Iris Vidmar Jovanović

One of the most contentious question in today’s discussions on the educational policies concerns the role and values of the humanities in contemporary society and education. Many see the humanities as empty, unnecessary, inefficient, phony and worthless. This paper offers a rundown of arguments adduced to support this view, followed by an overview of Helen Small’s The Value of the Humanities, which offers an exceptionally critical and insightful analysis into the current debate over the value of the humanities. The paper ends by emphasizing further the need to recognize the contribution that the humanities make to the production of knowledge and enhancement of the quality of life, as well as to the much needed sense of purpose and meaning.

Big philosophical questions—about the mind, the idea of the good, justice, beauty, knowledge—have been the prime interest of philosophers ever since Plato first raised them in his dialogues. However, regardless of how hard philosophers have been trying to find answers to them, it seems that all they have ever managed to do was to find reasons for disagreements, and, on the whole, to have failed to reach a consensus on pretty much anything. Some philosophers now claim that there hasn’t been much progress in philosophy, especially when compared to the sciences. I take up this verdict and try to refute it, first by offering an alternative view on what counts as progress, and then by analyzing big philosophical questions and their relevance for our intellectual and practical pursuits. I argue that, due to the distinctive nature of philosophical curiosity, coming up with answers to the big philosophical questions is an ideal that can hardly be met, but that philosophy nevertheless delivers various benefits, intellectual and practical, which the proponents of the No-Progress View tend to ignore.

In this paper we want to explore different epistemological benefits that we gain by dealing with some artworks, and our focus is on narrative arts. We claim that there is a sense in which narrative arts can be similar to testimony, in that they provide information which can be epistemologically valuable for cognitive agents such as we are. We identify at least two broad categories of these epistemological benefits, the first one includes ‘facts stating’ and in that sense is parallel to the paradigmatic case of testimony in which what the testifier says can be a source of knowledge as mere acquisition of facts for his audience . This, however, is not the most peculiar and distinctive kind of epistemological benefits we can gain from art. The other one has to do with raising awareness, of deepening our understanding about some issues either by a specific, powerful and involving way of providing us facts , or by presenting us the stance, the attitude, the opinion of the artist that can be enlightening, or challenging for us

U ovom radu želimo istražiti različite epistemološke koristi koje dobivamo putem nekih umjetničkih djela, pri čemu smo primarno usredotočeni na narativne umjetnosti. Tvrdimo da u određenom smislu, narativne umjetnosti mogu biti slične svjedočanstvu, utoliko što pružaju informacije koje mogu biti epistemološki vrijedne za kognitivne djelatnike kakvi smo mi. Razlikujemo barem dvije šire kategorije tih epistemoloških vrijednosti, od kojih prva uključuje ‘navođenje činjenica’ i u tom je smislu pandan paradigmatskom slučaju svjedočanstva u kojem ono što informator govori može biti izvor znanja za publiku koja time naprosto dobiva činjenice . Međutim, to nije najsvojstvenija i najznačajnija vrsta epistemoloških vrijednosti koje dobijemo iz umjetnosti. Druga kategorija tiče se povećavanja svijesti ili produbljivanja razumijevanja o nekom fenomenu, koji se može odvijati na dva načina: ili pružanjem činjenica na specifično snažan i prožimalački način , ili prezentiranjem stajališta, stava ili mišljenja umjetnika koji nam može biti prosvjetljujući ili pak predstavljati izazov našem stajalištu

Stanislaw Lem, Philosopher of the Future is a revealing and instructive guide to the philosophical fiction of Stanislaw Lem. Throughout the book, Swirski builds a framework of philosophical and scientific concepts within which Lem’s works should be read, in particular its most significant aspect: Lem’s unyielding concern for knowledge supported by his conviction that literature is an epistemologically valuable tool for exploring reality. Swirski offers a rich background to Lem's litrary career and unravels the depths of Lem’s philosophical fiction

This article lies at the intersection of two problems: the one concerning the potential of fictional works to inform us about our social reality and foster our understanding of its various aspects, and the one concerning their potential to engage with philosophical issues. I bring these two together by analyzing the hit television series Law and Order: Special Victims Unit. According to my interpretation, the series is informative about our social world, and it raises philosophical concerns about it. This makes it well-equipped to fulfill the educative function attributed to mass art by Noël Carroll, and to stand out as an example of what he calls popular philosophy. To support this interpretation, I rely on contemporary views regarding the nature of our engagements with fictional narratives. I then explore how philosophical concerns are generated and I elaborate on the role they have in deepening one’s understanding of one’s social circumstances. I further show how the series provides innovative and independent philosophical knowledge by means specific to the medium of generic serialized fiction. The central part of my argument is an analysis of the narrative strategies which enable the informative and philosophical aspects of the series to generate the series’ educative function.

From philosophy of science, epistemology, and ethics to political philosophy and philosophy of mathematics, Philip Kitcher has made outstanding contributions to every philosophical discipline. With Deaths in Venice: The Cases of Gustav von Aschenbach, he continues his journey into philosophy of literature he undertook back in 2007 with his book Joyce’s Kaleidoscope. Written in his clear, precise, and occasionally almost poetic style, Deaths in Venice is not only an inspiring new interpretation of Thomas Mann’s famous novel Death in Venice but also a rich insight into the connection between philosophy and art, that is, literature and music. Original and thought provoking in his treatment of this much discussed...

Dans cet article, nous souhaitons étudier les différents avantages épistémologiques qu’on tire de certains ouvrages artistiques, en nous focalisant sur les arts narratifs. Nous affirmons que, dans un certain sens, les arts narratifs peuvent ressembler au témoignage, dans la mesure où ils fournissent des informations susceptibles d’être épistémologiquement précieuses aux acteurs cognitifs que nous sommes. Nous distinguons au moins deux catégories larges de ces avantages épistémologiques. La première comprend « l’énoncé des faits » et dans ce sens représente le pendant du cas paradigmatique de témoignage où, ce que le témoin dit, peut être source de connaissance pour le public qui de cette manière reçoit simplement les faits . Cependant, cette sorte d’avantage épistémologique n’est pas la plus originale ou la plus pertinente qu’on puisse tirer de l’art. L’autre catégorie concerne l’accroissement de la conscience ou l’approfondissement de la compréhension de certains phénomènes, soit en rapportant les faits d’une façon spécifique, puissante et engageante , soit en présentant la position, l’attitude ou l’opinion de l’artiste, qui puissent nous être révélateurs ou provocateurs

In diesem Paper möchten wir den unterschiedlichen epistemologischen Vorzügen auf den Grund gehen, die wir in der Arbeit mit einigen Kunstwerken erlangen, wobei unser Schwerpunkt in der narrativen Kunst liegt. Wir behaupten, die narrativen Künste könnten in gewissem Sinne dem Zeugnis ähneln, insofern sie Informationen besorgten, die epistemologisch wertvoll für kognitive Agenten wie uns seien. Wir identifizieren zumindest zwei breite Kategorien dieser epistemologischen Vorzüge, die Erste schließt „Tatsachenangaben“ ein und ist in diesem Sinne vergleichbar mit dem paradigmatischen Fall des Zeugnisses, wo die Aussagen des Zeugen als Wissensquelle, als bloße Faktenaneignung für sein Publikum zu dienen vermögen . Dies dagegen ist nicht die eigenartigste und distinktivste Art der epistemologischen Werte, die uns die Kunst verschafft. Die andere hat es mit der Bewusstseinssteigerung sowie Verständnisvertiefung bezüglich gewisser Fragestellungen zu tun, entweder durch spezifische, kraftvolle und involvierende Art der Tatsachenvermittlung , oder eben durch die Präsentierung der Haltung, Einstellung oder Ansicht des Künstlers, welche sich für uns als erhellend oder herausfordernd herausschälen könnten

U suvremene rasprave o svjedočanstvu C. A. J. Coady uveo je pojam patologije. Radi se o stanovitim otklonima od normalnih slučajeva svjedočenja zbog kojih epistemička vrijednost takvih iskaza postaje dvojbena. Temeljem Coadyjeve analize komunikacijskih akata pokušale smo identificirati uvjete ne-patološkog svjedočanstva kako bismo propitale može li se fikcija smatrati svjedočanstvom. U članku argumentiramo u prilog stava da je moguće govoriti o fikcijskom svjedočanstvu jer praksa fikcije ne krši postavljene uvjete epistemičke odgovornosti govornika/autora; proizvodi epistemičku korist za čitatelja koja predstavlja legitimni epistemički cilj

In this paper I address Jerome Stolnitz’s famous article “On the cognitive triviality of art,” with the aim of defending aesthetic and literary cognitivism against the charges Stolnitz issues at it therein. My defence of literary cognitivism is grounded in contemporary epistemology, which, I argue, is more embracive of cognitive values of literature traditionally invoked by literary cognitivists. My discussion is structured against Stolnitz’s individual arguments, dedicated in particular to the problem of literary truth. After exploring what such notion might amount to, I move on to address the problems of applicability and triviality of literary truths, and I end by defending literature as a cognitively valuable social practice.

Poetry and philosophy have had a long and convoluted relation, characterized often by mutual antipathy and rarely by mutual acknowledgment and respect. Plato was one influential philosopher who trashed poetry’s capacities to trade in the domain of truth and knowledge, but it was J. L. Austin who blew the final whistle by dismissing it as non-serious. And while for many poets that was an invitation to dismiss Austin, for many philosophers that was a confirmation of the overall discomfort they had already felt with respect to poetry. Just how wrong both parties were in this standoff is revealed in the latest book by Maximilian De Gaynesford, The Rift in the Lute: Attuning Poetry and Philosophy, which calls for a dismissal of the separation of the two and for their mutual cooperation. In this paper, we look at De Gaynesford’s proposal, mostly praising its strong points and occasionally raising doubts regarding its success.