Ingrid Robeyns

Este trabajo propone una visión, llamada limitarismo, que sugiere que debería haber límites máximos a la cantidad de ingresos y riqueza que una persona puede tener. Un argumento a favor del limitarismo es que la superriqueza puede socavar la igualdad política. La otra razón es que sería mejor si el dinero excedente que los hogares superricos retienen para sí fuera utilizado para enfrentar necesidades urgentes insatisfechas y problemas de acción colectiva tanto locales como globales. Un ejemplo particularmente urgente de estos últimos es el cambio climático. El trabajo analiza una objeción al limitarismo y extrae algunas conclusiones para la sociedad, así como para el paradigma del desarrollo humano y el enfoque de las capacidades. Publicado originalmente como: "What, if Anything, is Wrong with Extreme Wealth?" (2019), Journal of Human Development and Capabilities, 20(3), 251-266. DOI: 10.1080/19452829.2019.1633734. Publicado con la autorización de la autora. J. C. del Arco (Trad.), J. Elgarte (Rev. Téc.).

'Tener demasiado' es el primer volumen académico dedicado al limitarismo: la idea de que el uso de los recursos económicos o de los ecosistemas no sobrepasen ciertos límites. Se trata de un concepto profundamente arraigado en el pensamiento económico y político, por lo que es posible encontrar premisas similares en pensadores como Platón, Aquino o Spinoza. No obstante, 'Tener demasiado' es el primer ejemplar en el campo de la filosofía política contemporánea en el que el limitarismo se explora en profundidad y con detalle. Asimismo, este estudio reúne por primera vez los mejores escritos de los principales teóricos del limitarismo, lo que le convierte en una contribución esencial al campo de la filosofía política, en general, y de las teorías sobre la justicia distributiva, en particular. Incluye tanto artículos seminales ya publicados como nuevos capítulos y se presenta como lectura indispensable para académicos y estudiantes de teoría política y filosofía, así como para todos aquellos interesados en cuestiones relacionadas con la justicia distributiva.

Having Too Much is the first academic volume devoted to limitarianism: the idea that the use of economic or ecosystem resources should not exceed certain limits. This concept has deep roots in economic and political thought. One can find similar statements of such limits in thinkers such as Plato, Aquinas, and Spinoza. But Having Too Much is the first time in contemporary political philosophy that limitarianism is explored at length and in detail. Bringing together in one place the best writing from key theorists of limitarianism, this book is an essential contribution to political philosophy in general, and theories of distributive justice in particular. Including some of the key published articles as well as new chapters, Having Too Much is necessary reading for scholars and students of political theory and philosophy, as well as anyone interested in questions of distributive justice.

In this paper we provide a critical discussion of how the most progressive parental leave policies are doing with respect to three goods which we identify as essential for liberal egalitarian feminists interested in parental leaves: the good of parental care, the good of gender fairness, and the good of individual choice. Then we offer our own model, based on the power of defaults, which promotes the goods of parental care and gender justice by sacrificing as little as possible of the good of individual choice.

The complexities of how justice comes to be realized, and by which agents, is a relatively neglected element in contemporary theories of justice. This has left several crucial questions about agency and justice undertheorized, such as why some particular agents are responsible for realizing justice, how their contribution towards realizing justice should be understood, and what role agents such as activists and community leaders play in realizing justice. We aim to contribute towards a better understanding of the landscape of these kinds of questions. First, we argue that theorists should distinguish between (i) agents who are responsible for realizing justice, but not committed to it, (ii) agents who are not responsible for realizing justice, but who are committed to it, and (iii) agents who are both responsible for and committed to realizing justice. Second, we discuss how to incorporate agents of justice more robustly into theorizing about justice.

The diagnosis of autism is on the rise. Autistic people, parents, professionals, and policy makers alike face important questions about the right approach toward autism. For example, there are questions about the desirability of early detection, the role and consequences of underlying cognitive theories, and whether autism is a disorder to be treated or an identity to be respected. How does the fact that autism is a heterogeneous concept affect the answers to these questions? Who has the authority or knowledge to speak on behalf of people with autism? In this paper, we describe a cluster of research topics which should be on the agenda of the emerging field of autism ethics. These topics include the very concept of autism itself, the question whether autism is primarily an identity or a disorder, the ethical questions that parents of autistic children face, metaethical questions, the ethical consequences of epistemological questions, and a cluster of questions related to social justice, stigma, and paternalism.

We explore the desirability of an idea that has not received the attention it deserves by political philosophers: that governments should bring privately-owned fossil fuel companies into public ownership with a view to managing their wind-down in the public interest – often simply referred to as ‘nationalising the fossil fuel industry’. We aim to make a conditional case for public ownership of fossil fuel companies. We will assume certain conditions about government motivations and capacities that are similar to assumptions made generally in the philosophical and economic analysis of climate policies: that the government is suitably motivated, has effective control over the companies it acquires, and is able to sustain this motivation and control for long-enough to wind-down acquired companies in the public interest. We argue that bringing fossil fuel companies into public ownership, under these conditions, allows the government to take ten actions that are in the public interest, which will enhance social justice, enable a fair division of burdens and benefits, and strengthen democracy. We consider four plausible objections. While some of these point to the need for further research, they do not undermine our claim that nationalising the fossil fuel industry is a policy option that merits serious consideration.

An Upper Limit on Wealth? Should (extreme) wealth be seen as an undesirable situation? This question is called for by a number of social developments, but also from theories of justice in political philosophy and from economic ethics. Answering this question requires first and foremost a proper conceptualisation of wealth. In this paper, I propose such a conceptualisation. In addition, two reasons are advocated for an upper limit on wealth, and possible objections are investigated. The paper ends with some suggestions for future philosophical research on an upper limit on wealth.

An Upper Limit on Wealth? Should (extreme) wealth be seen as an undesirable situation? This question is called for by a number of social developments, but also from theories of justice in political philosophy and from economic ethics. Answering this question requires first and foremost a proper conceptualisation of wealth. In this paper, I propose such a conceptualisation. In addition, two reasons are advocated for an upper limit on wealth, and possible objections are investigated. The paper ends with some suggestions for future philosophical research on an upper limit on wealth.

In the philosophy of well-being, there is hardly anything written on the lives of people with autism or on the question whether existing philosophical theories of well-being are suited for understanding how well the lives of autistic persons are going. This paper tries to make some progress towards filling this gap. I start by giving a concise account of autism, which highlights the huge heterogeneity among autistics. I discuss some basic features of autism, ask whether there are good reasons why we would need an account of well-being specifically for autistics and what philosophical well-being research could learn from being informed by autistic experiences and phenomenology. I then investigate to what extent the capability approach gives us a helpful theory of well-being for autistics, and what looking through an autism-lens can contribute to the further development of the capabilitarian well-being. In particular, I show that some capabilities that are crucially relevant for autistics are also relevant for the lives of non-autistic people. The final part of the paper looks at an important difficulty in using the capabilitarian account of well-being for autistics, namely: should the normative focus be on achievements (functionings) or real opportunities (capabilities)?

Two of the most important theories in contemporary liberal egalitarianism are Ronald Dworkin’s equality of resources and Amartya Sen’s capability approach. Recently Dworkin has claimed that Sen’s capability approach does not provide a genuine alternative to equality of resources. In this article, we provide both an internal and an external critique of Dworkin’s claim. In the first part of the article we develop an internal critique by providing a detailed analysis of Dworkin’s claim. Andrew Williams has contested Dworkin’s claim, but he has failed to convince Dworkin of his objections. We analyze this debate, and offer an argument that, we hope, settles this dispute. In the second part of the article we argue that an analysis beyond the current parameters of the liberal-egalitarian debate points to three significant differences between Dworkin’s and Sen’s egalitarian theories: the degree to which they rely on an ideal-theoretical approach; their ability to judge social structures that are intertwined with people’s social endowments; and their endorsement of a well-defined criterion to demarcate morally relevant from morally irrelevant inequalities. This broader analysis not only reinforces our conclusion that Dworkin’s equality of resources and Sen’s capability approach are genuinely distinct, but it also suggests some more general insights that may be relevant for a better understanding of contemporary egalitarian thinking.