Henk Keizer

The important conclusion of this article is that essences of singular things are not eternal in the sense of being distinctive eternal modes, as is generally held by Spinoza scholars. Both the essence and the existence of singular things are eternal in the sense that they are comprehended in God’s eternal nature, that is to say, in the sense that they follow necessarily from that nature. The second conclusion is that the essence and the existence of things are inseparable. There are no essences of things when things do not exist. Another conclusion regards the meaning of ”formal essence’. It is argued that the formal essence of a thing is the essence of a thing that formally follows from an attribute. It is not in any sense opposite to the actual essence of a thing. The formal essence is simply the actual essence of a thing that formally follows from an attribute.

This article explores a new reading of an important section of Part II of Spinoza’s Ethics. It recognizes that Spinoza actually differentiates between the human mind conceived from the viewpoint of its cause and the human mind conceived from the viewpoint of its nature. It shows, most importantly, that Spinoza assigns different objects to those ‘minds’. Consequently they represent different knowledge of the body. It will appear that the human mind in respect of its cause represents non-conscious knowledge of the human body and that the human mind in respect of its nature represents conscious knowledge of the human body. It will be shown that knowledge of the inner processes of the human body and of the body per se belongs to the domain of non-conscious knowledge. The same conclusion will be obtained in an analysis that starts from the distinction between the formal and the objective being of the human mind.

Since it has generally been accepted that to Spinoza attributes are real features of substance, the interpretation of his attribute definition has become a notorious problem. The reason is that interpreters have failed to see that the definition formulates a purely epistemological account of the state of affairs. The article presents and justifies such an interpretation. It will be shown that the definition in spite of its epistemological character implies a real ontological definition, which specifies the critical features of an attribute. As to the reason why Spinoza has stated the definition in an ‘indirect way’, it is shown that it is likely that he has done so in order to have a more efficient, a more unambiguous and a more elegant definition. The relevance of the new interpretation is not only that it provides us with an interpretable, transparent attribute definition, but it also contributes to the establishment of a coherent picture of Spinoza’s metaphysics around this definition.