•  321
    Probability kinematics
    British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 18 (3): 197-209. 1967.
  •  295
    On indeterminate probabilities
    Journal of Philosophy 71 (13): 391-418. 1974.
  •  258
    Pareto unanimity and consensus
    Journal of Philosophy 87 (9): 481-492. 1990.
  •  241
    Confirmational conditionalization
    Journal of Philosophy 75 (12): 730-737. 1978.
  •  232
  •  211
      We present a decision-theoretically motivated notion of contraction which, we claim, encodes the principles of minimal change and entrenchment. Contraction is seen as an operation whose goal is to minimize loses of informational value. The operation is also compatible with the principle that in contracting A one should preserve the sentences better entrenched than A (when the belief set contains A). Even when the principle of minimal change and the latter motivation for entrenchment figure pro…Read more
  •  204
    Kyburg on random designators
    Philosophy of Science 50 (4): 635-642. 1983.
    To ground judgments of credal probability on knowledge of chance via direct inference, one should appeal to the information about chances available relative to the most specific description known to be true of the trial event.Thus, to obtain a judgment of credal probability concerning the hypothesis that coin a landed heads at t given that it is known that at t it is known that a was tossed by Levi in 728 Philosophy Hall, the pertinent knowledge of chances concerns the chances of coin a landing …Read more
  •  174
    This major work challenges some widely held positions in epistemology - those of Peirce and Popper on the one hand and those of Quine and Kuhn on the other.
  •  162
    This comprehensive discussion of the problem of rational belief develops the subject on the pattern of Bayesian decision theory. The analogy with decision theory introduces philosophical issues not usually encountered in logical studies and suggests some promising new approaches to old problems."We owe Professor Levi a debt of gratitude for producing a book of such excellence. His own approach to inductive inference is not only original and profound, it also clarifies and transforms the work of …Read more
  •  139
    Making it Explicit
    Journal of Philosophy 93 (3): 145. 1996.
  •  134
    Direct inference
    Journal of Philosophy 74 (1): 5-29. 1977.
  •  110
    The Paradoxes of Allais and Ellsberg
    Economics and Philosophy 2 (1): 23. 1986.
    In The Enterprise of Knowledge, I proposed a general theory of rational choice which I intended as a characterization of a prescriptive theory of ideal rationality. A cardinal tenet of this theory is that assessments of expected value or expected utility in the Bayesian sense may not be representable by a numerical indicator or indeed induce an ordering of feasible options in a context of deliberation. My reasons for taking this position are related to my commitment to the inquiry-oriented appro…Read more
  •  109
    The Demons of Decision
    The Monist 70 (2): 193-211. 1987.
    For three centuries, philosophers have mounted defenses against the melan genie with an obsessive intensity comparable to the Reaganite determination to squander American wealth on defenses against a Communist threat. And for three centuries, skeptics have argued for the futility of the expenditure of conceptual effort with no more success than critics of the Pentagon have had in stemming the flow of funds to the military and its industrial minions. My own sympathies are with the skeptics. Howev…Read more
  •  104
    Undercutting and the Ramsey test for conditionals
    Synthese 101 (2): 157-169. 1994.
    There is an important class of conditionals whose assertibility conditions are not given by the Ramsey test but by an inductive extension of that test. Such inductive Ramsey conditionals fail to satisfy some of the core properties of plain conditionals. Associated principles of nonmonotonic inference should not be assumed to hold generally if interpretations in terms of induction or appeals to total evidence are not to be ruled out
  •  104
    Imprecision and indeterminacy in probability judgment
    Philosophy of Science 52 (3): 390-409. 1985.
    Bayesians often confuse insistence that probability judgment ought to be indeterminate (which is incompatible with Bayesian ideals) with recognition of the presence of imprecision in the determination or measurement of personal probabilities (which is compatible with these ideals). The confusion is discussed and illustrated by remarks in a recent essay by R. C. Jeffrey
  •  101
    Money pumps and diachronic books
    Proceedings of the Philosophy of Science Association 2002 (3). 2002.
    The idea that rational agents should have acyclic preferences and should obey conditionalization has been defended on the grounds that otherwise an agent is threatened with becoming a “money pump.” This essay argues that such arguments fail to prove their claims
  •  100
    Two notions of epistemic validity
    with Horacio Arló Costa
    Synthese 109 (2). 1996.
    How to accept a conditional? F. P. Ramsey proposed the following test in (Ramsey 1990).(RT) If A, then B must be accepted with respect to the current epistemic state iff the minimal hypothetical change of it needed to accept A also requires accepting B.
  •  93
    If Jones only knew more!
    British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 20 (2): 153-159. 1969.
  •  93
    Jaakko Hintikka
    Synthese 140 (1-2). 2004.
  •  88
    Why Rational Agents Should Not Be Liberal Maximizers
    Canadian Journal of Philosophy 38 (S1): 1-17. 2008.
    Hans Herzberger's 1973 essay 'Ordinal Preference and Rational Choice' is a classic milestone in the erosion of the idea that rational agents are maximizers of utility. By the time Herzberger wrote, many authors had replaced this claim with the thesis that rational agents are maximizers of preference. That is to say, it was assumed that at the moment of choice a rational agent has a weak ordering representing his or her preferences among the options available to the agent for choice and that the …Read more
  •  84
    Belief and disposition
    with Sidney Morgenbesser
    American Philosophical Quarterly 1 (3): 221-232. 1964.
  •  82
    Chance
    Philosophical Topics 18 (2): 117-149. 1990.
  •  80
    On the seriousness of mistakes
    Philosophy of Science 29 (1): 47-65. 1962.
    Several authors have recently contended that modern statistical theory provides a powerful argument in favor of the view that if scientists accept or reject hypotheses at all they do so only in a behavioral sense--i.e., in a sense which reduces "accepting P" to "acting on the basis of P relative to an objective O". In this paper, the argument from statistics in favor of a behavioral view is outlined; an interpretation of two statistical procedures (Bayes method and signifigance testing) is offer…Read more
  •  80
    The Foundations of Causal Decision Theory
    Journal of Philosophy 97 (7): 387. 2000.
  •  74
    Possibility and probability
    Erkenntnis 31 (2-3): 365--86. 1989.
    De Finetti was a strong proponent of allowing 0 credal probabilities to be assigned to serious possibilities. I have sought to show that (pace Shimony) strict coherence can be obeyed provided that its scope of applicability is restricted to partitions into states generated by finitely many ultimate payoffs. When countable additivity is obeyed, a restricted version of ISC can be applied to partitions generated by countably many ultimate payoffs. Once this is appreciated, perhaps the compelling ch…Read more