Ian Duckles

The main thesis of my dissertation is that Kierkegaard's category of "the ethical" is an analogue for Kantian morality. Consequently, Kierkegaard's criticisms of the ethical can profitably be read as criticisms of Kant. Kierkegaard's objection to Kant is two-fold. First, he argues that Kant's account suffers from a 'foundational gap' in that morality is unable to find what it will count as a rational foundation for its norms. This foundational gap is a product of Kant's 'strong responsibility requirement'; the claim that an individual is only bound by the principles to which she chooses to give motivational efficacy. The second criticism is that because of the foundational gap, morality must make reference to religious concepts that are ultimately destructive of the central presuppositions of morality. ;I begin with an examination of Kant's Reciprocity Thesis---the claim that morality and freedom reciprocally imply each other. I argue for an existentialist reading of this thesis, which holds that a free individual ought to submit to moral norms because this is the only way to give an authentic expression of her freedom. Using the strong responsibility requirement, I argue that one can't give a reason in favor of morality because in choosing to allow moral norms to be authoritative the individual is at the same time choosing what will count for him as a reason. ;In subsequent chapters I explore how this foundational gap manifests itself in Kant's claim that morality leads inevitably to religion, concluding with Kant's claim that a commitment to morality requires divine aid to assist the moral agent in satisfying the demands of morality. This violates Kant's strong responsibility requirement, and thus calls Kant's conception of morality into question. ;The final chapters turn to an examination of Kierkegaard, and argue that his investigation of the category of the ethical can also be seen as an investigation of Kantian morality. I conclude by arguing that for Kierkegaard the foundational gap can only be resolved by abandoning the attempt to ground moral norms in reason, and instead ground them in the personal relationship an individual cultivates with God

Among Kierkegaard scholars, there is a great deal of concern regarding how to deal with Alasdair MacIntyre’s treatment of Kierkegaard in his seminal work After Virtue. In this essay, I attempt to defend MacIntyre’s claim that the choice articulated in Kierkegaard’s Either/Or is irrational through a close reading of an essay from a later work by Kierkegaard, Stages on Life’s Way. In so doing, I argue that though MacIntyre’s interpretation of the position articulated in Either/Or is essentially correct, he is mistaken to attribute that position, articulated by a pseudonym, to Kierkegaard. Instead, I argue that Kierkegaard should be seen as strategically employing that position to level a criticism against a certain rationalist tradition in ethics embodied by fi gures as diverse as Kant, Rousseau, and Diderot.