Inga Nayding

Yablo argued that some metaphors are representationally essential: they enable us to express contents that we would not be able to express without them. He defended a fictionalist view of mathematical language by making the case that it similarly serves as a representational aid. Against this, Colyvan argued that metaphorical/figurative language can never play an essential role in explanation and that mathematical language often does, hence concluding that Yablo’s fictionalism is untenable. I show that Colyvan’s thesis about explanation is highly implausible in the absence of a challenge to Yablo’s position on representationally essential metaphors, which Colyvan does not attempt. I also briefly discuss other attempts to produce a simple knock-out argument against fictionalism and show them wanting.

Two recent arguments purport to find a new and firmer foundation for evidentialism in the very nature of the concept of belief. Evidentialism is claimed to be a conceptual truth about belief, and pragmatism to be ruled out, conceptually. But can the conclusion of such conceptual arguments be regarded as the denial of pragmatism? The pragmatist traditionally conceived belief through its motivational role. Therefore, when confronted with conceptual evidentialism, the pragmatist should cede the term ‘belief,’ but insist that pragmatism be understood as a claim about another attitude, a motivational duplicate of belief. Thus, the original dispute is simply relocated terminologically

Fictionalists claim that instead of believing certain controversial propositions they accept them nonseriously, as useful make-believe. In this way they present themselves as having an austere ontology despite the apparent ontological commitments of their discourse. Some philosophers object that this plays on a distinction without a difference: the fictionalist’s would-be nonserious acceptance is the most we can do for the relevant content acceptance-wise, hence such acceptance is no different from what we ordinarily call ‘belief’ and should be so called. They conclude that it is subject to the norms applicable to paradigmatic empirical beliefs, and hence, pace fictionalists, ontological commitments must be taken seriously. I disentangle three strands in the objector’s thought: the ‘What more can you ask for?’ intuition, a linguistic/ conceptual claim, and a claim about norms. I argue that the former two are compatible with ontological deflationism, and therefore do not entail applicability of the norms. Nevertheless, if indeed there is no more robust acceptance with which to contrast the supposed nonserious acceptance, then the fictionalist’s claim to austere ontology must be abandoned. Is there a reason to suppose there is any merit to the distinction-without-a-difference charge? I argue that there is, clarify it, and defend against objections, focusing on Daly 2008.

This thesis aims to challenge the position of a philosopher who thinks that claiming to have a "fictionalist attitude" towards, for example, mathematics, allows him, under certain conditions, both to maintain that mathematics is not true and to use it as one ordinarily would, without offering a paraphrase for it or regarding it as mere symbol-manipulation. The motivation for this position runs along the following lines. Mathematics purports to refer to numbers. Positing existence of such entities is deemed undesirable. Nevertheless, abandoning mathematics altogether is not feasible, and giving a metaphysically attractive paraphrase---exceedingly difficult. Although the proponent of this position is aware of the potential charge of "doublethink" associated with similar views, he does not see his account as vulnerable insofar it satisfies certain conditions. ;The problem presented in this dissertation for such an approach is intended to be quite general. Although we talk mainly about numbers, it is simply for ease of exposition. ;First of all, it can't be too easy to claim to not believe a given content---this can't be a philosopher's ticket to the kind of wholesale scepticism that appears to simply shift the meanings of the words. In order to avoid that, however, one is obliged to give an account of the avowed "fictionalist attitude" which would make it clear that this attitude couldn't simply replace belief more or less across the board. In facing this challenge, one finds that while the contrast between this attitude and genuine belief is easy to account for in a range of familiar cases, still, in cases of philosophical interest , it becomes difficult to make sense of the contrast. To substantiate these claims, a number of tentative accounts are considered, and it is shown that for each one there comes a point when the contrast "collapses". In light of that discussion it becomes prima facie plausible to suppose that there simply is no contrast to be drawn for, e.g. , one's attitude to numbers. The implications of this are very briefly considered in the final chapter