Hassan Fatzade

By separating the semiotic and the symbolic, Kristeva seeks to bring the semiotic chora back to the realm of politics. Chora includes the libidinal force belonging to the mother-child relationship, which at the same time that it has propagated the components of the symbolic realm, has always been suppressed. Kristeva regards this repression as the basis of all the repressions and wants to restrain the authority by returning to this suppressed affair. Here, the repressed affair itself does not return, but it should be backed up by profound psychoanalysis. Kristeva calls this a revolt and thus revealing the deep relationship between macropolitics and micropolitics by giving a political character to it. We will introduce this psychoanalytic understanding of the political affair as corpopolitics. As we will show, corpopolitics seeks to prevent matricide, and this is the most original political act; because, according to us, matricide is the root of all violence and repression. So we shall propose a new reading of Kristeva’s political thoughts.

Husserl thinks of philosophy as a general, fundamental and apodictic science of world. He set out to found transcendental phenomenology as general philosophy or apodictic science, but he ought to explain the possibility of objective knowledge of world as to reach to this point. Concerning about crisis in modern western culture, Crisis projects his view of philosophy and of duty of philosopher in context of a critics of modern philosophy and science concerns about crisis in modern western culture. So he introduces the original concept life-world that is a novel idea for the philosophy as general science. The paper is to consider the Husserl's point of view on relation between philosophy and crisis of modern culture and to review the question if life-world can introduce Husserl's transcendental phenomenology as a fundamental philosophy and general science. We consider the problem of possibility of objectivity of world, a problem that proposed in late philosophy of Husserl in more extensive and innovative form.

Nietzsche takes two aspects for the origin of values. On the one hand he is faithful to the most prominent aspect of the western thought, the thought that takes the world as a whole, and thus considers the world as the active and passive forces that bring the life into existence. In his thought life has at its heart a kind of obligation that forces us to apply the values, and when we respect the values the life would become valuable. On the other hand, by turning to the slave and master morality in his philosophy, and pointing that that was masters who construct the value and valuing, he attributes another origin to values. This antinomy encounters his philosophy with a challenge that must be overcome by any accurate and coherence reading. In this article, alongside with analyzing master and slave moralities, we attempt to eliminate this antinomy and render a coherent reading of the origin of values in Nietzsche's philosophy. a pre-subjective view to the origin of values and do not let us evaluate life by some thing beyond it. On the other hand, by turning to the slave and master morality in his philosophy, and pointing that that was masters who construct the value and valuing, he attributes another origin to values. This antinomy encounters his philosophy with a challenge that must be overcome by any accurate and coherence reading.