•  85
    On cognitive and biological neuroscience
    Mind and Language 13 (1): 110-131. 1998.
    Many philosophers and neuroscientists defend a view we express with the slogan that mental science is neuroscience. We argue that there are two ways of interpreting this view, depending on what is meant by ‘neuroscience’. On one interpretation, the view is that mental science is cognitive neuroscience, where this is the science that integrates psychology with the biology of the brain. On another interpretation, the view is that mental science is biological neuroscience, where this is the investi…Read more
  •  13
    The Limits of Ecological Psychology
    with Anna Garr, Susan Curry, Jim Engle-Warnick, Paul Fedoroff, Natasha Knack, and Rebekah Ranger
    American Journal of Bioethics Neuroscience 4 (2): 21-22. 2013.
  •  10
    From Brain Image to the Bush Doctrine: Critical Neuroscience and the Political Uses of Neurotechnology
    with Suparna Choudhury and Laurence J. Kirmayer
    American Journal of Bioethics Neuroscience 1 (2): 17-19. 2010.
  •  13
    Neuroscience as Cultural Intervention: Reconfiguring the Self as Moral Agent
    with Laurence J. Kirmayer
    American Journal of Bioethics Neuroscience 1 (4): 53-55. 2010.
  •  6
    Introduction. There is substantial evidence that patients with delusions exhibit a reasoning bias—known as the “jumping to conclusions” bias—which leads them to accept hypotheses as correct on the basis of less evidence than controls. We address three questions concerning the JTC bias that require clarification. Firstly, what is the best measure of the JTC bias? Second, is the JTC bias correlated specifically with delusions, or only with the symptomatology of schizophrenia? And third, is the bia…Read more
  • Color and Other Illusions: A Philosophical Theory of Vision
    Dissertation, Princeton University. 1993.
    In this work I explore the question of whether visual perception produces knowledge, or correct representations, of the external world. I argue that it does not, and that the way the world looks is rather a function of the properties of perceivers. I also argue, however, that it is not necessary for perceivers to have correct representations of the environment. The common sense view that the purpose of vision is to make acquaintance with the environment possible is mistaken. This conception of t…Read more
  •  68
    On Lewis on naming the colours
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy 77 (3): 365-370. 1999.
    This Article does not have an abstract
  •  873
    The concept of the receptive field, first articulated by Hartline, is central to visual neuroscience. The receptive field of a neuron encompasses the spatial and temporal properties of stimuli that activate the neuron, and, as Hubel and Wiesel conceived of it, a neuron’s receptive field is static. This makes it possible to build models of neural circuits and to build up more complex receptive fields out of simpler ones. Recent work in visual neurophysiology is providing evidence that the classic…Read more
  •  88
    Rationality and schizophrenic delusion
    Mind and Language 15 (1): 146-167. 2000.
    The theory of rationality has traditionally been concerned with the investigation of the norms of rational thought and behaviour, and with the reasoning procedures that satisfy them. As a consequence, the investigation of irrationality has largely been restricted to the behaviour or thought that violates these norms. There are, however, other forms of irrationality. Here we propose that the delusions that occur in schizophrenia constitute a paradigm of irrationality. We examine a leading theory …Read more
  •  78
  •  35
  •  72
    Spatial location in color vision
    Consciousness and Cognition 10 (1): 59-62. 2001.
    Ross argues that the location problem for color-the problem of how it is represented as occupying a particular location in space-constitutes an objection to color subjectivism. There are two ways in which the location problem can be interpreted. First, it can be read as a why-question about the relation of visual experience to the environment represented: Why does visual experience represent a patch of color as located in this part of space rather than that? On this interpretation, the subjectiv…Read more
  •  10
    Does natural law have non-normative foundations?
    Sophia 41 (1): 1-17. 2002.
    This paper addresses one aspect of the natural law theory of Germain Grisez. According to Grisez, practical reason identifies the goods of human life prior to the invocation of any moral or normative notions. It can thus provide a non-normative foundation for moral theory. I present Grisez’s position and argue that the apparently non-normative aspect of natural law cannot support the moral position built upon it. I argue, in particular, that practical principles, as Grisez understands them, are …Read more
  •  45
    The evolution of color vision
    Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (4): 671-671. 2001.
    It is argued that color constancy is only one of the benefits of color vision and probably not the most important one. Attention to a different benefit, chromatic contrast, suggests that the features of the environment that played a role in the evolution of color vision are properties of particular ecological niches rather than properties of naturally-occurring illumination. [Shepard].
  •  58
    Interpreting the neuroscience of imagery
    Behavioral and Brain Sciences 25 (2): 190-191. 2002.
    Pylyshyn rightly argues that the neuroscientific data supporting the involvement of the visual system in mental imagery is largely irrelevant to the question of the format of imagistic representation. The purpose of this commentary is to support this claim with a further argument.
  •  18
    Phenomenal qualities and intermodal perception
    In Hugh Clapin, Phillip Staines & Peter Slezak (eds.), Representation in Mind, Elsevier. pp. 1--125. 2004.