•  4
    O que é que se sente diante de σοφία? amor cristão, amor pagão, amores avulsos
    with Pedro Mentor
    Filosofia E Educação 14 (3): 141-161. 2024.
    O seguinte ensaio escrito em texto corrido é uma breve apresentação da Filosofia do Amor no Cristianismo e na Antiguidade Clássica. Partimos do pressuposto que a palavra ‘filosofia’ tem uma dívida não apenas etimológica, mas conceitual com as definições de Amor, de forma que se faz pertinente uma investigação mais detida sobre o assunto. Começamos então com a interpretação cristã de C.S. Lewis sobre a Afeição, Amizade, Eros e Caridade para em seguida introduzir a visão pagã greco-romana. Concluí…Read more
  •  1
    This work explores the impact of negative X-Phi in the philosophical practice of relying on intuitions. After analyzing how intuitions work, their different types and how they orient thought, I argue that there are several interesting ways for philosophy to deal with the abundance of intuitions that sometimes are in conflict. The emerging image is one where philosophy responds directly or indirectly to truth and doesn't have in intuitions its sole evidential basis.Resumo: O texto explora o impac…Read more
  •  2
    Meus aspectos favoritos do ensino de filosofia
    Revista Sul-Americana de Filosofia E Educação 1. 2011.
    A partir da perspectiva do entrecruzamento entre dimensões políticas, educacionais e filosóficos do ensino da filosofia, o texto discute a importância da dissolução de fronteiras entre a filosofia, a educação, a política e a ciência para a análise do ensino da filosofia.
  •  10
    Indexicalism: The Metaphysics of Paradox
    Edinburgh University Press. 2021.
  •  11
    Neste texto examino algumas consequências da afirmação de Porchat de que o fenômeno no neopirronismo não precisa ser precisamente definido. Ao deixar o fenômeno variar ao sabor das circunstâncias, a abordagem de Porchat então parece deixar um dos elementos da dupla articulação que forma a epokhé neopirronista — a aceitação do fenômeno sem que ele comande crenças e que forma um par com a suspensão do juízo acerca do que não é fenômeno — imerso em imprecisões e, com isso, a posição neopirronista v…Read more
  •  27
    The Road from Leibniz to Whitehead
    Process Studies 49 (2): 234-253. 2020.
    This article is an attempt to compare the monadological multitude in Leibniz with Whitehead's view of process and the present. Some contemporary philosophers are considered in the effort to understand the monadologies of these two thinkers.
  •  560
    Logics and Their Galaxies
    In Arnold Koslow & Arthur Buchsbaum (eds.), The Road to Universal Logic, Birkhauser. pp. 243-252. 2015.
    This article introduces some concepts that help exploring the ontological import of universal logic. It studies the notions of an antilogic and counterlogic associated to each logic and shows some of their properties. It presents the notion of galaxy, as the class of possible worlds compatible with a given logic.We explore some consequences of these developments.
  •  5
    Horizonte e irredutibilidade: Eudoro de Sousa e o originário na ontologia
    Archai: Revista de Estudos Sobre as Origens Do Pensamento Ocidental 8 109-114. 2012.
  •  3
    Horizonte e irredutibilidade: Eudoro de Sousa e o originário na ontologia
    Archai: Revista de Estudos Sobre as Origens Do Pensamento Ocidental 8 109-114. 2012.
  •  21
    Horizonte e irredutibilidade: Eudoro de Sousa e o originário na ontologia
    Archai: Revista de Estudos Sobre as Origens Do Pensamento Ocidental 8 109-114. 2012.
  •  26
    Towards an Indexical Paradoxico-Metaphysics
    Open Philosophy 1 (1): 155-172. 2018.
    This paper sketches a metaphysical view according to which the furniture of the universe is made of indexicals. The view draws from work in the philosophy of language and thought concerning demonstratives, proper names and other deictic operations. It also draws on Levinas‘ conception of the Other as beyond any substantive description. Indexicalism, as I call it, is compared with object-oriented views such as Harman‘s and Garcia‘s. Indexicalism lapses into paradox concerning totality and proves …Read more
  •  1447
    In this paper we advocate the thesis that qualia are tropes (or qualitons), and not (universal) properties. The main advantage of the thesis is that we can accept both the Wittgensteinian and Sellarsian assault on the given and the claim that only subjective and private states can do justice to the qualitative character of experience. We hint that if we take qualia to be tropes, we dissolve the problem of inverted qualia. We develop an account of sensory concept acquisition that takes the presen…Read more
  •  8
    Beats and being
    Rhuthmos. forthcoming.
    This presentation has been performed in the conference “Performance Philosophy,” University of Surrey, Guilford in 2013. In the original, parts that are here in bold have been struck out by the author but unfortunately this website does not support strikethrough characters. We are sorry for the inconvenience. Tic. Right now. Tac. Something irrupts. At this moment. Something takes place. Something occupies the place. Something takes over the place. The place where things happen. The land of - Phi…Read more
  •  275
    Soft facts: Thinking practices and the architecture of reality
    Daimon: Revista Internacional de Filosofía 61 7-21. 2014.
    It is common to criticize the idea of objectivity by claiming that we cannot make sense of any cognitive contact with the world that is not constituted by the very materials of our thinking, and to conclude that the idea must be abandoned and that the world is ‘well lost’. We resist this conclusion and argue for a notion of objectivity that places its source within the domain of thoughts by proposing a conception of facts, akin to McDowell’s, as thinkable while independent of any act of thinking…Read more
  •  404
    Sense and Sensibility Educated: A Note on Experience and (Minimal) Empiricism
    International Journal of Philosophical Studies 20 (5): 741-747. 2012.
    McDowell’s minimal empiricism holds that experience, understood as providing conceptually articulated contents, plays a role in the justification of our beliefs. We question this idea by contrasting the role of perceptual experience in moral and non-moral judgments and conclude that experience per se is irrelevant in the former case and should also be so in the latter one: only with the help of adequate beliefs experience can provide a connection with the world. We conclude with some remarks con…Read more
  •  11
    Richard Moran has defended the need for two modes of access to our mental contents, a first-personal and a third-personal one. In this paper we maintain that, in the moral case, an excess of concentration on the a third-personal perspective precludes accounting for our responsibility over our own beliefs and our capacity to normatively respond to the world.
  •  22
    In this paper I consider two related threats to the idea that our beliefs compose a genuine worldview the global skeptic challenge to the clam that our beliefs are somehow grounded and the suspicion that our beliefs have no relation to the world whatsoever I consider these two threats from the point of view of our activity of doubting m order to establish what follows from our capacity to doubt any claim although not at once I argue that the two threats can be dispelled if we attend to a careful…Read more
  • El escéptico como despertador para sueños en tercera persona
    with Manuel de Pinedo
    Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 28 (1): 68-74. 2009.
  •  30
    Sobre o que Não Aparece (ao Neopirrônico)
    with Paulo A. G. De Sousa
    Discurso 23 53-70. 1994.
    O artigo critica a posição filosófica neopirrônica defendida por Oswaldo Porchat Pereira (Porchat 5). Argumentamos que uma de suas noções básicas, a de fenômeno, carece de uma definição apropriada. Além disso, mostramos que o neopirronismo abre as portas para o irracionalismo e que a ciência moderna traz problemas para essa postura
  •  393
    When my own beliefs are not first-personal enough
    with Manuel De Pinedo García
    Theoria 22 (58): 35-41. 2007.
    Richard Moran has argued, convincingly, in favour of the idea that there must be more than one path to access our own mental contents. The existence of those routes, one first-personal—through avowal—the other third-personal—no different to the one used to ascribe mental states to other people and to interpret their actions—is intimately connected to our capacity to respond to norms. Moran’s account allows for conflicts between first personal and third personal authorities over my own beliefs; t…Read more
  • Sobre Quem Não Pode Falar
    Ethic@ 13 (1): 191-203. 2006.
    Neste texto eu exploro alguns aspectos de um não-conformismo com respeitoà cognição. Começo analisando a inserção dos pensamentos em um ambientede subjetividades e a natureza pronominal do pensamento––é sempre alguémque pensa. Considero algumas relações políticas entre vozes e como elasatuam sobre os empreendimentos cognitivos; neste contexto menciono algumasformas de silenciamento sistemático de vozes. Termino recomendando umaforma de polifonia cognitiva.In this paper I explore some aspects of …Read more
  •  39
    When my Own Beliefs are not First-Personal Enough
    Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 22 (1): 35-41. 2007.
    Richard Moran has argued, convincingly, in favour of the idea that there must be more than one path to access our own mental contents. The existence of those routes, one first-personal —through avowal— the other third-personal —no different to the one used to ascribe mental states to other people and to interpret their actions— is intimately connected to our capacity to respond to norms. Moran’s account allows for conflicts between first personal and third personal authorities over my own belief…Read more
  • Metaphysics of plots in the world without arche
    with Tomas Ribeiro Cardoso
    Kriterion: Journal of Philosophy 53 (125): 281-298. 2012.
  • The Sceptic as an Alarm Clock for Dreams in the Third Person
    with Manuel de Pinedo
    Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 28 (1): 68-74. 2009.
  •  47
    Brandom on Thought and Reality: Showing Receptivity the Way out of the Bottleneck
    with Manuel de Pinedo
    Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 26 (1): 21-36. 2006.
  •  41
    Por uma metafísica de tramas: o mundo sem arché
    with Tomás Ribeiro Cardoso
    Kriterion: Journal of Philosophy 53 (125): 281-298. 2012.
  •  145
    When my own beliefs are not first-personal enough
    with Manuel de Pinedo
    Theoria 22 (1): 35-41. 2007.
    Richard Moran has argued, convincingly, in favour of the idea that there must be more than one path to access our own mental contents. The existence of those routes, one first-personal —through avowal— the other third-personal —no different to the one used to ascribe mental states to other people and to interpret their actions— is intimately connected to our capacity to respond to norms. Moran’s account allows for conflicts between first personal and third personal authorities over my own belief…Read more