Inkeri Koskinen

In the social epistemology of scientific knowledge, it is largely accepted that relationships of trust, not just reliance, are necessary in contemporary collaborative science characterised by relationships of opaque epistemic dependence. Such relationships of trust are taken to be possible only between agents who can be held accountable for their actions. But today, knowledge production in many fields makes use of AI applications that are epistemically opaque in an essential manner. This creates a problem for the social epistemology of scientific knowledge, as scientists are now epistemically dependent on AI applications that are not agents, and therefore not appropriate candidates for trust.

In bringing together a global community of philosophers, Global Epistemologies and Philosophies of Science develops novel perspectives on epistemology and philosophy of science by demonstrating how frameworks from academic philosophy (e.g. standpoint theory, social epistemology, feminist philosophy of science) and related fields (e.g. decolonial studies, transdisciplinarity, global history of science) can contribute to critical engagement with global dimensions of knowledge and science. Global challenges such as climate change, food production, and infectious diseases raise complex questions about scientific knowledge production and its interactions with local knowledge systems and social realities. As academic philosophy provides relatively little reflection on global negotiations of knowledge, many pressing scientific and societal issues remain disconnected from core debates in epistemology and philosophy of science. This book is an invitation to broaden agendas of academic philosophy by presenting epistemology and philosophy of science as globally engaged fields that address heterogeneous forms of knowledge production and their interactions with local livelihoods, practices, and worldviews. This integrative ambition makes the book equally relevant for philosophers and interdisciplinary scholars who are concerned with methodological and political challenges at the intersection of science and society.

In this introduction to the Topical Collection on Social and Cognitive Diversity in Science, we map the questions that have guided social epistemological approaches to diversity in science. Both social and cognitive diversity of different types is claimed to be epistemically beneficial. The challenge is to understand how an increase in a group’s diversity can bring about epistemic benefits and whether there are limits beyond which diversity can no longer improve a group’s epistemic performance. The contributions to the Topical Collection discuss various proposals to maintain an appropriate amount of cognitive diversity in science, for instance, by recruiting and retaining practitioners from underrepresented social groups, providing incentives for explorative and risky research, encouraging interdisciplinary collaborations and stakeholder participation in research, requiring industry scientists to share their evidence, and developing strategies to encounter politically motivated attempts to manufacture doubt. To be successful, efforts to promote diversity in science should anticipate risks related to institutional interventions, navigate trade-offs between different types of epistemically good outcomes, and identify hidden costs that such policies may cause for various actors. Such efforts need to be assessed not only from an epistemic perspective but also from the point of view of fairness and the political legitimacy of scientific institutions.

Research collaborations beyond the boundaries of science—such as transdisciplinary, participatory or co-research projects—usually aim at increasing the societal impact of the research conducted. In the literature discussing such collaborations, as well as in science policy endorsing them, it is generally assumed that the wanted societal impact is achieved through exchange that contributes to knowledge production and to the results of the research. However, collaboration beyond the boundaries of science can help a research project reach its societal impact goals even if it does not contribute to the epistemic outcomes of the project at all. Instead, other kinds of contributions from the extra-academic partners, and what the extra-academic partners receive from the collaboration, can be crucial. Recognizing this helps us to better understand existing practices, and to identify potentially interesting forms of collaboration beyond the boundaries of science.

Philosophers of science have in recent years presented arguments in favour of increasing cognitive diversity, diversity of social locations, and diversity of values and interests in science. Some of these arguments align with important aims in contemporary science policy. The policy aims have led to the development of institutional measures and instruments that are supposed to increase diversity in science and in the governance of science. The links between the philosophical arguments and the institutional measures have not gone unnoticed. Philosophers have even explicitly suggested that institutional measures could be used to increase diversity in science. But philosophical criticisms of the existing institutional instruments have also been presented. Here I review some recent case studies in which philosophers examine actual attempts to increase diversity in science by using institutional measures implemented from the top down—attempts that have failed in one way or another. These studies examine attempts to involve citizens or stakeholders in the governance of science and technology and attempts to increase the number of interdisciplinary collaborations. They draw attention to the limitations of such instruments, calling into question the most optimistic visions of using institutional instruments to increase diversity in science.

Many philosophers of science have recently argued that extra-academic participation in scientific knowledge production does not threaten scientific objectivity. Quite the contrary: citizen science, participatory projects, transdisciplinary research, and other similar endeavours can even increase the objectivity of the research conducted. Simultaneously, researchers working in fields where such participation is common have expressed worries about various ways in which it can result in biases. In this paper I clarify how these arguments and worries can be compared, and how extra-academic participation can both increase and threaten the objectivity of the research conducted.

Mitä tiedollista hyötyä tieteilijöille voi olla tutkimusyhteistyöstä taiteilijoiden kanssa? Taiteilijoiden kanssa työskennelleet tieteilijät usein kyllä pitävät kokemusta kiehtovana, mutta sen hyötyjen tarkka kuvaaminen vaikuttaa vaikealta. Monialaisen yhteistyön odotetaan usein lisäävän tutkimuksen yhteiskunnallista vaikuttavuutta, mutta odotus ei sovellu juuri tieteilijöiden ja taiteilijoiden yhteistyöhön kovinkaan hyvin. Selkeytän sosiaalisessa epistemologiassa ja feministisessä tieteenfilosofiassa esitettyjen ajatusten ja argumenttien sekä kahden tapausesimerkin avulla tapoja, joilla tieteilijöiden yhteistyö taiteilijoiden kanssa voi olla tiedollisesti hedelmällistä. Taiteen ja taiteellisen tutkimuksen keinoin voi joskus tuottaa tietoa. Tiedollisesti tärkeämpänä pidän kuitenkin sitä, miten taide voi tarjota huomaamatta jääneitä näkökulmia sekä tutkimuskohteeseen että tutkimuksen tekemisen tapaan, ja tiedollisesti hyödyllistä kritiikkiä.

The idea that in order to be objective, research should be value-free, has recently been questioned in philosophy of science. I concentrate on two senses of objectivity, detached objectivity and interactive objectivity that do not require value-freedom. I use each of these to assess a young, strongly value-laden and overtly political discipline: indigenous studies. It has been criticised as relativistic and essentialistic, and in consequence, as not objective in the detached sense of objectivity, as values are used in place of evidence. When addressing these critiques, I compare contemporary Sámi IS to early Finnish folkloristics. The interactive objectivity of the Sámi IS research community is increasing, and outside criticism is being taken into account. As a result, the detached objectivity of the conducted research has also increased.

In this paper I discuss and develop the risk account of scientific objectivity, which I have recently introduced, contrasting it to some alternatives. I then use the account in order to analyse a practice that is relatively common in anthropology, in the history of science, and in the sociology of scientific knowledge: withholding epistemic judgement. I argue that withholding epistemic judgement on the beliefs one is studying can be a relatively efficient strategy against collective bias in these fields. However, taking into account the criticisms presented against the strategy, I also argue that it is a usable strategy only when the distance between the researchers and their ideas, and the people and ideas being studied, is significant enough.

Sustainability science seeks to extend scientific investigation into domains characterized by a distinct problem-solving agenda, physical and social complexity, and complex moral and ethical landscapes. In this endeavor it arguably pushes scientific investigation beyond its usual comfort zones, raising fundamental issues about how best to structure such investigation. Philosophers of science have long scrutinized the structure of science and scientific practices, and the conditions under which they operate effectively. We propose a critical engagement between sustainability scientists and philosophers of science with respect to how to engage in scientific activity in these complex domains. We identify specific issues philosophers of science raise concerning current sustainability science and the contributions philosophers can make to resolving them. In conclusion we reflect on the steps philosophers of science could take to advance sustainability science.

Whereas much of the literature in the social epistemology of scientific knowledge has focused either on scientific communities or research groups, we examine the epistemic significance of scientific/intellectual movements (SIMs). We argue that certain types of SIMs can play an important epistemic role in science: they can remedy epistemic injus- tices in scientific practices. SIMs can counteract epistemic injustices effectively because many forms of epistemic injustice require structural and not merely individual remedies. To illustrate our argument, we discuss the case of indigenous studies.

The kind of epistemic relativism usually refuted by its critics is less frequently observable in ethnographic research practices than the critics assume. Instead, methodological conceptual relativism can be recognized in several cases. This has significant practical implications, since the kind of epistemic relativism described by its critics, if rigorously followed, could lead to ethnographers conflating ways of argumentation accepted by their informants, with ways of argumentation accepted in academia, whereas methodological conceptual relativism does not have such consequences

This article focuses on epistemic challenges related to the democratisation of scientific knowledge production, and to the limitations of current social accounts of objectivity. A process of ’democratisation’ can be observed in many scientific and academic fields today. Collaboration with extra-academic agents and the use of extra-academic expertise and knowledge has become common, and researchers are interested in promoting socially inclusive research practices. As this development is particularly prevalent in policy-relevant research, it is important that the new, more democratic forms of research be objective. In social accounts of objectivity only epistemic communities are taken to be able to produce objective knowledge, or the entity whose objectivity is to be assessed is precisely such a community. As I argue, these accounts do not allow for situations where it is not easy to identify the relevant epistemic community. Democratisation of scientific knowledge production can lead to such situations. As an example, I discuss attempts to link indigenous oral traditions to floods and tsunamis that happened hundreds or even thousands of years ago.

The paper looks at challenges related to the ideas of integration and knowledge systems in extra-academic transdisciplinarity. Philosophers of science are only starting to pay attention to the increasingly common practice of introducing extra-academic perspectives or engaging extra-academic parties in academic knowledge production. So far the rather scant philosophical discussion on the subject has mainly concentrated on the question whether such engagement is beneficial in science or not. Meanwhile, there is quite a large and growing literature on extra-academic TD, mostly authored by non-philosophers, seeking to develop TD research practices. We examine this literature in the light of recent discussions in pluralist philosophies of science. Some philosophical pluralists see the increase of extra-academic collaboration and participation in science as a potentially positive development. However, certain views promoted in the non-philosophical literature on extra-academic TD appear problematic in the light of the pluralistic discussions. For instance, the literature on TD appears to be overly optimistic with regard to integration, and the notion of knowledge systems used in it is problematic. We believe it would be worthwhile for scientific pluralists sympathetic to the aims of TD to look more closely into the complex settings in which extra-academic collaboration and participation happens in actual TD projects, and to offer constructive criticisms, exploiting insights developed within pluralist philosophy of science.

When discussing scientific objectivity, many philosophers of science have recently focused on accounts that can be applied in practice when assessing the objectivity of something. It has become clear that in different contexts, objectivity is realized in different ways, and the many senses of objectivity recognized in the recent literature seem to be conceptually distinct. I argue that these diverse ‘applicable’ senses of scientific objectivity have more in common than has thus far been recognized. I combine arguments from philosophical discussions of trust, from negative accounts of objectivity, and from the recent literature on epistemic risks. When we call X objective, we endorse it: we say that we rely on X, and that others should do so too. But the word ‘objective’ is reserved for a specific type of reliance: it is based on the belief that important epistemic risks arising from our imperfections as epistemic agents have been effectively averted. All the positive senses of objectivity identify either some risk of this type, or some efficient strategy for averting one or more such risks.

Participatory research in anthropology attempts to turn informants into collaborators, even colleagues. Researchers generally accept the idea of different knowledge systems, and the practice of avoiding critical appraisal of alien knowledge systems, common in ethnography, is continued within participatory research. However, if the aim of participatory research is to turn informants into collaborators, or ideally colleagues, the ethical imperative of offering constructive criticism to colleagues should apply to them, too, even if they are seen as representing different knowledge systems than the researchers. Avoiding appraisal of alien knowledge systems is problematic when the knowledge systems of the researcher and the researched are in constant contact.