•  11
    The social contract for science and the value-free ideal
    with T. Y. Branch
    Synthese 203 (2): 1-19. 2024.
    While the Value-Free Ideal (VFI) had many precursors, it became a solidified bulwark of normative claims about scientific reasoning and practice in the mid-twentieth century. Since then, it has played a central role in the philosophy of science, first as a basic presupposition of how science should work, then as a target for critique, and now as a target for replacement. In this paper, we will argue that a narrow focus on the VFI is misguided, because the VFI coalesced in the midst of other impo…Read more
  • Science, Values, and Democracy: The 2016 Descartes Lectures (edited book)
    with Ted Richards
    Consortium for Science, Policy & Outcomes, Arizona State University. 2021.
  •  176
    Replacing the value-free ideal (VFI) for science requires attention to the broader understanding of how science in society should function. In public spaces, science needed to project the VFI in norms for science advising, science education, and science communication. This resulted in the independent science advisor model and a focus on science literacy for science education and communication. Attending to these broader implications of the VFI which structure science and society relationships i…Read more
  •  12
    The integration of symbolic and non-symbolic representations of exact quantity in preschool children
    with Carolina Jiménez Lira, Miranda Carver, and Jo-Anne LeFevre
    Cognition 166 (C): 382-397. 2017.
  •  33
    A recent case in the Northern Territory of Australia has raised the issues of intra-racial rape and the legal recognition of traditional marriages between Indigenous people. The defendant in the Jamilmira case was charged with statutory rape of a 15-year-old girl. He argued that the girl’s status as his promised wife should lead to mitigation of his sentence. Members of the Northern Territory judiciary and others in the community were divided in their response to his claim. Ultimately the case l…Read more
  • Values in social science
    In Nancy Cartwright & Eleonora Montuschi (eds.), Philosophy of Social Science: A New Introduction, Oxford University Press. 2014.
  •  1
    Scientific freedom and social responsibility
    In Péter Hartl & Adam Tamas Tuboly (eds.), Science, Freedom, Democracy, Routledge. 2021.
  •  33
    Addressing the Reproducibility Crisis: A Response to Hudson
    with Kevin C. Elliott
    Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 53 (2): 201-209. 2022.
    In this response to Robert Hudson’s article, “Should We Strive to Make Science Bias-Free? A Philosophical Assessment of the Reproducibility Crisis,” we identify three ways in which he misrepresents our work: he conflates value-ladenness with bias; he describes our view as one in which values are the same as evidential factors; and he creates a false dichotomy between two ways that values could be considered in science for policy. We share Hudson’s concerns about promoting scientific reproducibil…Read more
  •  27
    Science is one of the most important forces in contemporary society. The most reliable source of knowledge about the world, science shapes the technological possibilities before us, informs public policy, and is crucial to measuring the efficacy of public policy. Yet it is not a simple repository of facts on which we can draw. It is an ongoing process of evidence gathering, discovery, contestation, and criticism. I will argue that an understanding of the nature of science and the scientific proc…Read more
  •  17
    Philip Kitcher science in a democratic society
    British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 64 (4): 901-905. 2013.
  •  4
    Science is one of the most important forces in contemporary society. The most reliable source of knowledge about the world, science shapes the technological possibilities before us, informs public policy, and is crucial to measuring the efficacy of public policy. Yet it is not a simple repository of facts on which we can draw. It is an ongoing process of evidence gathering, discovery, contestation, and criticism. I will argue that an understanding of the nature of science and the scientific…Read more
  •  406
    Resisting the Great Endarkenment: On the Future of Philosophy
    Philosophical Inquiries 2 (6): 93-106. 2018.
    Elijah Millgram’s book The Great Endarkenment takes philosophy to task for failing to note the kinds of creatures we are (serial hyperspecializers) and what that means for philosophy. In this commentary, I will complicate the picture he draws, while suggesting a more hopeful path forward. First, I argue that we are not actually serial hyperspecializers. Nevertheless, we are hyperspecializers, and this is the main source of the looming endarkenment. I will suggest that a proper understanding of e…Read more
  •  88
    Science, Policy, Values: Exploring the Nexus
    Perspectives on Science 24 (5): 475-480. 2016.
    The importance of science for guiding policy decisions has been an increasingly central feature of policy-making for much of the past century. But which science we have available to us and what counts as adequate science for policy-making shapes substantially the specific impact science has on policy decisions. Policy influences which science we pursue and how we pursue it in practice, as well as how science ultimately informs policy. Values inform our choices in these areas, as values shape the…Read more
  • The Use of Science in Policy-Making: A Study of Values in Dioxin Science
    Dissertation, University of Pittsburgh. 1998.
    The risk regulation process has been traditionally conceived as having two components: a consultation of the experts concerning the magnitude of risk and a negotiated decision on whether and how to reduce that risk . The first component is generally thought to be free of the contentious value judgments that often characterize the second component. In examining the recent controversy over dioxin regulation, I argue that the first component is not value-free. I review three areas of science import…Read more
  •  225
    Reintroducing prediction to explanation
    Philosophy of Science 76 (4): 444-463. 2009.
    Although prediction has been largely absent from discussions of explanation for the past 40 years, theories of explanation can gain much from a reintroduction. I review the history that divorced prediction from explanation, examine the proliferation of models of explanation that followed, and argue that accounts of explanation have been impoverished by the neglect of prediction. Instead of a revival of the symmetry thesis, I suggest that explanation should be understood as a cognitive tool that …Read more
  •  405
    The Irreducible Complexity of Objectivity
    Synthese 138 (3). 2004.
    The terms ``objectivity'''' and ``objective'''' are among the mostused yet ill-defined terms in the philosophy of science and epistemology. Common to all thevarious usages is the rhetorical force of ``I endorse this and you should too'''', orto put it more mildly, that one should trust the outcome of the objectivity-producing process.The persuasive endorsement and call to trust provide some conceptual coherenceto objectivity, but the reference to objectivity is hopefully not merely an attemptat …Read more
  •  62
    Fraud from the frontlines: the importance of being nice Content Type Journal Article DOI 10.1007/s11016-010-9492-2 Authors Heather Douglas, Department of Philosophy, University of Tennessee at Knoxville, 815 McClung Tower, Knoxville, TN 37996-0480, USA Journal Metascience Online ISSN 1467-9981 Print ISSN 0815-0796
  •  81
    Cognitive and social values
    with Peter Machamer
    Science & Education 8 (1): 45-54. 1999.
  •  172
    The Moral Terrain of Science
    Erkenntnis 79 (S5): 1-19. 2014.
    The moral terrain of science, the full range of ethical considerations that are part of the scientific endeavor, has not been mapped. Without such a map, we cannot examine the responsibilities of scientists to see if the institutions of science are adequately constructed. This paper attempts such a map by describing four dimensions of the terrain: (1) the bases to which scientists are responsible (scientific reasoning, the scientific community, and the broader society); (2) the nature of the res…Read more
  •  279
    The Value of Cognitive Values
    Philosophy of Science 80 (5): 796-806. 2013.
    Traditionally, cognitive values have been thought of as a collective pool of considerations in science that frequently trade against each other. I argue here that a finer-grained account of the value of cognitive values can help reduce such tensions. I separate the values into groups, minimal epistemic criteria, pragmatic considerations, and genuine epistemic assurance, based in part on the distinction between values that describe theories per se and values that describe theory-evidence relation…Read more
  •  259
    Science, Policy, and the Value-Free Ideal
    University of Pittsburgh Press. 2009.
    Douglas proposes a new ideal in which values serve an essential function throughout scientific inquiry, but where the role values play is constrained at key points, protecting the integrity and objectivity of science.
  •  181
    Weighing Complex Evidence in a Democratic Society
    Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 22 (2): 139-162. 2012.
    Weighing complex sets of evidence (i.e., from multiple disciplines and often divergent in implications) is increasingly central to properly informed decision-making. Determining “where the weight of evidence lies” is essential both for making maximal use of available evidence and figuring out what to make of such evidence. Weighing evidence in this sense requires an approach that can handle a wide range of evidential sources (completeness), that can combine the evidence with rigor, and that can …Read more
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