| Question |
Answer |
Comments |
| A priori knowledge: yes and no |
Accept: no |
|
| Abstract objects: Platonism and nominalism |
Lean toward: Platonism |
With loads of qualifications. I don't believe in nominalist programmes, at least not traditional ones. Platonism has a grain of truth but is grossly off the mark. Difficult one. On the face of it, I guess I lean towards Platonism lately. |
| Aesthetic value: objective and subjective |
Accept: objective |
|
| Analytic-synthetic distinction: yes and no |
Lean toward: no |
Some Kripkean views on what is necessary may force me to allow for some versions of the a-s distinction. |
| Epistemic justification: internalism and externalism |
Lean toward: externalism |
A measure of epistemic internalism seems however required when we try to understand why skeptical views often seem both compelling. |
| External world: idealism, skepticism or non-skeptical realism |
Accept: non-skeptical realism |
|
| Free will: compatibilism, libertarianism or no free will |
Accept: no free will |
|
| God: theism and atheism |
Lean toward: atheism |
|
| Knowledge: empiricism and rationalism |
Reject both |
|
| Knowledge claims: contextualism, relativism or invariantism |
Accept: contextualism |
|
| Laws of nature: Humean and non-Humean |
Reject both |
|
| Logic: classical and non-classical |
Accept: non-classical |
This is too broad a question, but I strongly lean towards some non-classical logic as an exploratory device. |
| Mental content: internalism and externalism |
Accept: externalism |
|
| Meta-ethics: moral realism and moral anti-realism |
Accept: moral realism |
|
| Metaphilosophy: naturalism and non-naturalism |
Lean toward: naturalism |
|
| Mind: physicalism and non-physicalism |
Accept: non-physicalism |
|
| Moral judgment: cognitivism and non-cognitivism |
Lean toward: non-cognitivism |
|
| Moral motivation: internalism and externalism |
Insufficiently familiar with the issue |
|
| Newcomb's problem: one box and two boxes |
Agnostic/undecided |
|
| Normative ethics: deontology, consequentialism or virtue ethics |
Accept: virtue ethics |
|
| Perceptual experience: disjunctivism, qualia theory, representationalism or sense-datum theory |
Lean toward: disjunctivism |
|
| Personal identity: biological view, psychological view or further-fact view |
Accept: psychological view |
|
| Politics: communitarianism, egalitarianism or libertarianism |
The question is too unclear to answer |
|
| Proper names: Fregean and Millian |
Accept: Millian |
|
| Science: scientific realism and scientific anti-realism |
Accept: scientific realism |
|
| Teletransporter (new matter): survival and death |
Lean toward: survival |
|
| Time: A-theory and B-theory |
Accept: A-theory |
|
| Trolley problem (five straight ahead, one on side track, turn requires switching, what ought one do?): switch and don't switch |
Lean toward: switch |
|
| Truth: correspondence, deflationary or epistemic |
Accept: deflationary |
|
| Zombies: inconceivable, conceivable but not metaphysically possible or metaphysically possible |
Lean toward: metaphysically possible |
|
