• University of Leeds
    School of Philosophy, Religion, and History of Science
    Associate Professor
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Department of Linguistics and Philosophy
PhD, 2009
Leeds, West Yorkshire, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
Areas of Specialization
Epistemology
Philosophy of Mind
PhilPapers Editorships
Disjunctivism
The Experience of Objects
  •  1821
    Why Naive Realism?
    Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 112 (2pt2): 211-237. 2012.
    Much of the discussion of Naive Realism about veridical experience has focused on a consequence of adopting it—namely, disjunctivism about perceptual experience. However, the motivations for being a Naive Realist in the first place have received relatively little attention in the literature. In this paper, I will elaborate and defend the claim that Naive Realism provides the best account of the phenomenal character of veridical experience
  •  1220
    Good News for the Disjunctivist about (one of) the Bad Cases
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (1): 105-133. 2011.
    Many philosophers are skeptical about disjunctivism —a theory of perceptual experience which holds roughly that a situation in which I see a banana that is as it appears to me to be and one in which I have a hallucination as of a banana are mentally completely different. Often this skepticism is rooted in the suspicion that such a view cannot adequately account for the bad case—in particular, that such a view cannot explain why what it’s like to have a hallucination can be exactly like what it’s…Read more
  •  705
    Experiential Content and Naive Realism: A Reconciliation
    In Berit Brogaard (ed.), Does Perception Have Content?, Oxford University Press. 2014.
    In the first section of this paper, after briefly arguing for the assumption that experiential content is propositional, I’ll distinguish three interpretations of the claim that experience has content (the Mild, Medium, and Spicy Content Views). In the second section, I’ll flesh out Naïve Realism in greater detail, and I’ll reconstruct what I take to be the main argument for its incompatibility with the Content Views. The third section will be devoted to evaluation of existing arguments for the …Read more
  •  346
    Either / or
    with Alex Byrne
    In Adrian Haddock & Fiona Macpherson (eds.), Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge, Oxford University Press. pp. 57-94. 2008.
    This essay surveys the varieties of disjunctivism about perceptual experience. Disjunctivism comes in two main flavours, metaphysical and epistemological.
  •  164
    Disjunctivism: Contemporary Readings (edited book)
    with Alex Byrne
    MIT Press. 2009.
    Classic texts that define the disjunctivist theory of perception.
  •  139
    Introduction
    with Alex Byrne
    In Alex Byrne & Heather Logue (eds.), Disjunctivism: Contemporary Readings, Mit Press. 2009.
  •  94
    Metaphysics of Color 1: Physicalist Theories of Color
    Philosophy Compass 11 (4): 211-219. 2016.
    This entry outlines physicalism about color, and objections to the effect that it cannot meet various desiderata on a metaphysics of color
  •  81
    Metaphysics of Color 2: Non‐Physicalist Theories of Color
    Philosophy Compass 11 (4): 220-231. 2016.
    This entry outlines relationalism, primitivism, and eliminativism about color and considers objections to each theory
  •  62
    Epistemological Disjunctivism, written by Duncan Pritchard (review)
    International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 5 (3): 257-262. 2015.
  •  29
    Gender Fictionalism
    Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 8 (n/a). 2021.
    This paper develops a proposal about the metaphysics of gender by focusing on the question, what is it to be a woman? In recent years, the view that it is a matter of self-identifying as a woman has become increasingly popular outside of philosophical circles. Metaphysicians of gender generally regard this kind of view as hopeless, but it is the only kind of view that accommodates the strongest form of first-person authority (FPA) over gender.This inquiry into the nature of gender is an ameliora…Read more
  •  26
    Purpose and Procedure in Philosophy of Perception (edited book)
    Oxford University Press. 2021.
    Contemporary philosophy of perception is dominated by extremely polarized debates. The polarization is particularly acute in the debate between naïve realist disjunctivists and their opponents, but divisions seem almost as stark in other areas of dispute (for example, the debate over whether we experience so-called ‘high-level’ properties, and the debate concerning individuation of the senses). The guiding hypothesis underlying this volume is that such polarization stems from insufficient attent…Read more
  • World in mind : extending phenomenal character and resisting skepticism
    In Johan Gersel, Rasmus Thybo Jensen, Morten S. Thaning & Søren Overgaard (eds.), In the light of experience: new essays on perception and reasons, Oxford University Press. 2018.
  • Can we visually experience aesthetic properties?
    In Anna Bergqvist & Robert Cowan (eds.), Evaluative Perception, Oxford University Press. forthcoming.
  • Disjunctivism
    In Mohan Matthen (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Perception, Oxford University Press Uk. 2015.