstein. I begin with the recognition that all scientific work, including pure theorizing, consists of actions, of the physical, mental, and ‘paper-and-pencil’ varieties. When we set out to see what it is that one actually does in scientific work, the following set of questions naturally emerge: who…Read more
  •  273
    We argue against the common view that it is impossible to give a causal account of the distant correlations that are revealed in EPR-type experiments. We take a realistic attitude about quantum mechanics which implies a willingness to modify our familiar concepts according to its teachings. We object to the argument that the violation of factorizability in EPR rules out causal accounts, since such an argument is at best based on the desire to retain a classical description of nature that consist…Read more
  •  269
    Scientific Progress: Beyond Foundationalism and Coherentism
    Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 61 1-20. 2007.
    Scientific progress remains one of the most significant issues in the philosophy of science today. This is not only because of the intrinsic importance of the topic, but also because of its immense difficulty. In what sense exactly does science makes progress, and how is it that scientists are apparently able to achieve it better than people in other realms of human intellectual endeavour? Neither philosophers nor scientists themselves have been able to answer these questions to general satisfac…Read more
  •  240
    Why do some epistemic objects persist despite undergoing serious changes, while others go extinct in similar situations? Scientists have often been careless in deciding which epistemic objects to retain and which ones to eliminate; historians and philosophers of science have been on the whole much too unreflective in accepting the scientists’ decisions in this regard. Through a re-examination of the history of oxygen and phlogiston, I will illustrate the benefits to be gained from challenging an…Read more
  •  237
    The absolute and its measurement; William Thomson on temperature
    with Sang Wook Yi
    Annals of Science 62 (3): 281-308. 2005.
    In this paper we give a full account of the work of William Thomson on absolute temperature, which to this day provides the theoretical underpinnings for the most rigorous measurements of temperature. When Thomson fashioned his concepts of ‘absolute’ temperature, his main concern was to make the definition of temperature independent of the properties of particular thermometric substances . He tried out a succession of definitions based on the thermodynamics of ideal heat engines; most notably, i…Read more
  •  214
    Contingent transcendental arguments for metaphysical principles
    Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 63 113-133. 2008.
  •  213
    Introduction: philosophy of science in practice (review)
    European Journal for Philosophy of Science 1 (3): 303-307. 2011.
    Introduction: philosophy of science in practice Content Type Journal Article Category Editorial Article Pages 303-307 DOI 10.1007/s13194-011-0036-4 Authors Rachel Ankeny, School of History & Politics, University of Adelaide, Napier Building, The University of Adelaide, Adelaide, SA 5005, Australia Hasok Chang, Department of History and Philosophy of Science, University of Cambridge, Free School Lane, Cambridge, CB2 3RH UK Marcel Boumans, Faculty of Economics and Business, University of Amsterdam…Read more
  •  209
    What can we conclude from a mere handful of case studies? The field of HPS has witnessed too many hasty philosophical generalizations based on a small number of conveniently chosen case studies. One might even speculate that dissatisfaction with such methodological shoddiness contributed decisively to a widespread disillusionment with the whole HPS enterprise. Without specifying clear mechanisms for history-philosophy interaction, we are condemned to either making unwarranted generalizations fro…Read more
  •  206
    I develop a concept of observability that pertains to qualities rather than objects: a quality is observable if it can be registered by human sensation (possibly with the aid of instruments) without involving optional interpretations. This concept supports a better description of observations in science and everyday life than the object-based observability concepts presupposing causal information-transfer from the object to the observer. It also allows a rehabilitation of the traditional empiric…Read more
  •  197
    The quantum counter-revolution: Internal conflicts in scientific change
    Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 26 (2): 121-136. 1995.
    Many of the experiments that produced the empirical basis of quantum mechanics relied on classical assumptions that contradicted quantum mechanics. Historically this did not cause practical problems, as classical mechanics was used mostly when it did not happen to diverge too much from quantum mechanics in the quantitative sense. That fortunate circumstances, however, did not alleviate the conceptual problems involved in understanding the classical experimental reasoning in quantum-mechanical te…Read more
  •  195
    Operationalism
    Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 2009.
  •  193
    Realism for realistic people
    Spontaneous Generations 9 (1): 31-34. 2018.
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  •  181
    This book presents the concept of “complementary science” which contributes to scientific knowledge through historical and philosophical investigations. It emphasizes the fact that many simple items of knowledge that we take for granted were actually spectacular achievements obtained only after a great deal of innovative thinking, painstaking experiments, bold conjectures, and serious controversies. Each chapter in the book consists of two parts: a narrative part that states the philosophical pu…Read more
  •  177
    Is Water H2O? Evidence, Realism and Pluralism
    Boston Studies in the Philosophy and History of Science. 2012.
    This book exhibits deep philosophical quandaries and intricacies of the historical development of science lying behind a simple and fundamental item of common sense in modern science, namely the composition of water as H2O. Three main phases of development are critically re-examined, covering the historical period from the 1760s to the 1860s: the Chemical Revolution, early electrochemistry, and early atomic chemistry. In each case, the author concludes that the empirical evidence available at th…Read more
  •  172
    Hasok Chang. 2012. Is Water H2O? Evidence, Realism and Pluralism
    Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 28 (2): 331-334. 2013.
  •  159
    Historians often feel that standard philosophical doctrines about the nature and development of science are not adequate for representing the real history of science. However, when philosophers of science fail to make sense of certain historical events, it is also possible that there is something wrong with the standard historical descriptions of those events, precluding any sensible explanation. If so, philosophical failure can be useful as a guide for improving historiography, and this constit…Read more
  •  157
    How to take realism beyond foot-stamping
    Philosophy 76 (1): 5-30. 2001.
    I propose a reformulation of realism, as the pursuit of ontological plausibility in our systems of knowledge. This is dubbed plausibility realism, for convenience of reference. Plausibility realism is non-empiricist, in the sense that it uses ontological plausibility as an independent criterion from empirical adequacy in evaluating systems of knowledge. Ontological plausibility is conceived as a precondition for intelligibility, nor for Truth; therefore, the function of plausibilty realism is to…Read more
  •  126
    A misunderstood rebellion
    Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 24 (5): 741-790. 1992.
  •  125
    Can planck's constant be measured with classical mechanics?
    International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 11 (3). 1997.
    An interesting case of the complex interaction between theory and experiment can be found in many experiments in quantum physics employing classical reasoning. It is expected that this practice would lead to quantitative inaccuracy, unless the measurements' results were averaged. Whether or not this inaccuracy is significant depends critically on the details of the particular experimental situation. The example of Millikan's photoelectric experiment, in which he obtained a precise value of Planc…Read more
  •  116
    Presentist History for Pluralist Science
    Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 52 (1): 97-114. 2020.
    Building on my previous writings on presentism, pluralism, and “complementary science”, I develop an activist view of historiography. I begin by recognizing the inevitability of presentism. Our own purposes and perspectives do and should guide the production of our accounts of the past; like funerals, history-writing is for the living. There are different kinds of presentist history, depending on the historians’ purposes and perspectives. My particular inclination is pluralist. Science remembers…Read more
  •  112
    VI—Operational Coherence as the Source of Truth
    Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 117 (2): 103-122. 2017.
  •  94
    In this innovative book, Hasok Chang constructs a philosophy of science for 'realistic people' interested in understanding and promoting the actual practices of inquiry in science and other knowledge-focused areas of life. Inspired by pragmatist philosophy, he reconceives the very notions of reality and truth on the basis of his concept of the 'operational coherence' of epistemic activities, and offers new pragmatist conceptions of truth and reality as operational ideals achievable in actual sci…Read more
  •  92
    Contribution to a symposium on Kostas Gavroglu and Ana Simões, Neither Physics nor Chemistry, The MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts.
  •  90
    Introduction to Synthese SI: Systematicity: The Nature of Science?
  •  85
    Acidity: The Persistence of the Everyday in the Scientific
    Philosophy of Science 79 (5): 690-700. 2012.
    Acidity provides an interesting example of an everyday concept that developed fully into a scientific one; it is one of the oldest concepts in chemistry and remains an important one. However, up to now there has been no unity to it. Currently two standard theoretical definitions coexist ; the standard laboratory measure of acidity, namely the pH, only corresponds directly to the Br⊘nsted-Lowry concept. The lasting identity of the acidity concept in modern chemistry is based on the persistence of…Read more