•  1
    Rationality, Prediction, and Autonomous Choice
    Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Supplementary Volume 19 339-363. 1993.
    Principles of rationality are invoked for several purposes: they are often deployed in explanation and prediction; they are also used to set standards for rational health for deliberating agents or to furnish blueprints for rational automata; and they are intended as guides to perplexed decision makers seeking to regulate their own attitudes and conduct. These purposes are quite different. It is far from obvious that what serves well in one capacity will do so in another. Indeed, I shall argue l…Read more
  •  45
    The anti- Humean proposal of constructing desire as belief about what would be good must be abandoned on pain of triviality. Our central result shows that if an agent's belief- desire state is represented by Jeffrey's expected value theory enriched with the Desire as Belief Thesis (DAB), then, provided that three pairwise inconsistent propositions receive non- zero probability, the agent must view with indifference any proposition whose probability is greater than zero. Unlike previous results a…Read more
  •  104
    Undercutting and the Ramsey test for conditionals
    Synthese 101 (2): 157-169. 1994.
    There is an important class of conditionals whose assertibility conditions are not given by the Ramsey test but by an inductive extension of that test. Such inductive Ramsey conditionals fail to satisfy some of the core properties of plain conditionals. Associated principles of nonmonotonic inference should not be assumed to hold generally if interpretations in terms of induction or appeals to total evidence are not to be ruled out
  •  30
    In Memoriam
    with Arthur C. Danto, Bernard Berofsky, and Charles D. Parsons
    Journal of Philosophy 100 (5): 272-272. 2003.
  •  37
    In memoriam: James J. Walsh
    with Arthur C. Danto, Bernard Berofsky, and Charles D. Parsons
    Journal of Philosophy 100 (5). 2003.
  •  21
    Foreword
    Journal of Philosophy 109 (8-9): 469-469. 2012.
  •  4
    Dissonance and Consistency according to Shackle and Shafer
    PSA Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1978 (2): 466-477. 1978.
    R.A.Fisher introduced the fiducial argument as a means for obtaining something from nothing. He thought that on some occasions it was legitimate to obtain a posterior probability distribution over a range of simple statistical hypotheses without commitment to a prior distribution [4].H.Jeffreys thought he could tame Fisher by casting his argument in a Bayesian mold through a derivation of the fiducial posterior from a suitably constructed ignorance prior via Bayes’ theorem and conditionalization…Read more
  •  2
    Critical Notice: Patrick Suppes' Probabilistic Metaphysics
    Philosophy of Science 55 (4): 646-652. 1988.
    In the introduction to Probabilistic Metaphysics, Patrick Suppes declares his intention to refute each of five central tenets of “neotraditional metaphysics”. These tenets run as follows:The future is determined by the past.Every event has a sufficient determinant cause.Knowledge must be grounded in certainty.Scientific knowledge can in principle be made complete.Scientific knowledge and method can in principle be unified.
  •  7
    Statistical and Inductive Probabilities (review)
    Journal of Philosophy 60 (1): 21-25. 1963.
  •  8
    Probabilistic Metaphysics
    Philosophy of Science 55 (4): 646-652. 1988.
    In the introduction to Probabilistic Metaphysics, Patrick Suppes declares his intention to refute each of five central tenets of “neotraditional metaphysics”. These tenets run as follows:The future is determined by the past.Every event has a sufficient determinant cause.Knowledge must be grounded in certainty.Scientific knowledge can in principle be made complete.Scientific knowledge and method can in principle be unified.
  •  139
    Making it Explicit
    Journal of Philosophy 93 (3): 145. 1996.
  •  15
    Epistemology and Inference
    Noûs 20 (3): 417. 1986.
  •  80
    The Foundations of Causal Decision Theory
    Journal of Philosophy 97 (7): 387. 2000.
  •  9
    The Logic of Consistency and the Logic of Truth
    Dialectica 58 (4): 461-482. 2004.
    In “Truth and Probability” Ramsey claimed that the logic of consistency for probability is not a logic of truth. After supporting this claim, he proceeded to explore the possibilities for a logic of truth for probability. An examination of Ramsey's intent reveals that Ramsey was far from being an orthodox Bayesian when it comes to statistical reasoning. The relations between Ramsey's thought and the ideas of Keynes and Peirce are discussed.
  •  22
    Three-Valued Logic
    with Hilary Putnam and Paul Feyerabend
    Journal of Symbolic Logic 25 (3): 289-291. 1960.
  •  6
    Meeting of the Association for Symbolic Logic
    with Jaakko Hintikka and Karel de Bouvère
    Journal of Symbolic Logic 35 (1): 179-185. 1970.
  • Abduction and demands for information
    In Ilkka Niiniluoto & Raimo Tuomela (eds.), The Logic and epistemology of scientific change, North-holland Pub. Co.. pp. 30--405. 1979.
  •  12
    A Paradox for the Birds
    In R. S. Cohen, P. K. Feyerabend & M. Wartofsky (eds.), Essays in Memory of Imre Lakatos, Reidel. pp. 371--378. 1976.
  • Is a miss as good as a mile
    In Sami Pihlström, Panu Raatikainen & Matti Sintonen (eds.), Approaching truth: essays in honour of Ilkka Niiniluoto, College Publications. pp. 209--223. 2007.
  •  9
    Meeting of the Association for Symbolic Logic
    with Jaakko Hintikka and Karel de Bouvère
    Journal of Symbolic Logic 35 (1). 1970.
  •  27
    Reviews (review)
    with B. Juhos
    Synthese 20 (1): 143-153. 1969.
  •  3
    Review: Inclusive Rationality (review)
    Journal of Philosophy 101 (5). 2004.
  •  40
    Gambling with truth
    MIT Press. 1967.
    This comprehensive discussion of the problem of rational belief develops the subject on the pattern of Bayesian decision theory. The analogy with decision theory introduces philosophical issues not usually encountered in logical studies and suggests some promising new approaches to old problems."We owe Professor Levi a debt of gratitude for producing a book of such excellence. His own approach to inductive inference is not only original and profound, it also clarifies and transforms the work of …Read more
  •  63
    Isaac Levi's new book develops further his pioneering work in formal epistemology, focusing on the problem of belief contraction, or how rationally to relinquish old beliefs. Levi offers the most penetrating analysis to date of this key question in epistemology, offering a completely new solution and explaining its relation to his earlier proposals. He mounts an argument in favor of the thesis that contracting a state of belief by giving up specific beliefs is to be evaluated in terms of the val…Read more
  •  40
    Conflict and social agency
    Journal of Philosophy 79 (5): 231-247. 1982.