•  4
    O que é que se sente diante de σοφία? amor cristão, amor pagão, amores avulsos
    with Pedro Mentor
    Filosofia E Educação 14 (3): 141-161. 2024.
    O seguinte ensaio escrito em texto corrido é uma breve apresentação da Filosofia do Amor no Cristianismo e na Antiguidade Clássica. Partimos do pressuposto que a palavra ‘filosofia’ tem uma dívida não apenas etimológica, mas conceitual com as definições de Amor, de forma que se faz pertinente uma investigação mais detida sobre o assunto. Começamos então com a interpretação cristã de C.S. Lewis sobre a Afeição, Amizade, Eros e Caridade para em seguida introduzir a visão pagã greco-romana. Concluí…Read more
  •  1
    This work explores the impact of negative X-Phi in the philosophical practice of relying on intuitions. After analyzing how intuitions work, their different types and how they orient thought, I argue that there are several interesting ways for philosophy to deal with the abundance of intuitions that sometimes are in conflict. The emerging image is one where philosophy responds directly or indirectly to truth and doesn't have in intuitions its sole evidential basis.Resumo: O texto explora o impac…Read more
  •  2
    Meus aspectos favoritos do ensino de filosofia
    Revista Sul-Americana de Filosofia E Educação 1. 2011.
    A partir da perspectiva do entrecruzamento entre dimensões políticas, educacionais e filosóficos do ensino da filosofia, o texto discute a importância da dissolução de fronteiras entre a filosofia, a educação, a política e a ciência para a análise do ensino da filosofia.
  •  10
    Indexicalism: The Metaphysics of Paradox
    Edinburgh University Press. 2021.
  •  11
    Neste texto examino algumas consequências da afirmação de Porchat de que o fenômeno no neopirronismo não precisa ser precisamente definido. Ao deixar o fenômeno variar ao sabor das circunstâncias, a abordagem de Porchat então parece deixar um dos elementos da dupla articulação que forma a epokhé neopirronista — a aceitação do fenômeno sem que ele comande crenças e que forma um par com a suspensão do juízo acerca do que não é fenômeno — imerso em imprecisões e, com isso, a posição neopirronista v…Read more
  •  27
    The Road from Leibniz to Whitehead
    Process Studies 49 (2): 234-253. 2020.
    This article is an attempt to compare the monadological multitude in Leibniz with Whitehead's view of process and the present. Some contemporary philosophers are considered in the effort to understand the monadologies of these two thinkers.
  •  5
    Horizonte e irredutibilidade: Eudoro de Sousa e o originário na ontologia
    Archai: Revista de Estudos Sobre as Origens Do Pensamento Ocidental 8 109-114. 2012.
  •  3
    Horizonte e irredutibilidade: Eudoro de Sousa e o originário na ontologia
    Archai: Revista de Estudos Sobre as Origens Do Pensamento Ocidental 8 109-114. 2012.
  •  21
    Horizonte e irredutibilidade: Eudoro de Sousa e o originário na ontologia
    Archai: Revista de Estudos Sobre as Origens Do Pensamento Ocidental 8 109-114. 2012.
  •  26
    Towards an Indexical Paradoxico-Metaphysics
    Open Philosophy 1 (1): 155-172. 2018.
    This paper sketches a metaphysical view according to which the furniture of the universe is made of indexicals. The view draws from work in the philosophy of language and thought concerning demonstratives, proper names and other deictic operations. It also draws on Levinas‘ conception of the Other as beyond any substantive description. Indexicalism, as I call it, is compared with object-oriented views such as Harman‘s and Garcia‘s. Indexicalism lapses into paradox concerning totality and proves …Read more
  •  1447
    In this paper we advocate the thesis that qualia are tropes (or qualitons), and not (universal) properties. The main advantage of the thesis is that we can accept both the Wittgensteinian and Sellarsian assault on the given and the claim that only subjective and private states can do justice to the qualitative character of experience. We hint that if we take qualia to be tropes, we dissolve the problem of inverted qualia. We develop an account of sensory concept acquisition that takes the presen…Read more
  •  8
    Beats and being
    Rhuthmos. forthcoming.
    This presentation has been performed in the conference “Performance Philosophy,” University of Surrey, Guilford in 2013. In the original, parts that are here in bold have been struck out by the author but unfortunately this website does not support strikethrough characters. We are sorry for the inconvenience. Tic. Right now. Tac. Something irrupts. At this moment. Something takes place. Something occupies the place. Something takes over the place. The place where things happen. The land of - Phi…Read more
  •  275
    Soft facts: Thinking practices and the architecture of reality
    Daimon: Revista Internacional de Filosofía 61 7-21. 2014.
    It is common to criticize the idea of objectivity by claiming that we cannot make sense of any cognitive contact with the world that is not constituted by the very materials of our thinking, and to conclude that the idea must be abandoned and that the world is ‘well lost’. We resist this conclusion and argue for a notion of objectivity that places its source within the domain of thoughts by proposing a conception of facts, akin to McDowell’s, as thinkable while independent of any act of thinking…Read more
  •  404
    Sense and Sensibility Educated: A Note on Experience and (Minimal) Empiricism
    International Journal of Philosophical Studies 20 (5): 741-747. 2012.
    McDowell’s minimal empiricism holds that experience, understood as providing conceptually articulated contents, plays a role in the justification of our beliefs. We question this idea by contrasting the role of perceptual experience in moral and non-moral judgments and conclude that experience per se is irrelevant in the former case and should also be so in the latter one: only with the help of adequate beliefs experience can provide a connection with the world. We conclude with some remarks con…Read more
  •  22
    In this paper I consider two related threats to the idea that our beliefs compose a genuine worldview the global skeptic challenge to the clam that our beliefs are somehow grounded and the suspicion that our beliefs have no relation to the world whatsoever I consider these two threats from the point of view of our activity of doubting m order to establish what follows from our capacity to doubt any claim although not at once I argue that the two threats can be dispelled if we attend to a careful…Read more
  •  11
    Richard Moran has defended the need for two modes of access to our mental contents, a first-personal and a third-personal one. In this paper we maintain that, in the moral case, an excess of concentration on the a third-personal perspective precludes accounting for our responsibility over our own beliefs and our capacity to normatively respond to the world.
  •  39
    When my Own Beliefs are not First-Personal Enough
    Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 22 (1): 35-41. 2007.
    Richard Moran has argued, convincingly, in favour of the idea that there must be more than one path to access our own mental contents. The existence of those routes, one first-personal —through avowal— the other third-personal —no different to the one used to ascribe mental states to other people and to interpret their actions— is intimately connected to our capacity to respond to norms. Moran’s account allows for conflicts between first personal and third personal authorities over my own belief…Read more
  •  241
    In this paper we put forward the thesis that qualia are tropes (or qualitons), and not (universal) properties. Further, we maintain that Wittgenstein hints in this direction. We also find in Wittgenstein elements of an account of language acquisition that takes the presence of qualia as an enabling condition. We conclude by pointing out some difficulties of this view.
  •  393
    When my own beliefs are not first-personal enough
    with Manuel De Pinedo García
    Theoria 22 (58): 35-41. 2007.
    Richard Moran has argued, convincingly, in favour of the idea that there must be more than one path to access our own mental contents. The existence of those routes, one first-personal—through avowal—the other third-personal—no different to the one used to ascribe mental states to other people and to interpret their actions—is intimately connected to our capacity to respond to norms. Moran’s account allows for conflicts between first personal and third personal authorities over my own beliefs; t…Read more
  •  17
    Pode Deus determinar o valor de pi?
    Kriterion: Journal of Philosophy 48 (115): 47-66. 2007.
  • Metaphysics of plots in the world without arche
    with Tomas Ribeiro Cardoso
    Kriterion: Journal of Philosophy 53 (125): 281-298. 2012.
  •  21
    Depois de anos de deflação galopante, O que sobrou da verdade?
    Philósophos - Revista de Filosofia 8 (1). 2003.
    Este texto considera algumas maneiras alternativas de pensar na verdade e no que queremos com ela. Analisa também os problemas com a concepção da verdade como correspondência e procura um diagnóstico do tipo de frustração que esses problemas trazem. Considera em seguida as alternativas deflacionistas e seus problemas em oferecer aquilo que comumente queremos de um predicado de verdade. Avalia então as vantagens e falhas das concepções da verdade como indefinível e da concepção de verdade como id…Read more
  •  47
    Brandom on Thought and Reality: Showing Receptivity the Way out of the Bottleneck
    with Manuel de Pinedo
    Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 26 (1): 21-36. 2006.
  •  41
    Por uma metafísica de tramas: o mundo sem arché
    with Tomás Ribeiro Cardoso
    Kriterion: Journal of Philosophy 53 (125): 281-298. 2012.
  •  3
    O cartório e a caixa registradora
    Trans/Form/Ação 35 (3). 2012.
    O trabalho considera as relações entre a escrita e o reconhecimento. Os esforços de Derrida começaram a mostrar que a distinção entre a oralidade e a escrita é filosoficamente importante – e que muitos problemas filosóficos são problemas da escrita. A partir dessa perspectiva, considero a distinção entre conotação e denotação e a ideia – abraçada por Mill e, mais recentemente, por teorias da denotação inspiradas em Kripke – de que a denotação prescinde, em grande medida, de conotação. A diferenç…Read more
  •  44
    Epistemic virtues and transparency
    Croatian Journal of Philosophy 11 (3): 257-266. 2011.
    Transparency is commonly held to be a property of one’s beliefs: it is enough for me to examine an issue to establish my beliefs about it. Recent challenges to first-person authority over the content of one’s beliefs potentially undermine transparency. We start considering some consequences in terms of variations of Moore’s paradox. Then we study cases where, in the process of acquiring and managing beliefs, one pays excessive attention to how reliable, empirically adequate, coherent, or widely …Read more