•  14
    Practical Rationality: Some Kantian Reflections
    Journal of Philosophical Research 15 57-77. 1990.
    Recent views on practical rationality harmonize well with a fundamentally Kantian conception of the foundations of morality. Rationality in practical thinking is not a matter of valid reasoning, or of foIlowing maximization principles. From an agent-centered perspective, it consists in observing certain standards of consistency. In themselves, these standards lack the force of duties, hence there can be no irresolvable conflict between rationality and morality. Furthermore, the Kantian test of u…Read more
  •  24
    God, sin, and Rogers on Anselm: A reply
    Faith and Philosophy 26 (4): 420-431. 2009.
    Based on views she draws from Anselm, Katherin Rogers mounts an extend­ed attack on my account of God’s relationship to human sin. Here I argue first that if Anselm’s view of the relationship in question is different from my own, then Rogers fails to locate any reason for thinking his account is correct. I argue further that Rogers fails to demonstrate her claim that my account of God’s relation to sin makes him a deceiver, that her criticisms of my theodicy of sin are misguided, and that she is…Read more
  • Pointless Suffering? How to Make the Problem of Evil Sufficiently Serious
    Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion 2 (1). 2010.
  •  12
    Dretske on the Metaphysics of Freedom
    Canadian Journal of Philosophy 23 (4): 619-630. 1993.
    Most philosophers of action have seen little or no connection between the individuation of action and questions of freedom and responsibility. Is this a mistake? According to a recent suggestion by Fred Dretske it may be. Dretske views overt actions not as observable events with a distinctive sort of causal history, but rather as causal sequences, in which a distinctive sort of inner cause produces the appropriate outcome. So when Jimmy voluntarily wiggles his ears, the motion of his ears is not…Read more
  •  6
    Springs of Action: Understanding Intentional Behavior
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54 (4): 979-982. 1994.
  •  8
    Practical Reason: Philosophical Papers, Volume I
    with G. H. Von Wright
    Noûs 22 (1): 150. 1988.
  •  24
    Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason
    Noûs 25 (2): 230. 1991.
  •  51
    Intention and Motivational Strength
    Journal of Philosophical Research 20 571-583. 1995.
    One of the principal preoccupations of action theory is with the role of intention in the production of action. It should be expected that this role would be important, since an item of behavior appears to count as action just when there is some respect in which it is intended by the agent. This being the case, an account of the function of intention should provide insight into how human action might differ from other sorts of events, what the foundations of human autonomy may be, etc. But the c…Read more
  •  108
    Divine providence
    Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 2008.
  •  2
    Alan Donagan, The Philosophical Papers of Alan Donagan Reviewed by
    Philosophy in Review 16 (2): 93-97. 1996.
  •  23
    The trouble with level-generation
    Mind 91 (364): 481-500. 1982.
  •  35
    Practical Rationality: Some Kantian Reflections
    Journal of Philosophical Research 15 57-77. 1990.
    Recent views on practical rationality harmonize well with a fundamentally Kantian conception of the foundations of morality. Rationality in practical thinking is not a matter of valid reasoning, or of foIlowing maximization principles. From an agent-centered perspective, it consists in observing certain standards of consistency. In themselves, these standards lack the force of duties, hence there can be no irresolvable conflict between rationality and morality. Furthermore, the Kantian test of u…Read more
  •  90
    Is Raising One's Arm a Basic Action?
    Journal of Philosophy 69 (9): 235. 1972.
    I hold no view as to what actions are basic, but I shall attempt to show in what follows that actions like raising an arm never are. My contention is that these actions involve actions of physical exertion on the part of the agent, the involvement being of a sort generally taken to be excluded by an actions being basic.
  •  1
    Edwards on Free Will.”
    In Paul Helm & Oliver Crisp (eds.), Jonathan Edwards: Philosophical Theologian, Burlington, Vt: Ashgate Publishing Co.. pp. 27--43. 2003.
  •  42
    Creation and the Sovereignty of God
    Indiana University Press. 2012.
    Creation and the Sovereignty of God brings fresh insight to a defense of God.
  •  39
    Nominals, facts, and two conceptions of events
    Philosophical Studies 35 (2). 1979.
    According to one view of english nominals, imperfect nominals designate facts, and perfect nominals, events. it is argued here that this is mistaken. of imperfect nominals only "that"-clauses are fact designators; imperfect gerundive nominals are to be classed with perfect nominals as event designators. there are, however, two conceptions of events, arising from two different conceptions of time. the events designated by imperfect gerundives are to be conceived as spread out in time, divisible i…Read more
  •  51
    Intending and planning: A reply to Mele
    Philosophical Studies 55 (1). 1989.
  •  23
    Anselm on Freedom
    Faith and Philosophy 28 (4): 456-460. 2011.
  •  133
    In these essays, Hugh J. McCann develops a unified perspective on human action. Written over a period of twenty-five years, the essays provide a comprehensive survey of the major topics in contemporary action theory. In four sections, the book addresses the ontology of action ; the foundations of action ; intention, will, and freedom; and practical rationality. McCann works out a compromise between competing perspectives on the individuation of action ; explores the foundations of action and def…Read more
  •  11
    Modality and Sovereignty: On Theism and Ultimate Explanation
    Philosophia Christi 12 (2): 289-296. 2010.
    Two important aspects of O’Connor’s Theism and Ultimate Explanation are explored. The first is whether God’s existence should be considered ontologically necessary. I suggest that although existence is essential to God, it is not a matter of ontological necessity. The second is whether prior to creating God deliberates about what universe or universes to create. I argue that he does not, that to say he does is to mistake creation for a kind of manufacturing. Implications of these claims regardin…Read more
  •  1
    The articles in the present collection deal with the religious dimension of the problem of free will. All of the papers also have implications for broader philosophical and theological issues, and will thus be of interest to a wide variety of scholars, both religious and secular. Together they provide a historical and contemporary overview of problems in the theology of freedom, together with recent work by some important philosophers in the field aimed at resolving those problems. The chapters …Read more
  •  94
    Di Nucci on the simple view
    Analysis 70 (1): 53-59. 2010.
    (No abstract is available for this citation)
  •  50
    Atheism and Theism
    Philosophical Review 107 (3): 462. 1998.
    In this volume, the sixth in Blackwell's Great Debates in Philosophy series, Smart and Haldane discuss the case for and against religious belief. The debate is unusual in beginning with the negative side. After a short jointly authored introduction, there is a fairly extended presentation of the atheist position by Smart. Haldane then offers an equally extended defense of theism. The authors respond to one another in the same order, and the book concludes with a brief co-authored treatment of an…Read more
  •  85
    The Author of Sin?
    Faith and Philosophy 22 (2): 144-159. 2005.
    Sin