•  17
    Random Discussion Leader in the Philosophy Classroom
    with Kristi Straus, José M. Guzmán, and Ariane Gauvreau
    Teaching Philosophy 46 (4): 531-557. 2023.
    Teaching through discussion is perhaps the most fundamental pedagogical technique of philosophy. When done well, discussion can promote long-term, durable learning. It supports an active-learning classroom, sparks higher-order cognition, and helps students construct their own understanding of the material. Yet it is often not done well: it is easily dominated by a few students; it can waste time on tangents and minutiae; it can fail to motivate students to prepare adequately; and it is not easil…Read more
  •  15
    This is the first collection of essays exclusively devoted to knowledge from non-knowledge and related issues. It features original contributions from some of the most prominent and up-and-coming scholars working in contemporary epistemology. There is a nascent literature in epistemology about the possibility of inferential knowledge based on premises that are, for one reason or another, not known. The essays in this book explore if and how epistemology can accommodate cases where knowledge is g…Read more
  •  14
    On Alien and On Film
    Film and Philosophy 23 114-135. 2019.
  •  162
  •  15
    Bactrians and Dromedaries
    Teaching Philosophy 40 (4): 463-481. 2017.
    In this paper I develop a version of Bloom’s taxonomy applicable to philosophy, and I use it to create a tool for categorizing the Bloom level of assessment items in formal logic classes. I then show how to use the tool to improve the alignment of teaching and assessment in one’s courses. Alignment means we are assessing students on what we are actually teaching them. One dimension of alignment is cognitive levels, such as lower-level factual knowledge or higher-level critical reasoning skills. …Read more
  •  112
    Basic factive perceptual reasons
    Philosophical Studies 173 (4): 1103-1118. 2016.
    Many epistemologists have recently defended views on which all evidence is true or perceptual reasons are facts. On such views a common account of basic perceptual reasons is that the fact that one sees that p is one’s reason for believing that p. I argue that that account is wrong; rather, in the basic case the fact that p itself is one’s reason for believing that p. I show that my proposal is better motivated, solves a fundamental objection that the received view faces, and illuminates the nat…Read more
  • Reid: Knowledge and Morality
    Philosophical Forum 42 (3): 311-312. 2011.
  •  844
    There Is No Knowledge From Falsehood
    Episteme 12 (1): 53-74. 2015.
    A growing number of authors defend putative examples of knowledge from falsehood (KFF), inferential knowledge based in a critical or essential way on false premises, and they argue that KFF has important implications for many areas of epistemology (whether evidence can be false, the Gettier debate, defeasibility theories of knowledge, etc.). I argue, however, that there is no KFF, because in any supposed example either the falsehood does not contribute to the knowledge or the subject lacks know…Read more