• Decisions, Decisions, Decisions: Can Savage Salvage Everettian Probability?
    In Simon Saunders, Jonathan Barrett, Adrian Kent & David Wallace (eds.), Many Worlds?: Everett, Quantum Theory, & Reality, Oxford University Press. 2010.
  •  51
    Time's Arrows and Quantum Measurement
    British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 49 (3): 522-525. 1998.
  •  27
    Essays in Quasi-Realism
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (4): 965-968. 1996.
  •  117
    argues that the success of the backward causation hypothesis in quantum mechanics would provide strong support for a version of Reichenbach's account of the direction of causal processes, which takes the direction of causation to rest on the fork asymmetry. He also criticises my perspectival account of the direction of causation, which takes causal asymmetry to be a projection of our own temporal asymmetry as agents. In this reply I take issue with Dowe's argument at three main points: his claim…Read more
  •  15
    A Realist Conception of Truth
    Philosophical and Phenomenological Research 60 (1): 231-234. 1996.
  •  1
    Truth as Convenient Friction
    In Robert B. Talisse & Scott F. Aikin (eds.), The Pragmatism Reader: From Peirce Through the Present, Princeton University Press. pp. 451-470. 2011.
  •  35
    Global Expressivism by the Method of Differences
    Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 86 133-154. 2019.
    In this piece I characterise global expressivism, as I understand it, by contrasting it with five other views: the so-called Canberra Plan; Moorean non-naturalism and platonism; ‘relaxed realism’ and quietism; local expressivism; and response-dependent realism. Some other familiar positions, including fictionalism, error theories, and idealism, are also mentioned, but as sub-cases to one of these five.
  •  68
    Making a Difference presents fifteen original essays on causation and counterfactuals by an international team of experts. Collectively, they represent the state of the art on these topics. The essays in this volume are inspired by the life and work of Peter Menzies, who made a difference in the lives of students, colleagues, and friends. Topics covered include: the semantics of counterfactuals, agency theories of causation, the context-sensitivity of causal claims, structural equation models, m…Read more
  •  87
    What Makes Time Special?
    Philosophical Review 128 (2): 250-254. 2019.
  •  31
    In defending so-called global expressivism I have often seen Carnap as an ally. Both Carnap’s rejection of “externalist” metaphysics and his implicit pluralism about linguistic frameworks seem grist for the global expressivist’s mill. André Carus argues for a third point of connection, via Carnap’s voluntarism. I note two reasons for thinking that this connection is not as close as Carus contends.
  •  157
    Ramsey and Joyce on Deliberation and Prediction
    with Yang Liu
    Synthese 197 4365-4386. 2020.
    Can an agent deliberating about an action A hold a meaningful credence that she will do A? 'No', say some authors, for 'Deliberation Crowds Out Prediction' (DCOP). Others disagree, but we argue here that such disagreements are often terminological. We explain why DCOP holds in a Ramseyian operationalist model of credence, but show that it is trivial to extend this model so that DCOP fails. We then discuss a model due to Joyce, and show that Joyce's rejection of DCOP rests on terminological choic…Read more
  •  266
    New Slant on the EPR-Bell Experiment
    with Peter Evans and Ken Wharton
    British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 64 (2): 297-324. 2013.
    The best case for thinking that quantum mechanics is nonlocal rests on Bell's Theorem, and later results of the same kind. However, the correlations characteristic of Einstein–Podolsky–Rosen (EPR)–Bell (EPRB) experiments also arise in familiar cases elsewhere in quantum mechanics (QM), where the two measurements involved are timelike rather than spacelike separated; and in which the correlations are usually assumed to have a local causal explanation, requiring no action-at-a-distance (AAD). It i…Read more
  •  37
    The dustjacket of The Common Mind bears a photograph of the traffic at a Sydney intersection on a wet winter’s evening in 1938. It is rush hour, and the homeward traffic conveys a fine sense of common purpose. The scene has a special resonance for me, for I stood at that very spot with my parents and brothers one similar evening in 1966, on the day we first arrived in Australia. There was a marked pedestrian crossing there then, which we set out to negotiate, taking it for granted that the relev…Read more
  •  1
    Pragmatism is the idea that philosophical concepts must start with, and remain linked to human experience and inquiry. This book traces and assesses the influence of American pragmatism on British philosophy, with emphasis on Cambridge in the inter-war period, post-war Oxford, and recent developments.
  • Facts and the Function of Truth
    Mind 99 (394): 301-305. 1990.
  •  10
    Naturalism and the Fate of the M-Worlds: Huw Price
    Supplement to the Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 71 (1): 247-268. 1997.
  • No Title available: New Books (review)
    Philosophy 49 (187): 102-106. 1974.
  •  251
    "Click!" Bait for Causalists
    with Yang Liu
    In Arif Ahmed (ed.), Newcomb's Problem, Cambridge University Press. pp. 160-179. 2018.
    Causalists and Evidentialists can agree about the right course of action in an (apparent) Newcomb problem, if the causal facts are not as initially they seem. If declining $1,000 causes the Predictor to have placed $1m in the opaque box, CDT agrees with EDT that one-boxing is rational. This creates a difficulty for Causalists. We explain the problem with reference to Dummett's work on backward causation and Lewis's on chance and crystal balls. We show that the possibility that the causal facts …Read more
  •  206
    Heart of DARCness
    with Yang Liu
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy 97 (1): 136-150. 2019.
    There is a long-standing disagreement in the philosophy of probability and Bayesian decision theory about whether an agent can hold a meaningful credence about an upcoming action, while she deliberates about what to do. Can she believe that it is, say, 70% probable that she will do A, while she chooses whether to do A? No, say some philosophers, for Deliberation Crowds Out Prediction (DCOP), but others disagree. In this paper, we propose a valid core for DCOP, and identify terminological causes …Read more
  •  88
    This paper revisits some views about negation I defended in two early papers. Some of the themes of those papers have been developed sympathetically in recent work by Tim Smiley, Lloyd Humberstone and Ian Rumfitt. However, Rumfitt and Peter Gibbard have both criticised arguments I offered in defence of Double Negation Elimination (DNE), against a Dummettian intuitionist. I reconsider those arguments, arguing that although they survive Rumfitt’s and Gibbard’s attacks, the case against Dummett is for …Read more
  •  172
    Burbury's Last Case: The Mystery of the Entropic Arrow
    Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 50 19-56. 2002.
    Does not the theory of a general tendency of entropy to diminish [sic] take too much for granted? To a certain extent it is supported by experimental evidence. We must accept such evidence as far as it goes and no further. We have no right to supplement it by a large draft of the scientific imagination.
  •  224
    Is semantics in the plan?
    In David Braddon-Mitchell & Robert Nola (eds.), Conceptual Analysis and Philosophical Naturalism, Mit Press. pp. 159--82. 2009.
    The so-called Canberra Plan is a grandchild of the Ramsey-Carnap treatment of theoretical terms. In its original form, the Ramsey-Carnap approach provided a method for analysing the meaning of scientific terms, such as “electron”, “gene” and “quark”—terms whose meanings could plausibly be delineated by their roles within scientific theories. But in the hands of David Lewis (1970, 1972), the original approach begat a more ambitious descendant, generalised and extended in two distinct ways: first,…Read more
  •  71
    This is a review of John Leslie's 'Infinite Minds: A Philosophical Cosmology' (OUP, 2001). It was commissioned by the London Review of Books in 2002, but rejected by the commissioning editor, apparently because he disliked its anti-theological stance. (See the Postscript to the present version for more details.).
  •  86
    Abusing One’s Position
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 82 (3): 772-779. 2011.
    I once stood staring at a map in a large US airport, looking for an ATM. Next to me a couple also stared at the map, trying to figure out where in the airport they were. “Sheesh!” said the male at last, pointing to the red dot and the words ‘You are here’ in the key beside the map: “We’re way over here, right off the map!” Jenann Ismael’s understanding of red dots lies very much at the other extreme, but self-location – the task that couple were engaged in, however haplessly – is the unifying th…Read more
  •  243
    Why ‘Not’?
    Mind 99 (394): 221-238. 1990.
  •  180
    Expressivism for Two Voices
    In Pragmatism, Science and Naturalism , Peter Lang. pp. 87-113. 2011.
    I discuss the relationship between the two forms of expressivism defended by Robert Brandom, on one hand, and philosophers in the Humean tradition, such as Simon Blackburn and Allan Gibbard, on the other. I identify three apparent points of difference between the two programs, but argue that all three are superficial. Both projects benefit from the insights of the other, and the combination is in a natural sense a global expressivism