Hilkje Charlotte Hänel

Wem wird geglaubt und wem nicht? Wessen Wissen wird weitergegeben und wessen nicht? Wer hat eine Stimme und wer nicht? Theorien der epistemischen Ungerechtigkeit befassen sich mit dem breiten Feld der ungerechten oder unfairen Behandlung, die mit Fragen des Wissens, Verstehens und Kommunizierens zusammenhängen, wie z.B. die Möglichkeit, vom Wissen oder von kommunikativen Praktiken ausgeschlossen zu werden oder zum Schweigen gebracht zu werden, aber auch Kontexte, in denen die Bedeutungen mancher systematisch verzerrt oder falsch gehört und falsch dargestellt werden, in denen manchen misstraut wird oder es an epistemischer Handlungsfähigkeit mangelt. In diesem Buch wird eine Übersicht über die breite Debatte epistemischer Ungerechtigkeit, epistemischer Unterdrückung und epistemischer Gewalt gegeben, in dem unterschiedliche Theorien, die sich auf der Schnittstelle von Gerechtigkeitstheorie und epistemischen Fragen befinden, systematisch und kritisch diskutiert sowie theoretische Vorgänger dieser Theorien beleuchtet werden.

In the debate on epistemic injustice, it is generally assumed that testimonial injustice as one form of epistemic injustice cannot be committed (fully) deliberately or intentionally because it involves unconscious identity prejudices. Drawing on the case of sexual violence against refugees in European refugee camps, this paper argues that there is a form of testimonial injustice—willful testimonial injustice—that is deliberate. To do so, the paper argues (a) that the hearer intentionally utilizes negative identity prejudices for a particular purpose and (b) that the hearer is aware of the fact that the intentionally used prejudices are in fact prejudices. Furthermore, the paper shows how testimonial injustice relates to recognition failures both in terms of a causal as well as a constitutive claim. In fact, introducing willful testimonial injustice can support the constitutive claim of such a relation that has so far received little attention. Besides arguing for a novel form of testimonial injustice and contributing to the recent debate on the relation between epistemic injustice and recognition failures, this paper is also motivated by the attempt to draw attention to the inhumane conditions for refugees at the border of Europe as well as elsewhere.

We can currently see the formation of new nationalist and racist parties or tendencies within established parties to lean towards right-wing politics within many European countries; from the Alternative für Deutschland in Germany, the Partij voor de Vrijheid (PVV) in the Netherlands, Lega Nord or Lega in Italia, Vox in Spain, the Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs, Front National in France, the Sverigedemokraterna in Sweden, Fidesz in Hungary, and Golden Dawn in Greece, to name only a few. At the same time, there has been a surge in racist, fascist, and antisemitic attacks within Europe. Since 1991, Neo-Nazi gangs have attacked migrants and members of antifascist groups, burned down housing facilities for asylum seekers (including facilities for Ukrainian refugees in 2022), disrupted social initiatives, and spread fear (BfV, 2022; cf. Speit, 2021). However, most of these activities were described as the criminal action of socially marginalized individuals, downplaying the organized structure behind these far-right activities and, thus, paving the way for more attacks. Part of this paper is to show how the epistemic tools developed by the epistemology of ignorance literature can help to understand (a) why the organized structures of far-right movements are unintelligible within the dominant frame of intelligibility in Europe and (b) how the silence about far-right movements shifts the boundaries for what can be said or done, thus, having deeply problematic repercussions for who can feel safe in Europe. This paper has a modest aim: By bringing into focus contexts of social injustice that have not received much attention in the current literature and by understanding them with the help of existing research from the debate on problematic epistemic practices and philosophy of language, the paper aims to highlight some problematic practices.

The main aim of this paper is to investigate how sexist ideology distorts our conceptions of sexual violence and the hermeneutical gaps such an ideology yields. I propose that we can understand the problematic issue of hermeneutical gaps about sexual violence with the help of Fricker’s theory of hermeneutical injustice. By distinguishing between hermeneutical injustice and hermeneutical misfire, we can distinguish between the hermeneutical gap and its consequences for the victim of sexual violence and those of the perpetrator of such violence. I then argue that perpetrators are both morally responsible and accountable for their acts, even if they are the result of a hermeneutical misfire. Ultimately, I show that with regard to sexual violence, we should opt for accountability to change the behaviour of the perpetrator and the social structure. Content warning: The paper discusses sexual violence and difficulties conceptualising experiences of such violence.

Nicht erst seit Covid-19 sind die Wissens- und Kommunikationslücken sowie die Hierarchie zwischen Ärzt*innen und Patient*innen offensichtlich. Zusätzlich befinden sich kranke Menschen sowohl aufgrund ihrer Krankheit als auch aufgrund ihrer Abhängigkeit vom Gesundheitswesen in einer besonders verletzlichen Lage; Patient*innen sind ein paradigmatisches Beispiel für fragile epistemische Subjekte. Im vorliegenden Text wird zunächst skizziert inwieweit Patient*innen fragile epistemische Subjekte sind und welche Formen testimonialer und hermeneutischer Ungerechtigkeit im Gesundheitswesen besonders zum Tragen kommen. Danach wird ein besonderes Augenmerk auf die Idee gelegt, dass sogenannte „pathozentrische epistemische Ungerechtigkeiten“ durch bestimmte theoretische Vorstellungen von Gesundheit untermauert und reproduziert werden. Hierbei soll schlussendlich untersucht werden, inwieweit dieses Problem durch technische Mittel in der Medizin verstärkt oder geschwächt werden kann; so reproduzieren Algorithmen beispielsweise die vorhandenen Vorstellungen und Praktiken.

In einem kürzlich erschienenen Artikel argumentiert Almut v. Wedelstaedt überzeugend, warum Zustimmung zwar „die Bedingung für die Legitimation von Sex“ ist (2020, 127), dass die moralische Güte von Sex aber nur dann einzuschätzen ist, wenn wir darauf achten, ob die Beteiligten der Handlung sich auf Augenhöhe begegnen. Die Idee ist: Es gibt legitime sexuelle Handlungen, die moralisch gut sind, und es gibt legitime sexuelle Handlungen, die moralisch besser sind. Hier möchte ich die Idee des besseren Sexes genauer ausloten. Während v. Wedelstaedt von moralisch gelungenem Sex spricht und somit auf der Ebene der moralischen Bewertung von Sex bleibt, möchte ich die Frage danach stellen, was Sex qualitativ gut macht. Tatsächlich wird in der Zustimmungsdebatte meist davon ausgegangen, dass diese zwei Fragen wenig gemeinsam haben; ob eine sexuelle Handlung legitim ist, hat zunächst nichts damit zu tun, ob diese auch gut ist. Ich werde drei Argumente liefern, warum wir legitimen Sex und qualitativ guten Sex zusammen betrachten sollten – und es wird sich zeigen, dass die gegenwärtige philosophische und rechtstheoretische Debatte Zustimmung verkürzt diskutiert und daher alleingenommen wenig hilfreich ist, stattdessen benötigt die Zustimmungsdebatte auch eine Untersuchung von qualitativ gutem Sex.

Ten years ago, I was diagnosed with a rare illness called Myasthenia Gravis. Myasthenia Gravis is a long-term neuromuscular autoimmune disease where antibodies block or destroy specific receptors at the junction between nerve and muscle; hence, nerve impulses fail to trigger muscle contractions. The disease leads to varying degrees of muscle weakness. Currently, I have only minor symptoms, I am not seriously impaired, and I do not suffer from any social disadvantage because of my illness. Yet, my life and my body since my diagnosis feel different than before. In this paper I aim to make this feeling intelligible and propose that it is a state of what I call ‘latent impairment’. Latent impairment is a state of being ‘in between’, different from being actually impaired and also different from being abled-bodied. The theory takes its cues both from social constructionist theories of disability as well as theories of (chronic) illness and their focus on the importance of subjectivity. Furthermore, I suggest that a phenomenological understanding of latent impairment can show possible ways of becoming an ally to the DRM.

In this paper, I use the example of rape myths to argue that certain real-life phenomena compel us to adjust our philosophical methods such that we explicitly endorse feminist commitments and strive for democratic practices in our philosophical thinking. The concept of rape has evolved significantly over the past few decades both in law and common usage. But despite decades of work to dispel rape myths, they persist and interfere with the proper application of the concept. This paper aims to account for this problem and propose a solution. First, I consider three examples that show how rape myths and other problematic schemas can distort our dominant working understanding of phenomena. All three examples are cases of grave injustices to the victims. I suggest that a revisionary project of conceptual amelioration can help counter injustices like these. In a second step, I argue that problematic schemas (such as rape myths) not only distort our working understanding or the accurate application of an existing concept, but can furthermore interfere with our philosophical analyses—even in cases of amelioration. As a solution, taking clues from theories of epistemologies of ignorance, I propose a more democratic and progressive method for engaging in conceptual amelioration.

This article argues that non-ideal theory is distinctive in its use of a certain methodology which is prior to specific topics (such as injustice, oppression, etc.), grounded in the idea of socially situated knowledge, and able to address ideological situatedness. Drawing on standpoint epistemology, we show that one’s social position within given power structures has implications for knowledge acquisition and that being in a vulnerable or marginalised position can be advantageous to knowledge acquisition. Following ideology critique, we argue that both marginalised and powerful social positions are embedded within a given ideology. As ideology is more than a mere set of attitudes or beliefs that social agents endorse or resist, situated agents and theorists cannot develop normative criteria that are not themselves situated. Hence, non-ideal theory has to be equipped with methods that are likely to make this situatedness visible. We close by presenting some diverse methods that already do so.

Die Debatte um epistemische Ungerechtigkeit verbindet normative Gerechtigkeitstheorien mit erkenntnistheoretischen Theorien und stellt somit die Art von wichtigen Fragen, die in den letzten Jahren sowohl innerhalb als auch außerhalb der Wissenschaft internationale Aufmerksamkeit erfahren haben. Verwiesen sei hier etwa auf soziale Bewegungen wie #MeToo und #BlackLivesMatter zeigen. Theorien der epistemischen Ungerechtigkeit können sowohl epistemische Praktiken analysieren und einen Beitrag zu Gerechtigkeitstheorien und sozialer Epistemologie liefern, als auch zu adäquateren Verständnissen von existierenden Ungerechtigkeiten beitragen. In dem hier vorliegenden Schwerpunkt werden Beiträge zu eben solchen bislang wenig erforschten Ungerechtigkeiten sowie neue Diskussionsbeiträge zur Debatte um epistemische Ungerechtigkeiten geliefert.

Serene Khader ist eine der wenigen feministischen Philosoph:innen in der anglosächsischen Philosophie, die sich gezielt mit globaler Ungerechtigkeit und Imperialismus aus Sicht jener Frauen beschäftigen, die von kolonialer und kultureller Herrschaft betroffen sind. Hierbei entlarvt sie eindrucksvoll die oftmals westliche Prägung von Feminismus, Gleichstellungspolitik und Philosophie und verfolgt so das Ziel, die Autonomie und Entscheidungskraft aller Frauen anzuerkennen. So zielt Khader in Decolonizing Universalism: A Transnational Feminist Ethic auf eine Neuausrichtung der feministischen Perspektive, welche es schafft, dekolonial und anti-imperialistisch zu sein, ohne gleichzeitig dem Universalismus komplett abzuschwören. Die folgende Buchdiskussion begibt sich in eine kritische Auseinandersetzung mit Khaders interessanter wie wichtiger Theorie. Einleitend werden wir einen Überblick über Khaders Grundgedanken geben. Es schließen sich kritische Kommentare von Tamara Jugov, Mirjam Müller, Kerstin Reibold sowie Hilkje C. Hänel und Fabian Schuppert an, auf die Serene Khader abschließend antwortet.

In Decolonizing Universalism: A Transnational Feminist Ethic zielt Serene Khader auf eine Neuausrichtung der feministischen Perspektive, welche es schafft, dekolonial und anti-imperialistisch zu sein, ohne gleichzeitig dem Universalismus komplett abzuschwören. Die Motivation hinter dieser Neuorientierung ist die Einsicht, dass der liberale moralische Universalismus oftmals kulturelle Vorherrschaft und Imperialismus verstärkt. In diesem Kommentar wollen wir uns mit der Frage beschäftigen, was genau unter Geschlechtergerechtigkeit verstanden werden soll und welcher Maßstab zur Beantwortung der Frage nach Gerechtigkeit angebracht ist und einige Ideen zum Unterschied zwischen idealer und nicht-idealer Theorie liefern.

This paper starts from the premise that Western states are connected to some of the harms refugees suffer from. It specifically focuses on the harm of acts of misrecognition and its relation to epistemic injustice that refugees suffer from in refugee camps, in detention centers, and during their desperate attempts to find refuge. The paper discusses the relation between hermeneutical injustice and acts of misrecognition, showing that these two phenomena are interconnected and that acts of misrecognition are particularly damaging when they stretch over different contexts, leaving us without or with very few safe spaces, and they dislocate us, leaving us without a community to turn to. The paper then considers the ways in which refugees experience acts of misrecognition and suffer from hermeneutical injustice, using the case of unaccompanied children at the well-known and overcrowded camp Moria in Greece, the case of unsafe detention centers in Libya, and the case of the denial to assistance on the Mediterranean and the resulting pushbacks from international waters to Libya as well as the preventable drowning of refugees in the Mediterranean to illustrate the arguments. Finally, the paper argues for specific duties toward refugees that result from the prior arguments on misrecognition and hermeneutical injustice.

Philosophy & Social Criticism, Volume 48, Issue 6, Page 833-859, July 2022. Two decades ago, Tarana Burke started using the phrase ‘me too’ to release victims of sexual abuse and rape from their shame and to empower girls from minority communities. In 2017, actress Alyssa Milano made the hashtag #MeToo go viral. This article’s concern is with the role of testimonial practices in the context of sexual violence. While many feminists have claimed that the word of those who claim to being sexually violated by others have political and/or epistemic priority, others have failed to recognize the harm and injury of instances of sexual violence that are not yet acknowledged as such and failed to listen to victims from marginalized social groups. In fact, some feminists have attacked #MeToo for mingling accounts of ‘proper’ sexual violence and accounts that are not ‘proper’ experiences of sexual violence. My aim in this article is to show why this critique is problematic and find a philosophically fruitful way to understand the #MeToo-movement as a movement that strives for moral and conceptual progress.

Feminismus – das ist nicht nur für Männer, sondern auch für einige Frauen immer noch ein bedrohliches Wort, selbst oder gerade in Zeiten von #MeToo. Liegt das daran, dass viele gar nicht wissen, was Feminismus ist und worauf er hinarbeitet? Gibt es den einen Feminismus? Was hat Feminismus eigentlich mit Sexismus zu tun? Und was mit unseren Beziehungen? Die Philosophin Hilkje Hänel klärt über diese Fragen auf und plädiert für einen Feminismus, von dem alle etwas haben. Offener Frauenhass ist in unserer Gesellschaft mittlerweile weitgehend geächtet. Aber auch nach über fünfzehn Jahren mit einer Frau an der Regierungsspitze sind wir noch längst nicht in der Gleichberechtigung angekommen. Im Gegenteil: Weiterhin strukturiert Sexismus geschlechtsspezifische Alltagserfahrungen, bis hinein in unsere Intimbeziehungen, wo die Grenzen zwischen Lust und sexueller Gewalt schnell verschwimmen. Die Philosophin und Schriftstellerin Hilkje Hänel deckt die Mechanismen sexueller Objektifizierung und männlichen Anspruchsdenkens auf. Sie zeigt, wie Frauen oft in die sexistischen Alltagsstrukturen verstrickt sind, an denen auch viele Männer leiden. Ihr zugängliches Buch ist das Plädoyer für einen Feminismus, von dem alle etwas haben.

Sex. Die meisten von uns haben ihn. Mal schlecht, mal gut, manchmal phänomenal. Die wenigsten denken lange drüber nach. Oder reden offen drüber. Dabei ist gar nicht so klar, was Sex eigentlich gut macht. Und wann ist Sex schlecht? Oder nicht nur schlecht, sondern sogar moralisch problematisch? Hilkje Hänel zeigt, dass es gar nicht so einfach ist, zwischen (moralisch) problematischem Sex und gutem Sex klar zu unterscheiden und dass es dabei häufig vor allem auf den Kontext und unsere Kommunikation ankommt. Auf der Basis aktueller Wissenschaft und medialer Bewegungen wie #MeToo verteidigt Hänel ihre Ansichten gegen die wichtigsten Einwände und argumentiert für mehr Respekt im Bett.

In this paper, we have two goals. First, we argue for a blueprint for hermeneutical injustice that allows us to schematize existing and discover new varieties of hermeneutical injustices. The underlying insight is that Fricker provides both a general concept of hermeneutical injustice and a specific conception thereof. By distinguishing between the general concept and its specific conceptions, we gain a fruitful tool to detect such injustices in our everyday lives. Second, we use this blueprint to provide a further example of hermeneutical injustice that draws our attention to yet another distinction: Some hermeneutical injustices result from a lack or distortion in the collective conceptual resource and some are due to problems in the application of existing concepts. We argue that to combat hermeneutical injustices, we have to make sure not only that individuals have accurate concepts at their disposal but that they have the capabilities to use these concepts adequately.

Two decades ago, Tarana Burke started using the phrase ‘me too’ to release victims of sexual abuse and rape from their shame and to empower girls from minority communities. In 2017, actress Alyssa Milano made the hashtag #MeToo go viral. This article’s concern is with the role of testimonial practices in the context of sexual violence. While many feminists have claimed that the word of those who claim to being sexually violated by others have political and/or epistemic priority, others have failed to recognize the harm and injury of instances of sexual violence that are not yet acknowledged as such and failed to listen to victims from marginalized social groups. In fact, some feminists have attacked #MeToo for mingling accounts of ‘proper’ sexual violence and accounts that are not ‘proper’ experiences of sexual violence. My aim in this article is to show why this critique is problematic and find a philosophically fruitful way to understand the #MeToo-movement as a movement that strives for moral and conceptual progress.

Miranda Fricker’s account of hermeneutical injustice and remedies for this injustice are widely debated. This article adds to the existing debate by arguing that theories of recog- nition can fruitfully contribute to Fricker’s account of hermeneutical injustice and can provide a framework for structural remedy. By pairing Fricker’s theory of hermeneutical injustice with theories of recognition, I bring forward a modest claim and a more radical claim. The first concerns a shift in our vocabulary; recognition theory can give a name to the seriousness of the long-term effects of hermeneutical injustice. The second claim is more radical: thinking of hermeneutical injustice as preventing what I call “self-recogni- tion” provides a structural remedy to the phenomenon of hermeneutical injustice. Because hermeneutical injustice is first and foremost a structural injustice, I contend that every virtue theory of hermeneutical justice should be complemented by structural remedies in terms of recognition. Finally, what I argue sheds light on the seriousness of cases of exclusion of and discrimination against women in academia and helps to draw our attention to new ways to combat such problems.

One night in 2017, ‘Grace’ went on a date with actor Aziz Ansari. She later described the date as “the worst experience with a man I’ve ever had,” and accused him of sexual assault. In a statement, he responded by saying that the sexual activity was completely consensual. While Grace felt pressured, uncomfortable, and violated, he was convinced that the sexual acts were consensual. How is it possible that a man who describes himself as an ally to the feminist cause engages in such unacceptable actions and seems incapable of understanding them for what they are, that is, acts of sexual violence? And how is it possible that a woman who feels uncomfortable is still incapable of resisting further advances? In this paper, I argue that such cases have to be understood within the framework of a ‘sexist ideology,’ that is, a social structure that constrains our actions and epistemic tools of interpretation. What hinders Ansari from understanding the act as sexual violence and what hinders Grace from resisting Ansari is the complex set of interconnected sexist practices which determine who owes what to whom based on different gendered roles.

Being a member of a minority group makes it harder to succeed in academic philosophy. Research suggests that students from underrepresented groups have a hard time in academic philosophy and often drop out instead of pursuing a career in philosophy, despite having the potential to become excellent philosophers. In this paper, I will argue that there is a specific way of thinking about traditional conceptual analysis within analytic philosophy that marginalizes underrepresented groups. This has to do with what kinds of analyses we philosophers think are worthy of conducting and with who we think are worthy of pursuing such analyses. I will then show why this is particularly worrisome for the profession of philosophy as an institution geared towards the love of knowledge and argue that it should be in our interest as philosophers to find ways to prevent this marginalization of underrepresented groups. Finally, I will provide an example of how to do philosophy differently that does not exclude members of underrepresented groups and suggest ways in which the teaching of analytic philosophy can directly counter the discriminatory practices of academic philosophy.

What exactly is rape? And how is it embedded in society? Hilkje Charlotte Hänel offers a philosophical exploration of the often misrepresented concept of rape in everyday life, systematically mapping out and elucidating this atrocious phenomenon. Hänel proposes a theory of rape as a social practice facilitated by ubiquitous sexist ideologies. Arguing for a normative cluster model for the concept of rape, this timely intervention improves our understanding of lived experiences of sexual violence and social relations within sexist ideologies.