•  1137
    There is No Question of Physicalism
    with Tim Crane
    Mind 99 (394): 185-206. 1990.
    Many philosophers are impressed by the progress achieved by physical sciences. This has had an especially deep effect on their ontological views: it has made many of them physicalists. Physicalists believe that everything is physical: more precisely, that all entities, properties, relations, and facts are those which are studied by physics or other physical sciences. They may not all agree with the spirit of Rutherford's quoted remark that 'there is physics; and there is stamp-collecting',' but …Read more
  •  284
    The semantics and ontology of dispositions
    Mind 109 (436): 757--780. 2000.
    The paper looks at the semantics and ontology of dispositions in the light of recent work on the subject. Objections to the simple conditionals apparently entailed by disposition statements are met by replacing them with so-called 'reduction sentences' and some implications of this are explored. The usual distinction between categorical and dispositional properties is criticised and the relation between dispositions and their bases examined. Applying this discussion to two typical cases leads to…Read more
  •  276
    Real Time
    Cambridge University Press. 1981.
    This is a study of the nature of time. In it, redeploying an argument first presented by McTaggart, the author argues that although time itself is real, tense is not. He accounts for the appearance of the reality of tense - our sense of the passage of time, and the fact that our experience occurs in the present - by showing how time is indispensable as a condition of action. Time itself is further analysed, and Dr Mellor gives answers to most of the metaphysical questions it provokes, concerning…Read more
  •  262
    Real Time Ii
    Routledge. 1998.
    Real Time II extends and evolves D.H. Mellor's classic exploration of the philosophy of time, Real Time . This wholly new book answers such basic metaphysical questions about time as: how do past, present and future differ, how are time and space related, what is change, is time travel possible? His Real Time dominated the philosophy of time for fifteen years. This book will do the same for the next twenty years.
  •  167
    The Matter of Chance
    Cambridge University Press. 2004.
    This book deals not so much with statistical methods as with the central concept of chance, or statistical probability, which statistical theories apply to nature.
  •  139
    Laws, chances and properties
    International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 4 (2). 1990.
    Abstract The paper develops a unified account of both deterministic and indeterministic laws of nature which inherits the merits but not the defects of the best existing accounts. As in Armstrong's account, laws are embodied in facts about universals; but not in higher?order relations between them, and the necessity of laws is not primitive but results from their containing chances of 0 or 1. As in the Ramsey?Lewis account, law statements would be the general axioms and theorems of the simplest …Read more
  •  131
    Natural kinds
    British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 28 (4): 299-312. 1977.
  •  131
    Equally effective causes
    Analysis 60 (1). 2000.
  •  120
    The Facts of Causation
    Routledge. 1995.
    The Facts of Causation grapples with one of philosophy's most enduring issues. Causation is central to all of our lives. What we see and hear causes us to believe certain facts about the world. We need that information to know how to act and how to cause the effects we desire. D. H. Mellor, a leading scholar in the philosophy of science and metaphysics, offers a comprehensive theory of causation. Many questions about causation remain unsettled. In science, the indeterminism of modern physics and…Read more
  •  114
    Wholes and parts: The limits of composition
    South African Journal of Philosophy 25 (2): 138-145. 2006.
    The paper argues that very different part-whole relations hold between different kinds of entities. While these relations share most of their formal properties, they need not share all of them. Nor need other mereological principles be true of all kinds of part–whole pairs. In particular, it is argued that the principle of unrestricted composition, that any two or more entities have a mereological sum, while true of sets and propositions, is false of things and events.
  •  107
    The point of refinement
    Analysis 60 (3). 2000.
  •  105
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  •  82
  •  78
    Possibility, chance and necessity
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy 78 (1). 2000.
    This Article does not have an abstract
  •  65
    Science, Belief and Behaviour: Essays in Honour of R B Braithwaite (edited book)
    with R. B. Braithwaite
    Cambridge University Press. 1980.
    This volume is a collection of original essays by eminent philosophers written for R. B. Braithwaite's eightieth birthday to celebrate his work and teaching. In one way or another, all the essays reflect his central concern with the impact of science on our beliefs about the world and the responses appropriate to that. Together they testify to the signal importance of his contributions in areas of philosophy bearing on this concern: the philosophy of science, especially of the statistical scienc…Read more
  •  61
    Ramsey's Legacy (edited book)
    Oxford University Press. 2005.
    The Cambridge philosopher Frank Ramsey died tragically young, but had already established himself as one of the most brilliant minds of the twentieth century. Besides groundbreaking work in philosophy, particularly in logic, language, and metaphysics, he created modern decision theory and made substantial contributions to mathematics and economics. In these original essays, written to commemorate the centenary of Ramsey's birth, a distinguished international team of contributors offer fresh pers…Read more
  •  51
    Transcendental Tense
    Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 72 (1). 1998.
    [D. H. Mellor] Kant's claim that our knowledge of time is transcendental in his sense, while false of time itself, is true of tenses, i.e. of the locations of events and other temporal entities in McTaggart's A series. This fact can easily, and I think only, be explained by taking time itself to be real but tenseless. /// [J. R. Lucas] Mellor's argument from Kant fails. The difficulties in his first Antinomy are due to topological confusions, not the tensed nature of time. Nor are McTaggart' s d…Read more
  •  51
    This paper attacks two contrary views. One denies that nature has joints, taking the properties we call natural to be merely artefacts of our theories. The other accepts real natural properties but takes their naturalness to come by degrees. I argue that both are wrong: natural properties are real, and their naturalness no more comes by degrees than does the naturalness of the things that have them.1