Ignace Haaz

Between practical ethics, which seeks to define a wide range of ethical norms and ways of ethical reasoning on firm philosophical basis, including the definition of the foundation of ethics, and business ethics, environmental ethics or health ethics the difference is only about the degree we get to apply practically ethics. The Business Ethics Center of Corvinus University of Budapest, lead by Prof. Laszlo Zsolnai, takes all these levels very seriously. The external observer who would want to review the activities of the Center would immediately get in trouble if all that he would expect is either great theories on practical ethics, or only concrete observations on how, in some precise context, ethics is applied by economic science professionals. Indeed, as we shall review, the 30 Years Report of the Business Ethics Center of Corvinus University Budapest presents the most important conferences and workshops that they organized, describes significant books they published, and summarizes the main findings of their decades-long research. Crucially, the functioning of the Center is based on the conviction that ethics is a relevant aspect of all levels of economic activity, from individual and organizational to societal and global. Business ethics is practiced by the Center as an action-oriented, interdisciplinary scientific inquiry where normative and descriptive elements are intermingled.

As a child we all admired the sparkling desert crystal sand grains of the sandglass, and while they slowly, silently rolled down, occasionally, we started dreaming, after having turned it very carefully, watching the grains taking different directions, as the sand was suddenly starting to dance! While the sunlight reflected on the even flow of crystal grains, imagination soared far, into the actual deserts, desert ships, camels, into the fantasy worlds… It was good to dream, freely, realistically, or with a free imagination. As in the sandglass time moments are overlapping, never simply a passing of time as bidirectional succession of points. The duration of the present suggests a radical experience of the hic et Nunc. The sandglass gives us also about five minutes to figure out the right order of our experience. It is both short as an aphorism, both long enough to captures some real perfection and harmony in the world. In our dialogue we tried to crystallize a few central ethical notions, such as an ethical evolution in time, captured by the allegory of the sandglass, which opens not only the imagination but also challenges the decision-maker: “Now quick, take the right decision, I give you five minutes!”

Obiora F. Ike’s impressive amount of research texts on ethics can be found on Globethics.net Library. In general, there is no need to search for a justification of a life work and commitment to values, when a person reaches beyond a certain level of experience in life, in any field of professional work, even more in spiritual and ethical development. In the following lines I shall focus on the value of the common good for a person who not only had precise notions about a philosophical and theological concept, but taught by the example, believing integrity matters and integral development can be a life-long mission and altruistic commitment, even if life can be either simple or complicate.

In philosophical literature, the complex emotional state of ressentiment gained popularity through the writings of Friedrich Nietzsche. According to Nietzsche, ressentiment was a bad feeling that reflected the suppressed anger, the pain of impotence, and the general misery of the weak when they compared themselves to the strong and talented members of society. Max Scheler took up Nietzsche’s thesis and described ressentiment as a complex condition characterised by a thirst for revenge. Moreover, ressentiment has the annoying property of presenting itself as having some merit: the modern social and political context offers more than enough examples. First, the aim of this article is to take a closer look at Nietzsche’s ‘man of ressentiment,’ an odious personality characterised by weakness, deep frustrations, and hypocrisy. It will turn out that ressentiment has many different shades that paint a somewhat different picture and raise philosophical questions about positive valuation, vulnerability, and the sense of injustice. Second, we shall be working on the link between the psychology of ressentiment and the temptation to lack integrity in writing, art, or science. The well-described and well-known fact that academic fraudsters evolve in disguise, that they first reactively endorse values very different from their own values, and that these plagiarist authors, second, embark on long-term projects repeating their misdeeds and errors, as if it were normal, are two facts worthy of our attention.

Le contexte des prisons africaines offre amplement matière à revisiter l’idée classique de l’inutilité de certaines criminalisations. Dans un monde plus que jamais dominé par le spectacle des châtiments et des modèles de justice expéditives, il est bienvenu de replacer le rôle de l’éducation dans la prison, puisque tout détenu emprisonné, aussi démuni et à plaindre soit-il, est riche de son temps, et capable de résilience et de perfectionnement. Encore faut-il, sous peine de paraître très idéaliste, dessiner de manière convaincante les lignes directrices de la rédemption par la formation et les études dans le cadre de la prison. Les prisons ne sont pas des mouroirs, tel est le leitmotiv de l’entretien passionnant entre sept spécialistes des prisons dans l’enceinte de la prison de Libreville et le truchement de l’œuvre de Diangitukwa et de Siadous.

The role of an academic editor and publisher is not simple. It is even less so when providing guidance and support for authors from the countries of the majority world becomes a habitual condition of this activity. Editorial commitment in this context becomes ambivalent, as it has to be oriented towards meeting two distinct objectives: ensuring academic quality and providing support to authors. To meet this challenge the publisher hopes to make the most of online tools and networks. If some scholarly work fails to be published, it raises the question whether authors would benefit from mentorship to improve their texts and thereby meet with international academic standards. The publisher cannot entirely compensate for the weakness of the research work, but should seek to mitigate it.

This publication articulated in three parts, and twelve chapters endeavours to engage with the complex negative emotions and consequent phenomenon of self-deceit, radicalisation and extremism. First part: Emotions as Lines of Demarcation or Guidelines to Our Self. The Psychodynamic Surrounding of our Intentional Self; second part: Case Studies of Some Concrete Societal Encapsulations of the Negative Passions; and third part: Resisting the Colonisation of Tyrannical Affections. Possible Paths of Mitigating Radicalisation and Extremism. What kind of educational responses can be given to extremist claims of territory, identity, resources, power, and interpretations? How can a dialogue on unifying ethical principles and values aid in developing common grounds for preventing radical and extremist excesses? With authors from three continents, this publication endeavours to not only ask the uncomfortable questions with regard to the exteriorisation of human emotive predispositions and inclinations to ostracize, stigmatise and discriminate. The exit door from the extreme is also clearly presented, through four contributions, notably the interplay of Charvaka philosophy, Sikh wisdom on balanced forms of engagement with strong emotions.

The value of up-hill skiing is double, it is first a sport and artistic expression, second it incorporates functional dependencies related to the natural obstacles which the individual aims to overcome. On the artistic side, M. Dufrenne shows the importance of living movement in dance, and we can compare puppets with dancers in order to grasp the lack of intentional spiritual qualities in the former. The expressivity of dance, as for, Chi Gong, ice skating or ski mountaineering is a particular innocence and lightness which is called grace. It is life without the burden of worries. Grace, in slow progression uphill on snow, is as dance for Dufrenne, it has the most central and specific aesthetical quality of life. Others compared dance to a landscape, a landscape is for the sight, what dance is for life, a symbolical space, different from a usual space, where utility and dependency are present. A mountain can be a space of experience of natural beauty. Aesthetical qualities can be closely related to function related qualities as when a climber needs to adjust his movements to the natural convex inclination of the rocks, and avoid slippery forms of inclination, present on the other side of the mountain. The natural object, the quality of the snow or the rock differ from the aesthetical quality of the style of ascent by the absence of neutralization of the object, in case of a purely instrumental approach. On the contrary, grace in the rhythm of the progression of ski climbers needs a difference of attitude, which is not only proper to the playing, and delimited by the conditions of that play, but as a contingency driven attitude, without signification as radical alterity, without any finality. First ascent of the Matterhorn succeeded from the Swiss side, and not from the Italian side because of the different inclination of the rock on both sides. Grace in dance as in martial art or mountaineering is allowing to perceive an autonomy of the expression, as the truth of the perceived object, it puts away a cognitive and practical orientation and replaces it by a new meaning as movement in the whole set of movements done by the climber. This replacement of the functional expression resembles that operated by the painter who chooses a color in the whole set of colors in a painting, or a shape in the whole set of possible existing shapes. Ref. Dufrenne, Mikel, (1989): The Phenomenology of Aesthetic Experience. Studies in Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy, trans. by Edward S. Casey, 1st publ. in 1953, Evanston: Northwestern University Press.

It is commonly believed that considering nature different from us, human beings (qua rational, cultural, religious and social actors), is detrimental to our engagement for the preservation of nature. An obvious example is animal rights, a deep concern for all living beings, including non-human living creatures, which is understandable only if we approach nature, without fearing it, as something which should remain outside of our true home. “Walking with the earth” aims at questioning any similar preconceptions in the wide sense, including allegoric-poetic contributions. We invited 14 authors from 4 continents to express all sorts of ways of saying why caring is so important, why togetherness, being-with each others, as a spiritual but also embodied ethics is important in a divided world.

This chapter as the whole book are a result of a Globethics conference in March 2018 at the Catholic University of East Africa (CUEA) in Kenya, focused on the integration of Ethics in Higher Education. The book captures the potential for sharing of knowledge, and triggering interdisciplinary collaboration and research across a wide variety of issues ranging from research practice, religion, entrepreneurship, leadership, fundraising and corruption. While some of the chapters focus on the understanding of ethics and its relationship with the various other aspects of life, others concentrate on the methods and strategies of effectively teaching ethics. Our chapter is concerned by the ways research practices and the value of integrity might be at risk, in very limited situations. We have good hope that responsible answers and proportionate reason-based actions in confronting some of these risks - as with plagiarism - can protect the giving virtues necessary for dynamical and effective research processes, which are all ultimately built on the value of trust.

The fear of the largely unknown consequences of being exposed to coronavirus should have brought a more dynamic interplay of beliefs and opinions for those who in the footsteps of J.S. Mill believe that the limits of power, which can be legitimately exercised by society over the individual, is to prevent harm to others. It is surprising that not much debate or critical interaction has taken place on the choice of locking down most of the populace in 185 countries after the outbreak of COVID-19. The general lockdown, instead of testing and isolating the sick, can be seen as ‘a gross usurpation upon the liberty of private life.’ The axiological and ethical question confronting philosophers relates to the type and degree of authority needed during this period. As Mill claims, no general basic liberties can be respected overall without some previous and gradual evolution, that is, before other more specific liberties have met sustainable social practice. This essay reviews some of the problematic situations highlighting that no society is free or can achieve the objective of a fairly pluralistic set of values without a given social practice of these values, and shows how this logic of spreading of values unfolds in the context of the Coronavirus crisis.

In many universities and related knowledge transmission organisations, professional focus on empirical data shows as in vocational education that preparation for real life technical work is important, as one would expect from “career education”. University is as the name shows on the contrary focusing on the universality of some sort of education, which is neither a technical one, nor much concerned by preparing oneself for a career. The scope of this chapter is to propose an analysis of inclusion as the very essence of an ethics of reformation of education, which in our opinion cannot come from the institution of education as much as from a common basis between everyday learning capacities and curriculum based learning methods. Inclusive vision and values should be theoretically explained by philosophers in order to be refined and adapted into our current experience of values, pointing out issues about method and knowledge parameters. In particular a focus on epistemic values should bring good indications on how to empower others, and leave a more inclusive life, assuming the somehow paradoxical and surprising idea that knowledge is as important in real life outside the university as it is in the classroom, being the real universal value and currency across disciplines, times and contexts. University learns from being inclusive, i. e. by bringing not only a higher point of view on technical education but also a wider view on the human being.

This book aims at six important conceptual tools developed by philosophers. The author develops each particular view in a chapter, hoping to constitute at the end a concise, interesting and easily readable whole. These concepts are: 1. Ethics and realism: elucidation of the distinction between understanding and explanation – the lighthouse type of normativity. 2. Leadership, antirealism and moral psychology – the lightning rod type of normativity. 3. Bright light on self-identity and positive reciprocity – the reciprocity type of normativity. 4. The virtue of generosity and its importance for inclusive education – the divine will type of normativity. 5. Ethical education as normative philosophical perspective. The normativity of self-transformation in education. 6. Aesthetics as expression of human freedom and concern for the whole world in which we live.

Criminal law exists in order to punish people for their culpable misconducts, whenever there is a culpable wrong one should criminalize and punish. A distinctive moral voice: the criminal wrong that we don’t find beyond is revealed and any normative ethical enquiry should point out, as a specific axiological and moral category related to such evil conducts. Why not suppose an unconscious genesis of it in the sensitive faculties, because there is a constitution of what man is, learned through history? Eduard von Hartmann thinks that the normative role of self-control functions in different moral principles. This is valid also in criminal ethics. Thinking the process what begins to be morally relevant, as morally criminal is presented as “ruse of the conscious will”: pre ethically, by specific psychological drives, and metaphysically by character formation.

An inter-disciplinary enquiry concerning Europe, Europeans and Europeanity across time, based on proceedings of the 10th world congress of the International Society for the Study of European Ideas convened at the University of Malta. Originally published in: Frendo, Henry (2010): The European Mind: Narrative and Identity : Proceedings of the X World Congress of the International Society for the Study of European Ideas, University of Malta, 24th-29th July 2006. International Society for the Study of European Ideas. Malta University Press.

The claim of this paper is to present Spinoza’s view on self-esteem and positive reciprocity, which replaces the human being in a monistic psycho-dynamical affective framework, instead of a dualistic pedestal above nature. Without naturalising the human being in an eliminative materialistic view as many recent neuro-scientific conceptions of the mind do, Spinoza finds an important entry point in a panpsychist and holistic perspective, presenting the complexity of the human being, which is not reducible to the psycho-physiological conditions of life. From a panpsychist point of view, qualities and values emerge from the world, in a situation similar to what could be seen in animism, or early childhood psychology, where the original distance between the mind and the exterior thing is reduced ad minima, and both can even interrelate in a confusing manner. Human reality is nevertheless a social reality, it supposes a basis for shared competencies, that we will present as grounded on the one hand of the sustaining character of the essence of the animal-man as will-to-power. Negatively speaking we all share same asocial tendencies and affects. This aspect is not only negative but it is also a will to develop and master the environment, because values have an onto-metaphysical immanent dimension in nature, not because there is an individual bottom-up will to survive, but rather a will to live in harmony with the surrounding world. On the other hand, we shall see that Spinoza understood and described perfectly the power of the mind over the power of the affects, as a co-constituting dimension, which is alienating natural dependencies, leaving an inner space for the objectification of ethical values, not related to mere compensation mechanisms.

Le présent ouvrage fait suite aux deux précédents volumes de l’auteur : (2015) Droit des affaires en Afrique subsaharienne et économie planétaire, et (2016) : Démocratie électorale en Afrique subsaharienne Entre droit, pouvoir et argent, publiés par les Éditions Globethics. Bien que Pascal Mukonde convoque le thème du contrat du point de vue strictement juridique et dans le contexte du droit africain en RD. Congo, sur une ligne de recherche systématique (p.75), nous souhaitons mentionner comme préliminaire, la place de l’éthique vis-à-vis des concepts juridiques, dans ce livre centré sur la notion de contrat. Le contrat est en effet un concept central dans l’histoire de la philosophie, partagé entre les normes du droit et un type de collaboration politique. Il est intéressant de comparer la valeur éthique du concept de partenariat, dans l’expression « contrat de partenariat », que nous mettons par hypothèse en rapport avec une finalité de développement, car parmi les risques d’un contrat de partenariat, en particulier entre le public et le privé, il n’est pas seulement question de risques économiques : il y a aussi celui éthique de réputation, par exemple lorsqu’il y a corruption des agents (cf. ci-dessous p. 130), c’est-à-dire des obstacles au développement liés au caractère non transparent des pratiques.

In the following text we would like to present the philosophical discussion on untrusting lies, which introduces a space for innocent lie understood as figurative manipulation of the speech: a poetic trope that we would argue could not only be generously used to help us tolerating our sometime deceiving human condition—which is global and universally ours, that of the finitude of human capacity of knowledge and ethical action—but also to maximise our capacity for knowledge formation and adaptation to values. Concepts formation and communication relates to a collective interplay of different interiorized images, before it comes to the exterior in some well-chosen expressions, in self-mastered way; their origin remain in a mentally latent process of selection of content and ideas, as possible solutions of in a games of compatible propositions. These unconscious materials of our life relies on our capacity to identify and quickly switch between different spans, that enable us to focus on complex sets data, all depending very much on figurative manipulations, that should not be confounded with blameworthy and misleading representations.

This book on the topic of ethics and poetry consists of contributions from different continents on the subject of applied ethics related to poetry. It should gather a favourable reception from philosophers, ethicists, theologians and anthropologists from Africa, Asia, Europe and Latin America and allows for a comparison of the healing power of words from various religious, spiritual and philosophical traditions. The first part of this book presents original poems that express ethical emotions and aphorism related to a philosophical questioning of the grounding of our values for life. The poems are written by twelve authors coming from four continents, for whom poetic emotions are sources of artistic inspiration and that can be used for conflict resolution. In the second part, which features short essays, nine authors tackle how poems, symbolic representations, metaphorical narratives and lies impact the space of possibilities, in which we are moved to action, knowledge formation, and how we imagine the world together.

Part of education as interactive exercise is related to a community of practitioners, a dialogue based philosophy of morals which supposes ethical normative characteristics of the discourse. This normative layer can be interpreted either in relation to the lifeworld, i. e. to the understanding of the good life. Alternatively, it can be realized in relation to some cultural rights, since a mutual recognition based ethics, aiming at highlighting culture as necessary feature of human dignity, can explain an ultimate goal of higher education as global and universal education. Since the whole set of human rights should be seen as an indivisible system of basic limits to individual and collective freedom, a right based approach would be the other main perspective, certainly relevant in the context of the African continent, as it is worldwide. Furthermore a right based understanding is a much ignored aspect of human rights, although intimately related to basic interests of the higher education system from either the point of view of the national education systems, or as private universities and it is also related to non-governmental organisations understanding of the general aim of higher education development, where international organizations could help in the implementation of these cultural rights based good practices. In the first section we first develop briefly a normative ethical model of education based on the transformative model of the ethics of discourse compared to other possible classical models based on merit, then we will present cultural rights, reminding us some aspects of cultural rights related to higher education, and address the relevance for the African context of a contextual reflection on these rights.

Selon une psychologie empiriste, aucune vie mentale inconsciente n'existe ; la conscience devrait être vue comme intérieure au sujet. Au contraire, la psychologie idéaliste soutient une philosophie de l'inconscient (et non pas de l'inconscience). La multiplicité et la finalité ne sont pas représentables comme des produits de l'évolution ou du destin des individus ; notre image du monde est conscience du monde. Nietzsche (1874), le premier, réagit contre cette thèse ; il y voit un tourbillon de consciences étroites : "l'homme historique qui se laisse transformer en miroir historique." La psychologie idéaliste tendrait-elle vers une idolâtrie de l'histoire ? Il nous semble qu'une éthique et une philosophie sociale idéalistes, bâties sur les principes du droit, aident à former des hypothèses plausibles, notamment celle d'une solidarité inconsciente. L'expérience moniste d'unité entre notre représentation et notre volonté peut plaider pour une compréhension du monde sur le terrain de valeurs axiologiques, sans maladie historique. Elle explique une soif universelle de culture et de religion. Réexaminons l'utilité et l'inconvénient d'élargir la reconnaissance réciproque des sujets, vers un don de soi au monde.

Avant de peser les limites du pouvoir politique, l'auteur développe la thèse selon laquelle une société humaine doit réfléchir sur l'instance qui devrait être considérée comme souveraine. La réflexion sur le rapport entre puissance politique et puissance juridique est dérivée. Si le pouvoir politique constituait seul l'attribut de la souveraineté, alors les règles de la société seraient toujours bien faites. Dans une société idéale la seule force directrice des règles suffit sans force coercitive.

The latest news from our planet is threatening: climate change, pollution, forest loss, species extinctions. All these words are frightening and there is no sign of improvement. Simple logic leads to the conclusion that humanity has to react, for its own survival. But at the scale of a human being, it is less obvious. Organizing one’s daily life in order to preserve the environment implies self-questioning, changing habits, sacrificing some comfort. In one word, it is an effort. Then, what justifies such an effort? The personal choice to act in order to preserve our environment is often made by simple altruism. This choice is based on our love for other human beings: our love for the others grounds our effort. Our moral values, our ethical reflections and our religious beliefs are the deep core of these choices. “This is my commandment, that you love one another as I have loved you.” (John 15.12 NRSV). This Charter shows the moral and religious values that can help us react regarding the current environmental crisis and it should empower us to transcend the ideas of effort and sacrifice in order to consider the respect of the shared house, in a prophetic fulfillment of the being.

Solidarity could be defined in the broad sense either as a means or as an end. Considered as an end, solidarity is the motive of any virtuous action based on altruistic reasons, such as helping others to rescue someone in order to prevent a harmful situation. E. g. contributing to lift and rescue a heavy person, lying unconscious in the street on the floor, who is being handled by rescuers, but who might be needing an additional person, could express the value of solidarity as an end, since an answer to others request for help is given in the situation of emergency and risk, without having a particular obligation to help. Solidarity as a means (to an end, not an end), could be understood as a property of dependency of a set of parts to a whole (in solidum), as when in a family or a professional group, individual and collective roles and responsibilities are melt together to some extent.This idea of benefiting others could be understood either as a way of sharing together moral sentiments as love, social virtues as friendship and shared commitments and common economic and educational interests, in a limited community circle, that of the family. Even if the division of labour is not simply based on patriarchal authority, mutual consent of family members to rules and to a common circle of interests, those of the family, resemble to a egoism of the group, and not yet to truly social and altruistic values. Solidarity as cohesion of human beings, by the means of "interchangeability of ideas, services, goods, of workforce, virtues and vices", is solidarity limited to the constitution of a process of exchange that is a means that could be used to different ends.

Le modèle de la justice comme équité est élaboré sur des éléments centraux (en particulier: le consentement éclairé des citoyens). Les fonctions de ce modèle chez Rawls sont: un accord rationnel autour de libertés individuelles, un principe raisonnable de maximisation de la stabilité sociale et la fondation de principes, acceptables du point de vue des personnes défavorisées. Notre objectif consiste à mettre à l'épreuve une semblable conception de la justice politique libérale, avec sa composante la moins libérale : la balance à partir de laquelle il est bon de punir. Constatant que la criminalisation est l'intrusion la plus importante de l'Etat dans la sphère autonome de l'individu, l'éthique ausculte les principes normatifs du droit pénal. Justifier une peine amène à des finalités de rétribution et de prévention, qui sont véhiculées par la signification de " punir ". Notre méthode se veut une pesée éthique de la signification des idées et des mots ; notre objectif général est une discussion de ce qu'est une évaluation normative par des principes et des règles. Notre approche de Rawls consiste à repositionner le cadre de ce qui peut être légitimement interdit, face à la liberté discrétionnaire de l'individu.

L'éthique classique hérite avec Diogène de Sinope de l'idée maîtresse de simplicité, dont l'individu peut faire l'expérience dans l'existence, et dont la jarre est le symbole. L'école cynique, dont Diogène est le représentant, enseigne une pratique de l'absence de souffrance (apathia), caractérisitique d'une simplicité déterminée par la contrainte ou acquise par l'exercice volontaire de l'abandon de certains traits propres à notre identité locale, de ce qui nous entraîne à nous abuser nous-mêmes, et donc à nous décevoir sur le long terme; c'est une réflexion et un engagement personnel vers une utopie, où nous nous attacherions à l'essentiel dans la vie. Ce qui est simple pour moi, devrait l'être aussi pour autrui, ce qui ne veut pas dire qu'il ne faille pas faire un effort pour réaliser une vie bonne, puisque l'homme est traversé par des désirs et des besoins, ceci depuis l'enfance. Nietzsche parle de Diogène comme d'un premier cosmopolite et bon Européen, puisque le cynique a saisi certaines composantes éthiques classiques de base, qui traverseront l'histoire des éthiques ultérieures non seulement de la Grèce et de la Macédoine, mais préfigurant une ligne directrice de l'éthique chrétienne, ayant des accents d'une sagesse hindoue et bouddhiste ancienne de l'Orient.