My philosophical views

Question Answer Comments
A priori knowledge: yes and no Accept: yes
Abstract objects: Platonism and nominalism Accept: Platonism
Aesthetic value: objective and subjective Lean toward: objective
Analytic-synthetic distinction: yes and no Accept: yes
Epistemic justification: internalism and externalism Lean toward: internalism
External world: idealism, skepticism or non-skeptical realism Accept: idealism
Free will: compatibilism, libertarianism or no free will Accept: libertarianism
God: theism and atheism Accept: theism
Knowledge: empiricism and rationalism The question is too unclear to answer Is a Berkelian neo-platonist and empiricist or a rationalist?
Knowledge claims: contextualism, relativism or invariantism Lean toward: contextualism
Laws of nature: Humean and non-Humean The question is too unclear to answer In the empirical world it is Humean, but this is underpinned by the Divine Will. That is, Berkeley is correct which both is and is not Humean.
Logic: classical and non-classical Accept: classical I am assuming that logic concerns valid argument not some ground for the structure of language or a so-called formal semantics.
Mental content: internalism and externalism Accept: internalism
Meta-ethics: moral realism and moral anti-realism Accept: moral realism
Metaphilosophy: naturalism and non-naturalism Accept: non-naturalism
Mind: physicalism and non-physicalism Accept: non-physicalism
Moral judgment: cognitivism and non-cognitivism Accept: cognitivism Cognitivism depends on a 'thick' and probably theistic metaphysics. It cannot be derived by conceptual analysis alone. That gives only the 'universal prescriptivism' of 'The Languague of Morals' but metaphysical facts can determine what it is rational to prescribe (contrary to what Hare thought).
Moral motivation: internalism and externalism Skip
Newcomb's problem: one box and two boxes Insufficiently familiar with the issue
Normative ethics: deontology, consequentialism or virtue ethics Accept more than one
Perceptual experience: disjunctivism, qualia theory, representationalism or sense-datum theory Accept: sense-datum theory I'm not sure that I regard the sense datum theory and qualia theory as exclusive.
Personal identity: biological view, psychological view or further-fact view Accept: further-fact view
Politics: communitarianism, egalitarianism or libertarianism Lean toward: communitarianism I don't know much about this, but I get the impression that communitarians accept all traditions just because they are the practices of a community. I don't believe that. There are objectively correct traditions (perhaps the plural is a mistake).
Proper names: Fregean and Millian Accept another alternative Mill is not the opponent of Frege. His view was that names have no 'connotation' but that they rest on background knowledge. The current Mill/Kripke versus Frege idea rests on taking Frefe/Russell logic as a model for language and thought ('it's either a logically proper name or a description') and I think this is wrong.
Science: scientific realism and scientific anti-realism The question is too unclear to answer There is one true scientific account but in a sense that is compatible with Berkelian idealism.
Teletransporter (new matter): survival and death Lean toward: death Maybe the mind woujld go with the simulacrum, under these circumstances
Time: A-theory and B-theory Accept: A-theory
Trolley problem (five straight ahead, one on side track, turn requires switching, what ought one do?): switch and don't switch Lean toward: switch
Truth: correspondence, deflationary or epistemic Accept: correspondence
Zombies: inconceivable, conceivable but not metaphysically possible or metaphysically possible Accept: metaphysically possible With this proviso. Strictly, zombies assume epiphenomenalism. If you ditch that error, some modification of physical law (or extra physical apparatus) is needed to compensate for the loss of the interacting mind. But the basic point is that something could behave jyst like a conscious being without being one.