•  52
    Trying, Paralysis, and Volition
    Review of Metaphysics 28 (3): 423-442. 1975.
    The implications of this example for the philosophy of action are, of course, important: at the very least, it casts serious doubt on the often heard view that the notion of volition is a mere invention of philosophers, having no use outside philosophical contexts. It is, then, worthy of study. But many recent philosophers have paid practically no attention to actual cases of paralysis. Instead, they have preferred to deal a priori with the possibility of a paralytic trying to perform a bodily m…Read more
  •  4
    Action Individuation
    In Ernie Lepore & Kirk Ludwig (eds.), Blackwell Companion to Donald Davidson, Wiley. 2013.
    A description of the motivation and content of Davidson's theory of the individuation of action is given, followed by a brief account of the chief alternative to it. Objections to any ontology of events are considered, and then objections to the Davidson's theory in particular. A compromise position that seeks to deal with these objections is then presented and defended.
  •  2
    Creation and Conservation
    In Charles Taliaferro, Paul Draper & Philip L. Quinn (eds.), A Companion to Philosophy of Religion, Wiley‐blackwell. 2010.
    This chapter contains sections titled: Initial Reservations Coming to Be and Being Self‐Sustenance Conservation Principles and Secondary Causes Divine Intervention Works cited.
  •  65
    Intention and Motivational Strength
    Journal of Philosophical Research 20 571-583. 1995.
    One of the principal preoccupations of action theory is with the role of intention in the production of action. It should be expected that this role would be important, since an item of behavior appears to count as action just when there is some respect in which it is intended by the agent. This being the case, an account of the function of intention should provide insight into how human action might differ from other sorts of events, what the foundations of human autonomy may be, etc. But the c…Read more
  •  15
    Practical Rationality
    Journal of Philosophical Research 15 57-77. 1990.
    Recent views on practical rationality harmonize well with a fundamentally Kantian conception of the foundations of morality. Rationality in practical thinking is not a matter of valid reasoning, or of foIlowing maximization principles. From an agent-centered perspective, it consists in observing certain standards of consistency. In themselves, these standards lack the force of duties, hence there can be no irresolvable conflict between rationality and morality. Furthermore, the Kantian test of u…Read more
  •  28
    God, Sin, and Rogers on Anselm
    Faith and Philosophy 26 (4): 420-431. 2009.
    Based on views she draws from Anselm, Katherin Rogers mounts an extend­ed attack on my account of God’s relationship to human sin. Here I argue first that if Anselm’s view of the relationship in question is different from my own, then Rogers fails to locate any reason for thinking his account is correct. I argue further that Rogers fails to demonstrate her claim that my account of God’s relation to sin makes him a deceiver, that her criticisms of my theodicy of sin are misguided, and that she is…Read more
  • Pointless Suffering? How to Make the Problem of Evil Sufficiently Serious
    Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion 2 (1). 2010.
  •  17
    Dretske on the Metaphysics of Freedom
    Canadian Journal of Philosophy 23 (4): 619-630. 1993.
    Most philosophers of action have seen little or no connection between the individuation of action and questions of freedom and responsibility. Is this a mistake? According to a recent suggestion by Fred Dretske it may be. Dretske views overt actions not as observable events with a distinctive sort of causal history, but rather as causal sequences, in which a distinctive sort of inner cause produces the appropriate outcome. So when Jimmy voluntarily wiggles his ears, the motion of his ears is not…Read more
  •  6
    Springs of Action: Understanding Intentional Behavior
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54 (4): 979-982. 1994.
  •  50
    Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason
    Noûs 25 (2): 230. 1991.
  •  9
    Practical Reason: Philosophical Papers, Volume I
    with G. H. Von Wright
    Noûs 22 (1): 150. 1988.
  •  42
    Dretske on the metaphysics of freedom
    Canadian Journal of Philosophy 23 (4): 619-630. 1993.
    Contrary to Dretske's view, treating actions as causal complexes wherein inner states produce external results does not permit us to claim that even if their components are caused, the actions are not. What triggers the initial element of a causal sequence causes the sequence itself, so whatever might cause the relevant inner state would also cause the action. Dretske's claim that the failure of my agency to extend to the results of actions I induce in others is owing to the "sensitivity" of tho…Read more
  •  168
    Responsibility for an action requires what Professor McCann calls an exercise of legitimate agency of the part of an agent, a necessary condition for which is libertarian freedom. Free decisions are to be explained teleologically, not causally. Agent causation cannot account for the existence of a free decision, but neither does event causation account for the existence of determined events. The problem of accounting for the existence of a free decision is therefore of a piece with the problem o…Read more
  •  120
    The Simple View again: a brief rejoinder
    Analysis 71 (2): 293-295. 2011.
    In a recent issue of Analysis I gave a critique of some arguments made by Di Nucci concerning the so-called Simple View – the view that an agent performs an action intentionally only if he intends so to act. In turn Di Nucci offers a reply that concentrates on two points. The first has to do with a group of examples, one having to do with waking a flatmate, and the others with routine actions such as shifting gears while driving. I rejected these examples, arguing that it is not at all obvious t…Read more
  •  53
    Paralysis and the spring of action
    Philosophia 25 (1-4): 481. 1997.
  •  78
  •  100
    Divine Sovereignty and the Freedom of the Will
    Faith and Philosophy 12 (4): 582-598. 1995.
    Libertarian treatments of free will face the objection that an uncaused human decision would lack full explanation, and hence violate the principle of sufficient reason. It is argued that this difficulty can be overcome if God, as creator, wills that I decide as I do, since my decision could then be explained in terms of his will, which must be for the best. It is further argued that this view does not make God the author of evil in any damaging sense. Neither does it impugn my freedom. God’s cr…Read more
  •  12
    Book reviews (review)
    Mind 103 (409): 99-102. 1994.
  •  82
    Rationality and the Range of Intention
    Midwest Studies in Philosophy 10 (1): 191-211. 1986.
  •  144
    Settled objectives and rational constraints
    American Philosophical Quarterly 28 (1): 25-36. 1991.
    Some authors reject what they call the "Simple View"---i.e., the principle that anyone who A's intentionally intends to A. My purpose here is to defend this principle. Rejecting the Simple View, I shall claim, forces us to assign to other mental states the functional role of intention: that of providing settled objectives to guide deliberation and action. A likely result is either that entities will be multiplied, or that the resultant account will invite reassertion of reductionist theories. In…Read more
  •  91
    Mind in Action (review)
    with Bede Rundle
    Philosophical Review 108 (4): 566. 1999.
    To readers familiar with action theory as it was done thirty years ago, this book will strike a familiar chord. It presents an account of action of the sort that typified the ordinary language movement: fundamentally logical-behaviorist in its theory of mind, negatively disposed toward mental acts, anti-causalist in its account of explanation by reasons, and compatibilistic in its view of freedom. The object is to show that the ordinary concept of action is secured at the observational level, an…Read more
  •  56
    Intention and Motivational Strength
    Journal of Philosophical Research 20 571-583. 1995.
    One of the principal preoccupations of action theory is with the role of intention in the production of action. It should be expected that this role would be important, since an item of behavior appears to count as action just when there is some respect in which it is intended by the agent. This being the case, an account of the function of intention should provide insight into how human action might differ from other sorts of events, what the foundations of human autonomy may be, etc. But the c…Read more
  •  118
    Divine providence
    Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 2008.
  •  2
    Alan Donagan, The Philosophical Papers of Alan Donagan Reviewed by
    Philosophy in Review 16 (2): 93-97. 1996.
  •  26
    The trouble with level-generation
    Mind 91 (364): 481-500. 1982.
  •  39
    Practical Rationality
    Journal of Philosophical Research 15 57-77. 1990.
    Recent views on practical rationality harmonize well with a fundamentally Kantian conception of the foundations of morality. Rationality in practical thinking is not a matter of valid reasoning, or of foIlowing maximization principles. From an agent-centered perspective, it consists in observing certain standards of consistency. In themselves, these standards lack the force of duties, hence there can be no irresolvable conflict between rationality and morality. Furthermore, the Kantian test of u…Read more