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52Trying, Paralysis, and VolitionReview of Metaphysics 28 (3): 423-442. 1975.The implications of this example for the philosophy of action are, of course, important: at the very least, it casts serious doubt on the often heard view that the notion of volition is a mere invention of philosophers, having no use outside philosophical contexts. It is, then, worthy of study. But many recent philosophers have paid practically no attention to actual cases of paralysis. Instead, they have preferred to deal a priori with the possibility of a paralytic trying to perform a bodily m…Read more
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4Action IndividuationIn Ernie Lepore & Kirk Ludwig (eds.), Blackwell Companion to Donald Davidson, Wiley. 2013.A description of the motivation and content of Davidson's theory of the individuation of action is given, followed by a brief account of the chief alternative to it. Objections to any ontology of events are considered, and then objections to the Davidson's theory in particular. A compromise position that seeks to deal with these objections is then presented and defended.
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2Creation and ConservationIn Charles Taliaferro, Paul Draper & Philip L. Quinn (eds.), A Companion to Philosophy of Religion, Wiley‐blackwell. 2010.This chapter contains sections titled: Initial Reservations Coming to Be and Being Self‐Sustenance Conservation Principles and Secondary Causes Divine Intervention Works cited.
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65Intention and Motivational StrengthJournal of Philosophical Research 20 571-583. 1995.One of the principal preoccupations of action theory is with the role of intention in the production of action. It should be expected that this role would be important, since an item of behavior appears to count as action just when there is some respect in which it is intended by the agent. This being the case, an account of the function of intention should provide insight into how human action might differ from other sorts of events, what the foundations of human autonomy may be, etc. But the c…Read more
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Free will and the mythology of causationIn Andrei A. Buckareff & Yujin Nagasawa (eds.), Alternative Concepts of God: Essays on the Metaphysics of the Divine, Oxford University Press. 2016.
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15Practical RationalityJournal of Philosophical Research 15 57-77. 1990.Recent views on practical rationality harmonize well with a fundamentally Kantian conception of the foundations of morality. Rationality in practical thinking is not a matter of valid reasoning, or of foIlowing maximization principles. From an agent-centered perspective, it consists in observing certain standards of consistency. In themselves, these standards lack the force of duties, hence there can be no irresolvable conflict between rationality and morality. Furthermore, the Kantian test of u…Read more
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28God, Sin, and Rogers on AnselmFaith and Philosophy 26 (4): 420-431. 2009.Based on views she draws from Anselm, Katherin Rogers mounts an extended attack on my account of God’s relationship to human sin. Here I argue first that if Anselm’s view of the relationship in question is different from my own, then Rogers fails to locate any reason for thinking his account is correct. I argue further that Rogers fails to demonstrate her claim that my account of God’s relation to sin makes him a deceiver, that her criticisms of my theodicy of sin are misguided, and that she is…Read more
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63Natural Agency: An Essay on the Causal Theory of Action, by John Bishop (review)Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 (4): 1008-1010. 1992.
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Pointless Suffering? How to Make the Problem of Evil Sufficiently SeriousOxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion 2 (1). 2010.
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231. Divine Conservation and the Persistence of the WorldIn Thomas V. Morris (ed.), Divine and Human Action: Essays in the Metaphysics of Theism, Cornell University Press. pp. 13-49. 1988.
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17Dretske on the Metaphysics of FreedomCanadian Journal of Philosophy 23 (4): 619-630. 1993.Most philosophers of action have seen little or no connection between the individuation of action and questions of freedom and responsibility. Is this a mistake? According to a recent suggestion by Fred Dretske it may be. Dretske views overt actions not as observable events with a distinctive sort of causal history, but rather as causal sequences, in which a distinctive sort of inner cause produces the appropriate outcome. So when Jimmy voluntarily wiggles his ears, the motion of his ears is not…Read more
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6Springs of Action: Understanding Intentional BehaviorPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 54 (4): 979-982. 1994.
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42Dretske on the metaphysics of freedomCanadian Journal of Philosophy 23 (4): 619-630. 1993.Contrary to Dretske's view, treating actions as causal complexes wherein inner states produce external results does not permit us to claim that even if their components are caused, the actions are not. What triggers the initial element of a causal sequence causes the sequence itself, so whatever might cause the relevant inner state would also cause the action. Dretske's claim that the failure of my agency to extend to the results of actions I induce in others is owing to the "sensitivity" of tho…Read more
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168Responsibility for an action requires what Professor McCann calls an exercise of legitimate agency of the part of an agent, a necessary condition for which is libertarian freedom. Free decisions are to be explained teleologically, not causally. Agent causation cannot account for the existence of a free decision, but neither does event causation account for the existence of determined events. The problem of accounting for the existence of a free decision is therefore of a piece with the problem o…Read more
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120The Simple View again: a brief rejoinderAnalysis 71 (2): 293-295. 2011.In a recent issue of Analysis I gave a critique of some arguments made by Di Nucci concerning the so-called Simple View – the view that an agent performs an action intentionally only if he intends so to act. In turn Di Nucci offers a reply that concentrates on two points. The first has to do with a group of examples, one having to do with waking a flatmate, and the others with routine actions such as shifting gears while driving. I rejected these examples, arguing that it is not at all obvious t…Read more
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100Divine Sovereignty and the Freedom of the WillFaith and Philosophy 12 (4): 582-598. 1995.Libertarian treatments of free will face the objection that an uncaused human decision would lack full explanation, and hence violate the principle of sufficient reason. It is argued that this difficulty can be overcome if God, as creator, wills that I decide as I do, since my decision could then be explained in terms of his will, which must be for the best. It is further argued that this view does not make God the author of evil in any damaging sense. Neither does it impugn my freedom. God’s cr…Read more
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144Settled objectives and rational constraintsAmerican Philosophical Quarterly 28 (1): 25-36. 1991.Some authors reject what they call the "Simple View"---i.e., the principle that anyone who A's intentionally intends to A. My purpose here is to defend this principle. Rejecting the Simple View, I shall claim, forces us to assign to other mental states the functional role of intention: that of providing settled objectives to guide deliberation and action. A likely result is either that entities will be multiplied, or that the resultant account will invite reassertion of reductionist theories. In…Read more
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91Mind in Action (review)Philosophical Review 108 (4): 566. 1999.To readers familiar with action theory as it was done thirty years ago, this book will strike a familiar chord. It presents an account of action of the sort that typified the ordinary language movement: fundamentally logical-behaviorist in its theory of mind, negatively disposed toward mental acts, anti-causalist in its account of explanation by reasons, and compatibilistic in its view of freedom. The object is to show that the ordinary concept of action is secured at the observational level, an…Read more
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56Intention and Motivational StrengthJournal of Philosophical Research 20 571-583. 1995.One of the principal preoccupations of action theory is with the role of intention in the production of action. It should be expected that this role would be important, since an item of behavior appears to count as action just when there is some respect in which it is intended by the agent. This being the case, an account of the function of intention should provide insight into how human action might differ from other sorts of events, what the foundations of human autonomy may be, etc. But the c…Read more
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2Alan Donagan, The Philosophical Papers of Alan Donagan Reviewed byPhilosophy in Review 16 (2): 93-97. 1996.
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39Practical RationalityJournal of Philosophical Research 15 57-77. 1990.Recent views on practical rationality harmonize well with a fundamentally Kantian conception of the foundations of morality. Rationality in practical thinking is not a matter of valid reasoning, or of foIlowing maximization principles. From an agent-centered perspective, it consists in observing certain standards of consistency. In themselves, these standards lack the force of duties, hence there can be no irresolvable conflict between rationality and morality. Furthermore, the Kantian test of u…Read more
College Station, Texas, United States of America
Areas of Interest
Metaphysics |
Philosophy of Action |
Philosophy of Religion |