Heine A. Holmen

«Hva er det vi egentlig mener når vi sier, mennesket er dødelig?» spør Woody Allen i boken The Insanity Defence. Han legger til: «Det er åpenbart ikke et kompliment.»1 Jeg tror Woody tar feil her. Vår dødelighet er et kompliment – eller i det minste av det gode – siden livet uten døden ville være katastrofalt. Udødelige liv fører til dyp kjedsomhet, eksistensiell angst og en radikal form for verdinihilistisk tilværelse. Grunnen er at udødeligheten gjør at vi en gang i fremtiden må konfronteres med de radikalt livsfiendtlige stadiene av universets historie. Jeg argumenterer for at dette er en skjebne langt verre enn døden. Konklusjonen blir derfor, med et nikk til Voltaire, at om døden ikke hadde eksistert, hadde vi vært nødt til å finne den opp.

In the Insanity Defence Woody Allen claims that when we say humans are mortal we are obviously not complimenting them. It is difficult to contradict great comedy, of course, but if what I argue holds, Allen is wrong on this account. Mortality is a compliment – or at least something for which we should be grateful – since life without it threatens with disaster. To live without death also means living in the universe in its more hostile stages under conditions where there can be no meaningful life. In this way, immortality is worse than death. In addition, I argue that no matter how carefully we qualify the conditions that make up immortality the old problem of death resurface. I therefore conclude, with a nod towards Voltaire, that if death did not exist, it would have been necessary to invent it.

The following paper argues that the epistemology of action can best be understood via a metaphysical framework of knowledge where the latter is conceived as a metaphysically primitive relation holding between a subject (or mind) and a fact. In particular, it argues that we must separate sharply between the knowledge relation itself and the different means by virtue of which knowledge obtains. Once that distinction is in place, we can see that there is no obstacle to argue that ordinary knowledge can be had on the basis of distinctively practical attitudes or intentional actions.